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1. Body ownership and body representation 
Our body may be the object we know the best, and we use it to constantly receive a 
flow of sensory information. People have no difficulty to differentiate their own from any 
other physical body, but what grounds the experience of my body as belonging to me? 
Empirical research on the bodily self has started to investigate relations between the body and 
the self, how the link between a body and the experience of this body as mine is maintained 
and how it can be disturbed. Body-ownership was proposed to refer to a perceptual status of 
one’s own body, which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself, the feeling that “my 
body” belongs to me, and is ever present in my mental life (Gallagher, 2000; De Vignemont, 
2007; Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015; Lenggenhager & Lopez, 2015; 
Botvinick, 2004; Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Serino et al., 2013). 
This experience of body ownership has been assumed to be intimately related to stable 
body representations (Longo, 2015; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005; Kammers, 2008; Tsakiris & 
Fotopoulou, 2008) stored in people’s brain, a reference model of anatomical and structural 
representations of the body, possibly arising from prior experience and innate representations 
that involve more than the mere registration of peripheral inputs. As broadly defined by 
Graziano and Botvinik (2001), body-representations involve the interpretation of peripheral 
inputs in the context of a rich internal model of the body’s structure; body-related percepts are 
not simply correlated, but they are integrated against a set of background conditions that 
preserve the coherence of bodily experience. In a general consideration (Gallagher 2005; 
Paillard 1999), body representation was proposed to contain a body image (Fuentes, Longo, & 
Haggard, 2013; Ramachandran, 1998; Ramachandran et al., 1996), which is considered a 
rather permanent representation of the body’s configuration resulting from conscious 
perception and attitudes towards one’s own body; and a body schema (Holmes & Spence, 
2006; Cardinali et al., 2011), a sensorimotor representation based on afferent and efferent 
information related to bodily movements, which provides a reference frame for the guidance 
of movements.  
Accordingly, our body representation seems to be stable, and considerable time and 
effort would be needed to update it. Interestingly, however, there is increasing evidence that 
body representations can be quite malleable. For example, multisensory experience in some 
experimental paradigms can update or change such representations, as demonstrated in 
experimental paradigms used to investigate the rubber hand illusion (RHI), enfacement 
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illusion (EI), and full body illusion (FBI). Researchers successfully replicated two of these 
illusions in virtual reality environments, as shown by the virtual hand illusion (VHI) and the 
virtual enfacement illusion (VEI). In this thesis, the focus was on RHI, VHI and VEI. Briefly, 
these illusions involve an interaction between body representation and multisensory 
integration and the corresponding paradigms allow the controlled manipulation of the 
experience of body-ownership, which we tried to manipulate and alter. 
2. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) 
The RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) can be used as a method to investigate the way 
we perceive our bodily self, which allows for an external object to be recognized and treated 
as part of one’s body under specific conditions. In the RHI paradigm, participants are asked to 
put their own hand under a desk so that they cannot see it, to keep their hand still, and to 
watch a rubber hand which was put on the desk in fro t of them. Then both the real hidden 
hand and the rubber hand are being stroked synchronously or asynchronously for several 
minutes or even shorter. After the visuotactile stimulation, participants are asked to fill in a 
questionnaire assessing perceived ownership. The results showed that, if the real hand of 
participants and the rubber hand were stroked synchro ously, participants felt not only as if 
they were feeling the touch in the location of the rubber hand, but also they actually perceived 
the rubber hand as their own. In a sense, their tact le sensations were projected onto the rubber 
hand, which was eventually perceived as part of their own body.  
Researchers also used several other, more objective measurements besides the 
subjective questionnaire, such as proprioceptive drift, which indicates that participants 
mislocate the perceived position of their own hand judge the position of their hand to be 
closer to the rubber hand. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) suggested that RHI reflects a three-
way interaction between vision, touch, and proprioception: vision captured touch, resulting in 
a mislocalization of the tactile percept toward the spatial location of the visual percept, and 
this visual-tactile correlation influenced the felt position of one’s own hand, a visual 
adaptation of proprioceptive position. Interestingly, the prevalence of the illusion over time 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and the subjective intensity of the experience of body-ownership 
(Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008) are positively correlated with changes 
in the felt location of the subject’s own hand towards the rubber hand. 
The successful manipulation of body-ownership during the RHI has been 
demonstrated in several replications (e.g., Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson, Spence, & 
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Passingham, 2004; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and modifications of the 
classic paradigm (Crucianelli, Metcalf, Fotopoulou, & Jenkinson, 2013; Kanaya, Matsushima, 
& Yokosawa, 2012; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2009; Zopf, Truong, Finkbeiner, Friedman, & 
Williams, 2011) since the original study (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). A large sample study 
(Longo et al., 2008) investigated the subjective experience during the RHI by asking 
participants to complete a 27-item questionnaire aft r each of the synchronous and 
asynchronous blocks of visuotactile stimulation. The subjective experience of the rubber hand 
consists of several components: ownership, which is t at the rubber hand is a part of one’s 
body; location, which is that the rubber hand and oe’s own hand were in the same place; and 
agency, which is control over the rubber hand. A follow-up study (Longo, Schüür, Kammers, 
Tsakiris, & Haggard, in 2009) investigated the extent o which the experience of ownership 
over the rubber hand may impact on the perceived similar ty between the participant’s own 
hand and the rubber hand. Results showed that objective similarity did not influence 
participants’ experience of the RHI; but participants who experienced the RHI perceived their 
hand and the rubber hand as significantly more similar than participants who did not 
experience the illusion.  
3. The active rubber hand illusion (RHI) and virtual hand illusion (VHI)  
Recent research has studied the role of the kind of match between multisensory 
information about candidate effectors, and provided more sources of multisensory information. 
For example, some studies have focused on active effectors in the kind of action they are 
involved in, which brings together aspects of body wnership and of agency (Hommel, 2015a, 
in press; Hommel & Elsner, 2009) and considered the effect of voluntary control of the rubber 
hand on illusory perception of it (e.g., Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Tsakiris, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2005; Tsakiris, Longo & Haggard, 2010). In 
these active RHI paradigms, researchers manipulated finger or palm movements (of real and 
rubber hand) to investigate the effect of an integrated stimulation (or, more precisely, of the 
combination of self-produced visual, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive action feedback) on 
illusion induction. Some interesting findings for body ownership perception were revealed, 
for example, Tsakiris et al. (2005) argued that effer nt information distinctively contributes to 
self-recognition. And in some other studies, researchers found that RHI could be induced by 
finger or palm movements alone (e.g., Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; 
Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014) without applying the visuotactile stimulation which was used in 
most studies with traditional RHI paradigm. 
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Many studies (e.g., Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Sanchez-
Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010) have shown that the RHI can be 
produced in a virtual environment (VE), as indicated by subjective, behavioral and 
physiological evidence. A VE is a kind of specific environment in which real sensory data are 
replaced by computer-generated data. In a VE the partici nts can be “provided with” a 
virtual body, with different appearance and physical traits. In Slater et al. (2008), the 
researchers investigated the possibility to make virtual limbs feel like the person’s own limbs. 
In their study, the participants were asked to wear passive stereo glasses and stand in front of 
a rear projection screen. The virtual hand in the scr en was seen as projecting out of 
participant’s right shoulder from his point of view, ith her real arm out of view and statically 
resting on a plate. The experimenter stroked the participant’s real hand with a 6-degree 
freedom position tracker which determines the position of a virtual sphere; from the viewpoint 
of the participant, he felt his hand being stroked by a ball, and in the meantime saw a virtual 
ball that synchronously or asynchronously stroked the virtual hand. Questionnaire, 
proprioceptive drift and electromyogram results showed that participants illusorily perceived 
the virtual hand as their own hand. Sanchez-Vives et al. (2010) asked the participant to wear 
stereo glasses and a data glove with his right hand. The virtual arm was displayed on the 
screen in front of the participant. In the synchronous condition, with the data glove, the 
movements and finger position of the virtual hand followed the real hand in real time. 
Questionnaire results, proprioceptive drift showed significant difference between synchronous 
and asynchronous conditions. The conclusion was that multisensory integration between 
visual and proprioceptive information along with activity is enough to induce an illusory 
ownership over a virtual arm.  
In several other studies (Padilla et al., 2010; Yuan & Steed, 2010; Kokkinara & Slater, 
2014; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 2012), the researcher also manipulated the 
visuotactile stimulation, the participant was asked to wear a data glove and an orientation 
tracker through which participants could control the movement of the virtual hand. In the 
experiment, participants were asked to freely move or rotate their real hidden hand to control 
the virtual hand, and also move the virtual hand to touch another virtual object, while feeling 
a vibration on their own hand. Questionnaire, proprioceptive drift and SCR results showed 
that the illusion was successfully induced for the virtual hand. Some other applications in 
virtual reality environments were also conducted ansuggest that the virtual reality technique 
is of great potential in investigating psychological phenomena (Borland, Peck, & Slater, 2013; 
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Kilteni, Bergstrom, & Slater, 2013; Normand et al.,2012; Peña, Hancock, & Merola, 2009; 
Perez-Marcos, Slater, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009; Slater et al., 2006; Slater, 2009; Slater et al., 
2013; Yee & Bailenson, 2006; Ma & Hommel, 2013; Ma & Hommel, 2015a; Ma & Hommel, 
2015b; Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005). 
Besides the RHI and VHI, FBI is also extensively studied, with artificial physical or 
virtual reality techniques. But in this thesis, RHI and VHI are our focus point, so we are not 
going to extensively introduce and discuss FBI. More information can be found in respective 
studies (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Blanke, 2012; 
Guterstam & Ehrsson, 2012; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; Linkenauger, 
Ramenzoni, & Proffitt, 2010; Mancini, Longo, Kammers, & Haggard, 2011; Maselli & Slater, 
2013; Normand, Giannopoulos, Spanlang, & Slater, 2011; Petkova, Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 
2011; Preston & Ehrsson, 2014; Piryankova et al., 2014; Schmalzl & Ehrsson, 2011; 
Schmalzl et al., 2011; van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 2011; van der Hoort & Ehrsson, 
2014; Ehrsson,2007). 
4. The two most often used objective measurements: proprioceptive drift and 
Skin Conductance Responses (SCR) 
In RHI and VHI studies, the felt location of one’s hand drifts towards or away from 
the viewed hand has been shown to be correlated with the sense of body ownership 
(Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Longo et al. 2008), suggesting that proprioceptive drifts can be 
used as a behavioral measurement of ownership, that proprioceptive drifts towards the viewed 
object indicates incorporation and experienced ownership, while proprioceptive drifts away 
from the viewed object indicates failure of incorporation.  
However, proprioceptive drift is not always related o the illusion but also can occur in 
situations in which the subjective illusion is abolished, such as when the rubber hand is 
presented to the participant in the 180 degree rotated position (Holle, McLatchie, Maurer, & 
Ward, 2011) or in an asynchronous condition (Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011). 
Proprioceptive mislocalization can even be observed after only visual exposure to rubber 
hands (Holmes & Spence, 2005; Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006), which suggests that it 
cannot be used as a single measure of the illusion and highlights the necessity of 
complementary measurements to assess the presence of the illusion. 
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Furthermore, difference in proprioceptive drift result  may be due to different 
procedures being used. Different from Botvinick & Cohen (1998; and also Kalckert and 
Ehrsson 2012; Holmes et al. 2006; Heed et al. 2011; Kammers et al. 2010), in which 
participants were asked to point to the position of the index finger of the stimulated hand with 
the other unstimulated hand, Tsakiris et al., (2006) introduced a perceptual judgment approach 
to measure drift, in which participants were instruc ed to judge the position of their finger by 
verbally reporting the ruler number immediately above the center of their fingertip of the 
stimulated hand. In Kammers et al. (2009a, b), the res archers found that perceptual verbal 
reports about felt real hand positions were significantly biased by the illusory ownership, 
while the manual pointing accuracy was not, and preict d that perceptual changes are 
attributable to the body image but not to the body schema. Riemer et al. (2013) found that 
even questionnaire ratings did not show any difference, proprioceptive drift was stronger for 
the active RHI than the classical method, when drift was measured using a manual pointing 
procedure, but not with a perceptual judgment procedure. Overall, the proprioceptive drift 
might be based on different mechanisms and different f ames of reference in these different 
studies, and the cognitive mechanisms may be different for proprioceptive drift and ownership 
illusion perception (Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011). 
SCR is a good predictor of arousal in the autonomic nervous system (ANS). SCR was 
used as a physiological measurement in the RHI/VHI, as it is thought to be not easily biased 
by participants’ voluntarily control to respond to task demands (Armel & Ramachandran, 
2003). In the RHI/VHI, if the fake hand is perceived as one’s own hand, is threatened or 
injured, the anticipation of pain was thought to prduce higher SCR that can be measured. 
SCR was recorded with electrodes from the two positions of the unstimulated hand and 
predicted effect was obtained (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam, Petkova, & 
Ehrsson, 2011; Hägni et al., 2008; Yuan & Steed, 2010; and also see De Vignemont & Singer, 
2006; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2007; Ehrsson, Wiech, Weiskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007; Ocklenburg, Rüther, Peterburs, 
Pinnow, & Güntürkün, 2011). 
However, since SCR is also a reflection of sympathetic activity in the ANS 
(Kahneman, 1973), it seems that in the RHI/VHI the SCR may not only arise from perceived 
ownership for the rubber/virtual hand, but also from some affective resonance which was 
showed when observing other people under threat or in pain. For example, receiving a visual 
signal that a loved one will receive a painful electric shock has been found to activate the 
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same brain areas that are active when being in pain oneself (Singer et al., 2004). Even 
witnessing a stranger being treated with a painful pinprick stimulus activates the same areas 
that are active when receiving such a stimulus oneself (Morrison et al., 2004). Observations of 
that sort have been interpreted as indicating that people do not distinguish much between 
themselves and others if it comes to the representatio  of affect (Keysers, 2011; Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), and the same rgument has been made with respect 
to the actions (Gallese et al., 2004) and personalities (Hommel, Colzato & Van Den 
Wildenberg, 2009) of oneself and of others. These findings seem to imply that we care about 
others even when there is no body ownership. 
So it would be necessary to differentiate the two considerations about SCR results in 
RHI/VHI, for example, under which conditions, the SCR arises mostly because of the illusory 
ownership perception for the rubber hand/virtual hand, and under which conditions, the SCR 
arises mostly because of the affective resonance for the rubber hand/virtual hand. This thesis 
aims to provide an answer to this question. 
5. Bottom-up and top-down accounts of body ownership 
Researchers have started to investigate how a rubber hand can be experienced as part 
of one’s body in the RHI. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) suggested a bottom-up explanation of 
the RHI that emphasized the role of multisensory processing. Intermodal matching between 
vision and touch would be sufficient for self-attribution of the rubber hand, based on the fact 
that RHI occurs with synchronized visual and tactile stimulation but not after asynchronous 
stimulation (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) held a strong version of the Botvinick and Cohen view by 
arguing that visuotactile correlation is both necessary and sufficient condition for the RHI: 
any object can be experienced as a part of one’s body if the appropriate intermodal matching 
is present. In their experiment, after the synchronous visuotactile stimulation period, the 
experimenter “injured” the rubber hand by bending oe f the rubber fingers backwards, SCR 
measured from the subject’s unstimulated hand were significantly higher compared to the 
control asynchronous condition (Armel & Ramachandra, 2003). Similar differences, albeit 
smaller in magnitude, between SCR for synchronous and asynchronous conditions were found 
when participants observed a table, instead of a rubber hand, when a band-aid was pulled 
partly off of the table by experimenter. According to Armel and Ramachandran (2003), both 
the rubber hand and the table, and in principle any other object, can be experienced as part of 
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one’s body, provided that strong visuotactile correlations are present. Therefore, the sense of 
body ownership is the result of a bottom-up mechanism based on strong statistical 
correlations between different sensory modalities, which are both necessary and sufficient for 
body-ownership. 
However, various authors have argued that the processes underlying RHI may be more 
complicated. While the findings of Armel and Ramachandran (2003) are consistent with a 
bottom-up approach, their findings may be due to transfer effects from a previous robber-hand 
condition. Hohwy and Paton (2010) found indeed evidnce for transfer. In one experiment, 
the researchers first stroked a rubber hand and the real hand synchronously to apply the 
visuotactile stimulation, then replaced the rubber hand with a box, and found that the box was 
incorporated into participants’ bodies. In another experiment, the researcher replicated the 
procedure but excluded the prior onset of the basic illusion, which eliminated the illusory 
incorporation of the box. The researchers proposed that prior induction of the basic RHI is 
necessary for perceived ownership for the non-hand object.  
Accumulating evidence suggests that the RHI is not induced when the a neutral non-
corporeal object such as a wooden stick is used instead of a rubber hand (Haans, Ijsselsteijn, 
& de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005, see also 
Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; see also Graziano, Co ke, & Taylor, 2000). Moreover, the 
viewed object should match a visual representation of the tactually stimulated body-part for 
the synchronous visuotactile stimulation to elicit a sense of body-ownership. Even with strong 
statistical correlations between vision and touch, several studies demonstrated severe 
constraints on the RHI induction, such as the visual form of the factor, anatomical and 
postural properties, and spatial distance between ral and rubber hand. These findings, 
contrary to what bottom-up approach predict, suggest that RHI can only be induced for an 
object that is very similar to a real effector. 
In particular, several studies suggested that RHI cannot be induced when the rubber 
hand does not have the same visual form as the real hand (Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris, 
Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008; Holmes et al., 
2006; De Vignemont, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2005). This is the first constraint category. 
The second constraint category is that the rubber hand cannot be perceived as a body 
part if it fails to show the same anatomical and postural properties (Costantini & Haggard, 
2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005, see also Graziano et al., 2000; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 
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2000; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Austen, Soto-Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone, 2004; Ide, 2013), the 
same size (Pavani & Zampini, 2007) and lateral identity (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) as the 
real hand. Costantini and Haggard (2007) adjusted stimulation or posture of the real hand and 
the rubber hand to investigate the effects of directional mismatch between the stimulation of 
the two hands. Their results showed that the RHI can be induced when stimulation of the two 
hands was congruent in a hand-centered spatial referenc  frame. Another anatomical property 
is hand number: given that participants have only oe left/right hand, the rubber hand may be 
perceived as one’s actual hand and thus be perceived to r place the participant’s own hand. A 
study of Moseley et al. (2008) provides direct evidnce that the experience of illusory 
ownership during RHI is also accompanied by significant changes in the temperature of the 
real hand: the skin temperature of the real hand decreased when participants experienced the 
RHI for the rubber hand. 
A third constraint category refers to the spatial refe ence frame (Kalckart & Ehrsson, 
2014; Preston, 2013; Zopf, Savage, & Williams, 2010; Lloyd, 2007), the spatial relations 
between the rubber hand and the participant’s own hand. Lloyd (2007) systematically varied 
the horizontal distance between rubber and real hand, and found that ratings of the RHI 
decreased significantly when the distance exceeded 27.5 cm. Kalckart and Ehrsson (2014) 
used a similar method and varied the vertical distance between rubber and real hand, with 
similar results. Zopf et al., (2010) found no spatial limitations for the rubber hand illusion 
within reaching distances (the peripheral space). Pr ston (2013) argued the key point might 
not be the absolute distance but how far the fake hnd is from both the real hand and the trunk. 
Overall, a location within peripheral space near the real hand and trunk might be another 
necessary condition for illusory ownership. Makin, Holmes, and Ehrsson (2008) put forward 
an account of the RHI based on processes of multisensory integration in peri-hand space 
(Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 2003; Cardinali, Brozzli, & Farnè, 2009; Làdavas, 2002; 
Brozzoli, Gentile, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Brozzoli, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2012; Brozzoli, 
Gentile, Bergouignan, & Ehrsson, 2013; Moseley, Gallace, & Spence, 2012). In their account, 
the RHI occurs when the following two conditions are met: first, the rubber hand should be 
situated in an anatomically plausible position, andsecond, the synchronous visual and tactile 
events should be both located near the visible hand.  
Taken altogether, converging evidence from RHI studies suggests that ownership 
illusion for a rubber hand can only be induced when these constraints are met: correlated 
multisensory stimulation, spatial reference frame, visual from and anatomical and postural 
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properties. Among them, factors other than the mere co relation between synchronized 
multisensory stimulation are considered top-down information originating from a relatively 
stable body representation. 
Table 1. The constraints for body ownership illusion induction found in RHI paradigms 
Constraints 
Temporal Synchronous stimulations 
Spatial 
Location of Rubber Hand far from Real Hand,  
Directions of stroking are congruent in hand-centered spatial reference frame 
Visual form Hand-shaped 
Anatomical 
Identical hand laterality, Size of Rubber Hand, Connected, Number of hands,  
Position of the Rubber Hand is aligned with Real Hand 
 
On the basis of the empirical findings reviewed above, an alternative to this bottom-up 
approach assumes a top-down role played by pre-existing body representations. A 
neurocognitive model of body-ownership proposed by Tsakiris (2010) suggests that a stored 
internal body model modulates the integration of current multisensory input in a top-down 
manner, so that body ownership in the RHI arises from an interaction between bottom-up 
multisensory input and top-down modulation (Tsakiris, 2007; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
In this top-down modulation model, Tsakiris (2010) proposed that three comparisons 
are critical for the induction of the RHI and the exp rience of body-ownership, if one of the 
three comparisons is not fulfilled, the rubber hand will not be perceived as one’s own hand. In 
the first critical comparison, the visual form of the viewed object is compared against a pre-
existing body model that contains a reference description of the visual, anatomical and 
structural properties of the body. In the second critical comparison, the current state of the 
body and the postural and anatomical features of the rubber hand are compared against 
current state in the body model. In the third comparison, the current sensory input is compared 
against the reference frames, including the temporal and spatial reference frame.  
However, while this top-down modulation approach can explain the majority of the 
empirical findings, some studies cannot be explained. There are some indications that do not 
seem to fit with the assumption that ownership illus ons require a tight fit between the rubber 
hand and the internal body model (De Vignemont, 2010a). For example, in Haans et al. 
(2008), RHI was induced for a hand-shaped object with non-natural texture. Longo et al. 
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(2009) showed that differences in skin luminance and hand shape did not influence experience 
of the RHI. Similarly, Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, and Tsakiris (2012) and Maister, Sebanz, 
Knoblich, & Tsakiris (2013) found that the RHI can be induced with a hand of different skin 
color. Even Pavani and Zampini (2007, also see Haggard & Jundi, 2009) found no ownership 
effects for a rubber hand which is smaller than one’s own hand, but when the rubber hand is 
bigger, ownership illusion was found. Schütz-Bosbach, Tausche, and Weiss (2009) and White, 
Davies, Halleen, and Davies (2010) reported that some (in)congruencies between the visual 
and tactile stimulation did not affect the RHI strength (and also see D’Alonzo & Cipriani, 
2012). Giummarra, Georgiou-Karistianis, Nicholls, & Bradshaw (2011), Ehrsson (2009), 
showed that participant can accept an additional hand besides his own two hands (and also see 
Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010; Schaefer, Heinze, 
& Rotte, 2009), which is conflicting with the finding in Moseley et al. (2008). And Mohan et 
al. (2012) showed that the rubber hand illusion does not induce analgesia, which predicts that 
even the illusion disrupts thermoregulation, it does not reduce pain processing. Other studies 
also showed interesting findings, in Longo et al. (2008), two questions showed chance rating 
results, one asking whether participants felt as if they had three hands, and another whether 
they felt as if their own hand had disappeared. Folegatti, De Vignemont, Pavani, Rossetti, and 
Farnè (2009) manipulated the RHI without including a rubber hand; their results suggested 
that the skin temperature decrease is not because of experienced ownership over a new body-
part, but as a result of multisensory integration mismatch. Ehrsson et al. (2008) showed that 
amputees can experience RHI, and Guterstam, Gentile, and Ehrsson (2013) observed that, 
under multisensory integration conditions, empty spaces which do not sharing any common 
visual form and anatomical properties with a real hand, can be embodied by healthy 
individuals. These observations are difficult to explain from a top-down approach. 
6. Sense of agency and sense of ownership in RHI and VHI 
Two often distinguished aspects of the body self ar the sense of agency and the sense 
of body ownership (Gallagher, 2000a, 2000b; Haggard, 2005; Haggard & Chambon, 2012; 
Chambon, Sidarus, & Haggard, 2014; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a; Schütz-Bosbach, 
Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). The sense of agency is an awareness of initiating and 
executing voluntary actions, for example, controlling one’s own body movements, and 
causing a certain effect. Agency involves a strong efferent component as the motor commands 
precede voluntary movement (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Preston & Newport, 2010; 
David, Newen, & Vogeley, 2008; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). Body ownership 
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refers to the sense that one owns one’s body and receives sensations referring to it. The sense 
of body ownership involves a strong afferent component, through the various peripheral 
signals that indicate the state of the body. While earlier studies tended to consider body 
ownership and agency as separate components of the self (see Jeannerod, 2003; Gallagher, 
2000; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007), there is increasing evidence that these 
two factors interact in producing ownership illusions (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & 
Moore, 2009; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 
2006; Burin et al., 2015; Kokkinara & Slater, 2014).  
In studies with traditional RHI paradigm, the sense of body ownership is present 
without voluntary actions. But considering that peol  usually voluntarily move their bodies 
in the daily life, the body is not merely a sensing entity. In this sense, the traditional RHI 
paradigm lacks ecological validity in reflecting body ownership. Accordingly, researchers 
designed active RHI and VHI studies, in which the sense of body ownership is present as well 
as sense of agency. Indeed, one essential point of empirical and theoretical interest is to 
understand how body ownership is experienced during action, that is, to study how agency 
interacts with body ownership (see Gallagher, 2000; Marcel, 2003; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005b). 
However, studies have yielded conflicting results for the relationship between sense of 
ownership and sense of agency with active RHI paradigms. Most of these studies compared 
active movements, passive movements and visuotactile stimulation conditions. Some studies 
showed greater sense of illusory ownership with greater sense of agency, some showed the 
opposite relationship between the two senses, and some howed no correlation at all. For 
example, Burin et al. (2015) found that patients with left upper limb hemiplegia display 
stronger illusory effects than healthy participants when the affected hand is stimulated but no 
effects when the unaffected hand is stimulated, and co cluded that active movement plays a 
role for body ownership maintenance. Kokkinara and Slater (2014) observed higher 
ownership for a virtual leg in active-movement than visuotactile-stimulation conditions. 
Caspar et al. (2014) also report a positive correlation between agency and ownership ratings. 
However, Walsh and colleagues (2011) showed that ratings for passive-stimulation conditions 
were higher than for active-movement conditions. Dummer et al. (2009), using whole hand 
movements, measured the subjective strength of the illusion with a between subjects design 
and found stronger ratings of ownership during active movements than during passive 
movements, but lower than ratings in visuotactile stimulation. Riemer and colleagues (2013) 
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report equally strong subjective ratings for active-movements and visuotactile-stimulated 
conditions. Tsakiris et al. (2006) and Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012, 2014a) found no difference 
in ownership ratings or proprioceptive drift between three conditions that differed in activity. 
To add to the confusion, Braun et al. (2014) found some associations and some double-
dissociations between sense of agency and sense of ownership. 
What might be the reason for these confusing, seemingly nconsistent findings? We 
assume that there are two reasons. The first one may be terminological confusion. As 
discussed in Hommel (2015a), objective ownership and agency is often confused with the 
subjective experience of ownership and agency, commnly called the sense of ownership and 
the sense of agency, respectively (for an example, se  Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 
2007). Whereas objective agency refers to the question whether a person was actually 
producing a particular action, subjective (perceived) agency is about whether this person is 
actually sensing, experiencing, or reporting to have some sort of authorship. Objective agency 
may or may not provide the critical information used for subjective agency: While most 
researchers investigating the sense of agency implicitly assume that it does (so that 
manipulations of objective agency are assumed to bereflected in subjective agency), some 
authors have argued that objective and subjective agency rely on different sources of 
information (e.g., Wegner, 2003). At the same time, objective agency is likely to provide 
crucial information for subjective ownership: when in doubt whether an object belongs to 
one’s body the most obvious test would be to try moving it intentionally. Importantly, 
however, the previous investigations of the relationship between ownership and agency have 
not focused on the impact of objective agency on subjective ownership but, rather, on the 
relationship between subjective agency and subjective ownership. Among other things, this 
overlooks the fact that objective agency (subjectivly experienced or not) provides a means to 
create re-afferent multimodal stimulation, which according to bottom-up approaches to 
ownership should increase the informational basis to make ownership judgments. 
And the second reason may be a drawback of the traditional and active RHI paradigms. 
The RHI is a good paradigm to investigate the ownership illusion, but not a strong paradigm 
to investigate the relationship between sense of agency and ownership. In the traditional RHI 
setup, the artificial effector (rubber hand) is completely static (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), and 
in the active RHI setup, the rubber hand can only move with the real effector in rather limited 
ways, for example, only one specific finger can move up and down (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014, 
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2014a), or the whole palm can move up and down (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 
2009). This makes it a particularly conservative, ecologically invalid measure of the 
perception of ownership. We assume that the two reasons may account for the conflicting 
findings of earlier studies with active RHI paradigms. 
In contrast to RHI, VHI setups, in which the virtual h nd can be almost freely moved 
in sync with the real hand, and which sometimes include simulated contact with other virtual 
objects (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2012; Padilla et 
al., 2010), provide a much richer database. Indeed, continuously moving one’s felt hand 
together with the seen virtual hand and having simulated contact with another object creates 
hundreds if not thousands of data points that can be correlated to calculate the degree of 
intermodal matching. In contrast to some active RHI studies (e.g., Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006; Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014), in 
which visuomotor correlations contributed equally to or less than visuotactile stimulation to 
the illusion, VHI studies (and even some RHI studies) have shown that visuomotor 
correlations alone is sufficient to induce ownership illusions (Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, 
Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010). Kokkinara and Slater (2014) tested the two information 
sources against each other and found that visuo-proprioceptive synchronicity in active 
condition contributes significantly more to ownership illusions than visuotactile synchronicity 
in passive condition does. One possible interpretation of this finding is that a freely 
controllable virtual body provides more and more temporally extended multisensory 
information and thus a more extended database for bottom-up multisensory matching 
processes. 
Accordingly, given the apparently great importance of visuo-proprioceptive 
information for ownership illusions, we assume that previous studies that used static objects, 
like rubber hands, might have systematically underestimated the contribution of bottom-up 
factors, this suggest two implications. The first refe s to the underlying process for the illusion 
ownership perception we discussed above: researchers may put too much emphasis on the 
appearance of the rubber object. Considering that the previous failures to demonstrate 
ownership illusions for non-corporeal objects were mostly obtained in traditional RHI 
paradigms, we assume a more dynamic manipulation in a VHI paradigm may reveal some 
different results. The use of virtual effectors, together with visuo-proprioceptive 
manipulations, might allow participants to experienc  ownership for objects that do not look 
like a hand or other real effectors, that is, for nn-corporeal objects. If this is possible, it will 
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support the bottom-up approach and not fit with the assumption of a crucial role of internal 
body models (De Preester & Tsakiris, 2009; Tsakiris, 2010; Press, Heyes, Haggard, & Eimer, 
2008). The present thesis aims to tackle this question and shed some new light onto the 
cognitive process underlying the body ownership illus on. This approach is consistent with 
Short and Ward (2009), who observed that visuo-proprioceptive synchrony is sufficient to 
induce ownership for a wide variety of virtual controllable objects, including virtual hand and 
cones. However, in this work, the subjective ownership ratings for virtual cones was relatively 
low (3 on a 5-point scale), and the critical comparison was between controllable cones and 
uncontrollable hands, which is not consistent with most RHI/VHI studies, and more 
importantly, there was no objective measurement.  
And the second implication is: the effect of agency in the VHI would be much 
stronger than in the RHI, so that VHI studies can provide stronger correlations between sense 
of body ownership and agency than RHI studies do (Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Padilla et al., 
2010). So it is possible that clear results of the complicated relationship between them may be 
revealed with VHI paradigm. Factors such as RHI and VHI, synchrony, similarity, degree of 
agency (the degree to which the virtual effector could be controlled by people’s own 
movements) can all be manipulated and compared, and the effect of sense of agency on the 
illusory ownership perception can also be investigated. This thesis aims to do this. 
7. The Enfacement illusion (EI) 
Studies investigating body ownership with RHI/VHI paradigms have emphasized the 
role of multisensory integration, how current sensory inflow interacts with motor signals and 
body representations (Jeannerod, 2003; Farrer, Franck, Paillard, & Jeannerod, 2003; Tsakiris 
& Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Haggard, Franck, Mainy, & Sirigu, 2005; van den Bos & 
Jeannerod, 2002) to change one’s body representation. Note that face identity is very 
important in body representation, so it would be int resting to investigate whether one’s facial 
representation can be changed with some experimental paradigm. Different from the body 
ownership studies with RHI/VHI paradigms, previous studies on self-face recognition have 
focused on the retrieval of visual representations of one’s face (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000), the presence of view-invariant epresentations of one’s face (Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999), or the role of mnemonic representatio s of one’s face that argue against the 
existence of robust self-face representations (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2004, 2005; 
Brédart, 2003; Apps & Tsakiris, 2013; Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & 
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Collins, 2008; Bailenson, Garland, Iyengar, & Yee, 2006; Banissy, Garrido, Kusnir, Duchaine, 
Walsh, & Ward, 2011; Cardini, Bertini, Serino, & Ladavas, 2012; Calder & Young, 2005; 
DeBruine, 2002; Farmer, McKay, & Tsakiris, 2014; Goldman & Sripada, 2005; Yee & 
Bailenson, 2007; Gallup, 1970). Interestingly, one study about self-recognition errors in 
everyday life (Young & Brédart, 2004) reports that approximately half of the tested 
participants had at least once the experience of judging their own face in a mirror or 
photograph as being the face of someone else.  
However, considering that when we look in a mirror we do not only compare the face 
in the mirror with the one in our memory, but also usually move or touch the face. Therefore 
there is rich multisensory information including visual, proprioceptive, tactile and motor 
codes that are likely to represent strong cues for elf-recognition. Recent research has 
attempted to investigate the role of multisensory stimulation in recognizing our own face. 
There are two possibilities. One is that multisensory timulation plays the same important role 
for face ownership than it plays for hand ownership, so that mental representations of one’s 
own face would be reconstructed and possibly updated or altered by multisensory input. The 
other possibility is that, because our face is the most distinctive feature of our physical 
appearance and has a very important role in preserving identity, self-face recognition is much 
more immune to multisensory manipulation, so that facial illusions may be weak or absent. 
To investigate the extent to which current multisensory input may influence the sense 
of self-identity, Tsakiris (2008; and also Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & Schubert, 2011; 
Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010; Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino, & 
Tsakiris, 2013; Maister, Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013; Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 2012; Fini et al., 2013) extended the 
paradigm of multisensory integration to self-face recognition. Participants were stroked on 
their face while they were looking at a morphed face being touched in synchrony or 
asynchrony. Before and after the visuotactile stimulation participants performed a self-
recognition task. The results showed that synchronized multisensory signals had a significant 
effect on self-face recognition, and blurred the self-other boundaries, as assessed by means of 
a questionnaire, a self-face recognition task, and also some interpersonal tasks. The 
conclusion was that multisensory integration can update cognitive representations of one’s 
face. This illusion was named as enfacement illusion. 
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8. The objective measurements used in EI 
In the self-face recognition task (Keenan, Freund, Hamilton, Ganis, & Pascual-Leone, 
2000; Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez, 
Lorusso, & Tsakiris, 2013), participants watch a series of images that represent a morphing 
transition from another person to themselves or vice ersa. They are instructed to choose the 
first image on which the shown face is starting to look more like self than other, or vice versa, 
depending on the morphing direction displayed in the series—the transition point so to speak. 
The chosen points are then used to calculate the perc ntage of frames that were judged as 
belonging more to the participants’ own face, which represents the main dependent variable. 
The results showed that synchronous, but not asynchro ous, visuotactile manipulation 
produced a shift of the transition point in the direction of the other person, suggesting that 
synchrony increased the perceived similarity with the other person. Tajadura-Jiménez et al. 
(2012) investigated the interaction between self- and other-representations with four 
experiments that used different tasks. Interestingly, synchronous multisensory stimulation 
affected recognition of one’s own face only, but noof the other’s face. 
Interestingly, enfacement also has social implications because it blurs the self-other 
boundaries. For example, enfacement was correlated positively with the participant’s 
empathic traits and the physical attractiveness the participants attributed to the viewed face 
(Sforza et al., 2010); several tasks such as the physical resemblance, Inclusion of Other in the 
Self (IOS) scale, attraction toward the other, conformity behavior, inference on the personality 
of the other based on the Self all showed effects (Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & Schubert, 
2011; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010). 
Accordingly, there are much more possibilities given the personal and interpersonal 
implications EI has. One interesting consideration is that, given the successful replication of 
RHI in virtual environment (VE)-the VHI, and stronger agency manipulation in VHI, it is 
possible to replicate the EI in virtual environment, and develop the virtual enfacement illusion 
(VEI). And if we go one step further based on previous studies, one interesting question is 
whether facial expressions can be assimilated with VEI. For one, the stronger sense of agency 
in a virtual setup can provide more bottom-up integrated multisensory information and thus 
induce stronger illusions. For another, if synchronous multisensory stimulation serves to blur 
self-other boundaries, it might be possible to adopt the other person’s facial expression and 
perceive it as one’s own.  
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This hypothesis is consistent with the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel, 
Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Hommel, 2009; Hommel, 2016). TEC assumes that 
perceived and produced events (i.e., perceptions and actions) are represented in terms of 
networks of feature codes (event files; see Hommel, 2004). According to TEC, participants 
are assumed to store the combination of their own face and expression as well as the 
combination of the virtual face and expression. If the distinction between these two 
representations becomes blurred, features could be assumed to migrate from one 
representation to the other.  
9. The structure of this thesis 
Although body ownership and body representation have been studied extensively, 
there are still many unclear aspects. Investigating the flexibility of body representation and 
reveal some possible implication forms the aim of this hesis. The main experimental 
paradigm for investigation of the current research aim is to deploy bodily illusions similar to 
those discussed above, RHI, VHI and EI. In the present thesis, the effect of the bodily illusion 
is mostly investigated as a measurement of the flexibi ity of self-representation. 
The work presented in this thesis falls into three parts. The first part mainly addresses 
the affective consequences of body ownership and the particular role of the SCR measurement 
in RHI/VHI. The second part tries to investigate thflexibility of the body representation with 
the RHI/VHI paradigm, and possibly shed some new light onto the cognitive process 
underlying the body ownership illusions. And the third part tries to open some new 
possibilities with EI in virtual environment, and investigate the possible role of multisensory 
manipulation in interpersonal mood transfer. 
More specifically, Chapter 2 reports a study that used a VHI paradigm to investigate 
when and under which circumstances ownership is associated with affective resonance. 
Chapter 3 investigates whether non-corporeal objects can be perceived as part of one’s body if 
one has agency, that is, control over their behavior. Chapter 4 systematically investigates the 
different role of sense of agency, object appearance, and synchrony for the sense of ownership. 
Chapter 5 investigates the degree to which perceived body ownership is affected by the 
situational context and the availability of different spatial reference frames in particular. Next, 
Chapter 6 investigates whether the EI can be replicated in a virtual environment, and whether 
people adopt the mood shown on a face they identify with. Finally, in Chapter 7 results will 
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The rubber hand illusion refers to the observation that participants perceive “body 
ownership” for a rubber hand if it moves, or is stroked in synchrony with the participant's real 
(covered) hand. Research indicates that events targeting artificial body parts can trigger 
affective responses (affective resonance) only withperceived body ownership, while 
neuroscientific findings suggest affective resonance irrespective of ownership (e.g., when 
observing other individuals under threat). We hypothesized that this may depend on the 
severity of the event. We first replicated previous findings that the rubber hand illusion can be 
extended to virtual hands—the virtual-hand illusion. We then tested whether hand ownership 
and affective resonance (assessed by galvanic skin conductance) are modulated by the 
experience of an event that either “impacted” (a ball hitting the hand) or “threatened” (a knife 
cutting the hand) the virtual hand. Ownership was stronger if the virtual hand moved 
synchronously with the participant's own hand, but this effect was independent from whether 
the hand was impacted or threatened. Affective resonance was mediated by ownership 
however: In the face of mere impact, participants showed more resonance in the synchronous 
condition (i.e., with perceived ownership) than in the asynchronous condition. In the face of 
threat, in turn, affective resonance was independent of synchronicity-participants were 
emotionally involved even if a threat was targeting a hand that they did not perceive as their 
own. Our findings suggest that perceived body ownership and affective responses to body-
related impact or threat can be dissociated and are thus unlikely to represent the same 
underlying process. We argue that affective reactions t  impact are produced in a top-down 
fashion if the impacted effector is assumed to be part of one's own body, whereas threatening 
events trigger affective responses more directly in a bottom-up fashion—irrespective of body 
ownership. 
 
Keywords: Vibrotactile stimulation, Rubber hand illusion, Virtual hand illusion, Body 




In the “rubber-hand illusion” (RHI) first reported by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), 
people feel that a rubber hand lying in front of them belongs to their own body if the rubber 
hand and their own unseen hand are being stroked synchronously. This observation has been 
replicated and extended in various studies. For example, Tsakiris and Haggard (2005) showed 
that, for the RHI to work, the rubber hand should look like and be aligned with one's own 
hand. Moreover, Armel and Ramachandran (2003) report d that the illusion goes along with 
elevated galvanic skin conductance responses (SCR) in the case of possible threat directed at 
the rubber hand, indicating a kind of “affective resonance” and “emotional involvement” with 
the artificial hand. 
Recent research has provided evidence that the RHI can be induced through 
(sometimes immersive) virtual reality where the rubber hand is replaced by a virtual hand. A 
common method is to present participants with visual 3D images of the virtual hand on a 
screen in front of them, in some cases together with tactile stimulation of their real, hidden 
hand (Padilla et al., 2010). Sanchez-Vives et al. (2010) showed that a virtual hand illusion 
(VHI) can be induced even in the absence of tactile s mulation, simply by manipulating the 
temporal delay between the participant's own movement (as measured by a data glove) and 
the movements of the virtual hand on a screen. Slater et al. (2008) found reliable correlations 
between the impression of hand ownership and hand-related EMG activation, suggesting a 
connection between perceived ownership and action control. 
Of particular interest for the present study, Yuan and Steed (2010) measured SCR 
responses to what they considered threats to a virtual hand and found similar elevations as 
with rubber hands. Participants were operating the hand of an avatar, which allowed them to 
play games in virtual space. At some point, a (virtual) lamp would fall on the virtual hand 
operated by the participant, which induced a reliable increase in SCR. In a control condition, 
the hand was replaced by an arrow, which produced significantly less increase in SCR. The 
SCR effects were mirrored by the effect obtained for the body-ownership questionnaire 
(Botvinick and Cohen, 1998): perceived ownership was significantly more pronounced in the 
hand condition than in the arrow condition. Taken together, these findings suggest that people 
emotionally “care” about what they perceive as being a part of their body but not, or not so 
much, about what they perceive as belonging to the body of someone else. 
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Even though this interpretation fits with previous observations from studies on the 
RHI, it does not seem to be fully consistent with research showing affective resonance when 
observing other people under threat or in pain. For instance, receiving a visual signal that a 
loved one will receive a painful electric shock has been found to activate the same brain areas 
(such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula) that are active when being in 
pain oneself (Singer et al., 2004). Even witnessing a stranger being treated with a painful 
pinprick stimulus activates the same areas that are active when receiving such a stimulus 
oneself (Morrison et al., 2004). Observations of that sort have been interpreted as indicating 
that people do not distinguish much between themselve  and others if it comes to the 
representation of affect (Keysers, 2011), and the same argument has been made with respect 
to the actions (Gallese et al., 2004) and personalities (Hommel et al., 2009) of oneself and of 
others. This seems to imply that we care about others even when there is no body ownership, 
which does not seem to fit with Yuan and Steed's (2010) observation that people's affective 
response to the threat (as assessed by SCR) is much reduced in the absence of ownership. The 
aim of the present study was to resolve that issue, if possible. 
The consideration of two aspects of Yuan and Steed's study might help explaining this 
seeming discrepancy. For one, they did not use the standard synchronization technique to 
induce different degrees of body ownership (such as inducing different temporal delay 
between movement of the actual hand and movement of the virtual hand); rather, they 
compared people's responses to what can be considered a plausible body part—a virtual 
hand—with responses to what can be considered an implausible body part—a visual arrow. 
Arguably, this might not only have induced the observed differences in perceived ownership 
but also prevented the cognitive representation of the arrow as a possible body part as such. It 
might thus be that people would care about a threaten d virtual hand even if it would not be 
perceived as being a part of their own body—if it only is recognizable as a hand. In the 
present study, we tested this possibility by comparing people's perceived ownership and 
affective responses to virtual hands that they could perate with either no temporal delay (the 
synchronous condition) or with a considerable temporal delay (the asynchronous condition). 
Like in the study of Sanchez-Vives et al. (2010), we expected that perceived ownership would 
be significantly reduced in the asynchronous as compared to the synchronous condition. We 
also measured SCR to see whether and to what degree pe c ived ownership (i.e., 
synchronicity) would modulate the affective response to threats targeting the virtual hand. 
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For another, even though Yuan and Steed (2010) intended to investigate the affective 
response to threat, the threatening event merely consisted of a virtual lamp falling on the 
virtual hand. Even though the contact between the lamp and the hand was clearly visible to 
the participant, it is difficult to judge from the visual display how much pain, if any, this 
contact might have caused if it were real. Accordingly, the manipulation may have 
represented an “impact” of an object on the virtual hand rather than a degree of actual threat 
that would be comparable to an electric shock [as in Singer et al. (2004)] or a pinprick [as in 
Morrison et al. (2004)]. It is possible that some degree of severity of a threat is required to 
induce a high degree of cross-personal affective resonance as evidenced by the studies of 
Singer et al. and Morrison et al. To test this possibility, we combined the synchronicity 
manipulation with a manipulation of the object that would get in contact with the virtual hand. 
In one condition, the virtual hand was hit by a ball, which the participant could both see on a 
screen in front of her and feel in the palm of her and. This impact was clearly noticeable but 
the speed of the ball was chosen in such a way that a real contact with the same parameters 
would not be perceived as painful. In another condition, the virtual hand was hit and actually 
cut by a knife—an event that was considered to represent a threat. Our main question was 
whether the synchronicity manipulation would affect the two conditions differently. In view 
of the various previous demonstrations of the VHI, we expected that the affective response to 
mere impact (the ball condition) should be more pronounced for the synchronous than for the 
asynchronous condition. However, more interesting was hether the synchronicity effect 
would be comparable with a real threat (the knife condition) or whether participants would 
show affective resonance to the threatened hand irrespective of hand ownership (i.e., of 
synchronicity). 
Before conducting the actual experiment, we first investigated whether we could 
produce a reliable VHI with our equipment and which stimulus/feedback parameters would 
contribute to the illusion. In this pilot study, we presented participants with a virtual hand on a 
monitor in front of them. They were able to operate this virtual hand with their own, unseen 
hand by means of a data glove. In some trials, moving their own hand resulted in immediate 
movement of the virtual hand (synchronous condition) while in other trials the movements of 
the virtual hand were delayed (asynchronous condition). In some trials, participants only saw 
the movement of the virtual hand on the screen (visual conditions) while in other trials the 
virtual hand was hit by a ball, which was accompanied by a vibration in the palm of their own 
hand (visual-tactile conditions). 
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2. Pilot study 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty participants with mean age 22.2 ± 3.34 (SD) were recruited from Leiden 
University in exchange for course credit or pay. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants before the experiment. Participants were naive with respect to the RHI/VHI. The 
study was approved by the Leiden University Human research ethics committee. 
2.2. Experimental setup 
The study was performed in a virtual reality environment. The setup consisted of a 3 
degree-of-freedom orientation tracker (InterSense), a data glove (Cyberglove), and virtual 
reality software (Vizard). The Cyberglove has six vibration stimulators attached, one on each 
finger and one on the palm; they are programmable to s t the vibration time and strength. As 
shown in Figure 1A, participants wore the glove on their right hand and the InterSense tracker 
on their right wrist. We used a virtual hand from Vizard character set and imported the tracker 
and data glove module into Vizard, so that the virtual hand received the data from the tracker 
and data glove. We generated a virtual hand that was controlled by the participant's hand 
movement (see Figure 1B). 
 
Figure 1. The experimental setup. (A) Participants wore a data glove with attached vibrators 







There were two within-group factors: First, the movement of the virtual hand was 
either synchronous or asynchronous with the movement of the actual hand. Second, the virtual 
hand was either seen alone or hit by a virtual ball (as seen on the screen and felt in the palm of 
the hand). The order of the two synchronicity conditions was balanced across participants, as 
was the order of the visual and the visual-tactile onditions. 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor, wearing the glove on their 
right hand and the orientation tracker on their right wrist. At the beginning of each of the four 
trials, they were asked to move their fingers for 30 s in front of the black screen, which was 
necessary to initialize the system properly. Then the computer program generated a virtual 
hand on the screen and the trial started. In each of the four trials, participants were asked to 
move fingers and wrist for 1 min. In visual-tactile trials, they were asked to put their hand on 
the desk with the palm upwards, so that the contacti g ball would hit the virtual hand at the 
palm. The ball bounced several times, every time associated with a vibration of the stimulator 
located in the palm of the glove. In the synchronous trials, the virtual hand moved in 
synchrony with the participant's own hand and, in visual-tactile synchronous trials, the 
vibration was presented each time the ball contacted th  hand. In the asynchronous trials, the 
movement of the virtual hand was delayed by 2 s and the vibration set in 2 s after each ball-
hand contact. After the completion of each trial, prticipants worked through the 
questionnaire described below. 
2.5. Measurements 
Questionnaire. To assess the extent to which participants experienced the VHI we 
used an adapted version of the standard nine-item questionnaire (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; 
Slater et al., 2008; Padilla et al., 2010). For each statement, participants responded by 
choosing a score in a 5-point (0–4) Likert scale, ranging from 0 for “strongly disagree” to 4 
for “strongly agree.” The statements were: 
Q1. Sometimes I had the sensation that vibration I felt on my hand was on the same 
location where the hand on the screen was in contact with the object. 
Q2. Sometimes I had the sensation that the vibration I felt on my hand was caused by 
the contact of the object with the hand on the screen. 
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Q3. The movements of the hand on the screen were caused by myself. 
Q4. It sometimes seemed my own hand was located on the screen. 
Q5. The hand on the screen began to resemble my own hand, in terms of shape, skin 
tone, freckles, or some other usual feature. 
Q6. Sometimes it seemed as if what I was feeling was caused by the ball that I was 
seeing on the screen. 
Q7. Sometimes I felt as if the hand on the screen was my own hand. 
Q8. Sometimes I felt as if my real hand was becoming v rtual. 
Q9. It seemed as if I might have more than one right hand. 
Questions 1-4, 6, 7 are supposed to indicate the actual illusion, and Questions 5, 8, 9 
are usually considered fillers. In the pilot, three more questions were included for explorative 
purposes, but they were unrelated to the illusion pr per (“I felt that I can control the hand on 
the screen,” “sometimes I had the feeling that I was receiving the vibration in the location of 
the hand on the screen,” “sometimes it seems that the contact that I was feeling originated 
from the screen”) and were not further analyzed. 
2.6. Results 
We analyzed the responses to items 1, 2, and 6 by means of a one-factorial 
(synchronicity) ANOVA and responses to the remaining items by means of a 2 (synchronicity) 
× 2 (modality) ANOVA. Because Questions 1, 2, and 6 were specific to the tactile modality, 
the boxplots in the left panel of Figure 2 only show the scores of the remaining questions; see 
Table Table11 for means and standard deviation for all questions. For Questions 1–7 the 
analyses yielded reliable main effects of synchronicity (see Table 1 for p-values) but no other 
effects, all ps > 0.1. That is, all critical questions provided evidence for a VHI. This illusion 
was not reliably mediated by modality, but effects tended to be numerically larger for the 
visual-tactile condition. 
2.7. Discussion 
The outcome is clear: we were able to replicate the VHI with our setup. The lack of an 
interaction with modality suggests that adding the tactile information is not required to 
generate reliable effects. Nevertheless, given that the numerical effects tended to be more 




Table 1. Pilot study: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the questionnaire scores. 
P values for the main effects of synchronicity are shown in the last row. 











































































<0.001 <0.001 0.003 0.031 0.004 0.014 0.049 0.107 0.867 
p (modality)   0.196 0.702 0.154  0.111 0.585 0.234 
p (interaction)   0.269 0.874 0.625  1.000 0.766 0.419 
 
 
Figure 2. Boxplots for the questionnaire scores as a function of modality and synchronicity. 
Error bars represent ± 1 SD. 
3. Experiment 
Our actual experiment made use of the visual-tactile s mulation condition, so that 
modality was no longer a factor. However, we introduced another factor: type of event. In all 
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condition, this was a ball hitting the virtual hand like in the visual-tactile conditions of the 
pilot study. In the “threat” condition, this was a knife cutting the virtual hand, which caused 
some blood appearing from the thus-created wound. To assess affective resonance, we 
included SCR as a second measure. 
3.1. Participants 
Eighteen participants with mean age 23.6 ± 4.7 (SD) were recruited from Leiden 
University in exchange for course credit or pay. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants before the experiment. Participants were naive with respect to the RHI/VHI. The 
experiment was approved by the Leiden University Human research ethics committee. 
3.2. Experimental setup 
This was the same as in the pilot study, except for the SCR measurement. The SCR 
remote transmitter with a strap was worn on the participant's left wrist. The SCR data were 
recorded with a Biopac MP100 acquisition unit and AcqKnowledge software.  
3.3. Design 
There were two within-group factors: First, the movement of the virtual hand and the 
vibration of the stimulator was either synchronous r asynchronous with the movement of the 
actual hand and the event-hand contact. Second, the vir ual hand was either contacted by a 
ball or cut by a knife, in both cases accompanied by tactile vibration. The order of the two 
synchronicity conditions was balanced across participants, as was the order of the two types 
of events. 
3.4. Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that in the pilot study. Participants wore the data 
glove on their right hand and the orientation tracker on their right wrists, and the SCR finger 
electrodes on their left hand. They were to put their real right hand into a black box placed 
between them and the computer screen (Fig 1). Participants first experienced a same illusion 
inducement procedure as in the pilot study, under synchronous or asynchronous conditions. 
And then depending on the trial, participants would then see a virtual ball or knife slowly 
coming down from the top of the screen to approach and eventually touch the palm of their 
virtual hand. The ball would bounce several times, and the knife would approach and 
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eventually cut the palm of the virtual hand, and some blood would appear from the cut wound. 
All remaining details were as in the pilot study, and the same questionnaire was used. 
3.5. SCR Measurements 
Following previous studies (e.g., Armel and Ramachandr n, 2003) we used SCR to 
assess affective reactivity (see Figner and Murphy, 2010; Boucsein, 2011). SCR is a standard 
physiological measure and the best predictor of psychological arousal, and the fact that 
participants cannot control their SCR voluntarily makes it a reliable measure. We measured 
SCR during the entire experiment. We defined a latency onset window between 1 and 5 s after 
stimulus/event onset, with the skin conductivity befor  stimulus/event onset serving as 
baseline. We then calculated the magnitude of the event-induced SCR by subtracting baseline 
skin conductivity from the peak amplitude of the SCR during the analyzed time window, and 
took the log(magnitude+1). 
3.6. Results 
Questionnaire. We analyzed the responses to all 9 items by means of a 2 
(synchronicity) × 2 (event type) ANOVA. For Questions 1–7 the analyses yielded reliable 
main effects of synchronicity (see Figure 3 and Table 2 for p-values) but no other effects, 
except Questions 8 and 9, all event ps > 0.06. Hence, all critical questions provided evidence 
for a VHI, and the illusion did not depend on event type. 
Table 2. Experiment: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the questionnaire 
scores. P values for the main effects of synchronicity are shown in the last row. 













































































p (synchronicity) 0.002 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.135 
p (event) 0.659 0.069 0.726 1.000 0.692 0.762 0.772 0.042 0.010 





Figure 3. Boxplots for the questionnaire scores as a function of event type (impact vs. threat) 
and synchronicity. Error bars represent ± 1 SD. 
SCR. We analyzed the event-induced SCRs by means of a 2 (synchronicity) × 2 
(event type) ANOVA and used two-tailed t-tests for more detailed analyses. Figure 4 shows 
the outcome. The main effect of synchronicity was reliable, F(1, 17) = 6.046, p = 0.025, as 
was the type of event effect, F(1, 17) = 4.601, p = 0.047. However, both effects were 
mediated by a reliable interaction, F(1, 17) = 5.069, p = 0.038. Figure 4 shows that 
synchronicity clearly mediates SCR in the impact condition, producing a reliably higher peak 
in SCR in the synchronous as compared to the asynchro ous condition, p = 0.010. This is no 
longer the case in the threat condition, where peaks are high in both synchronicity conditions 
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Figure 4. SCR as a function of event type (impact vs. threat) and synchronicity. Error bars 
represent ± 1 SD. 
4. General discussion 
The aim of this study was to compare the effect of perceived events that either impact 
or threaten a virtual hand on perceived ownership and affective resonance. The findings from 
the impact condition fully replicate the observations of Yuan and Steed (2010). Even though 
we compared synchronous and asynchronous conditions (with the same effector) while Yuan 
and Steed compared a synchronous virtual hand with a synchronous virtual arrow, the 
outcomes are comparable: conditions that induce perceived hand ownership are associated 
with greater affective responses if the “owned” virtual hand becomes the target of some sort 
of impact. At the same time, the findings from our threat condition show that this interaction 
between ownership and affective resonance does not ge eralize to events that are more 
serious. This amounts to a partial non-replication of Yuan and Steed (2010) and suggests that 
their manipulation actually represented “impact” targeting the virtual hand rather than real 
“threat.” 
The outcome of the threat condition, in turn, is consistent with previous 
neuroscientific observations, suggesting that threa targeting another person produces 
affective responses comparable to those people showwhen being a target of threatening 
events themselves (Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004). As our findings demonstrate, 
such evidence of affective resonance is not restricted to body parts that belong to other people 
but can also be observed for unconnected body partsthat are not owned by, or associated with 
a person or agent. Interestingly, the degree of affective resonance was statistically 
independent of ownership, suggesting that people care much less about who is being attacked 
if a threat is only sufficiently serious. It is thus possible that cross-personal affective 
resonance can only be obtained in the face of events tha  are as serious as a flesh-cutting knife 
or a pricking needle (as in several neuroimaging studies), but not with less damaging events. 
In other words, people's emotional involvement in the fate of others may be restricted to really 
dangerous incidents. 
One possible take of these observations would be that people are more likely to 
neglect the actual ownership of body parts in the fac  of threat. This could be because threats 
(but not mere impact) induce stress-like states that are accompanied by an excessive turnover 
of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex and other areas, which again is known to result in 
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cognitive impairments (e.g., Deutch and Roth, 1990; Murphy et al., 1996). However, such a 
threat-induced relaxation of ownership criteria should have affected the ownership-related 
judgments obtained in the questionnaire, which however did not show any impact of event 
type. This renders a stress- or ownership-neglect appro ch of our observations less attractive. 
Another take relates to the claim that affective responses might be triggered along two 
different neural pathways (LeDoux, 1998): a slow, corti al pathway that processes all the 
available information and computes the emotional relevance based on the available 
knowledge and past experience and a fast, subcortical pathway mediated by the amygdala, 
which can directly access action and arousal systems, and hijack the cognitive apparatus in the 
face of threat. It makes sense to assume that our knife condition was sufficiently threatening 
to activate the fast, direct pathway while the ballcondition did not. As a consequence, the 
emotional reactions in the ball condition were mediated by cognitive processes including 
considerations about hand ownership, which triggered affective responses in a top-down 
fashion in the synchronous condition only. In contras , the emotional reactions in the knife 
condition might have been triggered more in a bottom-up fashion, thereby shortcutting 
ownership considerations. We speculate that a similar scenario holds for the successful 
neuroscientific demonstrations of affective resonance to the fate of “non-owned” body parts 
belonging to other individuals. In any case, however, our findings strongly suggest that 
perceived body ownership and affective responses to body-related impact or threat can be 
dissociated and are thus unlikely to represent the same underlying process. 
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Rubber-hand and virtual-hand illusions show that peopl  can perceive body ownership 
for objects under suitable conditions. Bottom-up aproaches assume that perceived ownership 
emerges from multisensory matching (e.g., between sobject and felt hand movements), 
whereas top-down approaches claim that novel body parts are integrated only if they resemble 
some part of a permanent internal body representatio . We demonstrate that healthy adults 
perceive body ownership for a virtual balloon changing in size, and a virtual square changing 
in size or color, in synchrony with movements of their real hand. This finding is inconsistent 
with top-down approaches and amounts to an existence proof that non-corporeal events can be 
perceived as body parts if their changes are systematically related to one’s actions. It also 
implies that previous studies with passive-stimulation echniques might have underestimated 
the plasticity of body representations and put too much emphasis on the resemblance between 
viewed object and real hand. 
 
Keywords: Rubber hand illusion, Virtual hand illusion, Body ownership, Non-




One commonly has no problem telling one’s own body from a tool or another person’s 
body and experience one’s body as constituting some kind of “me”. This achievement is 
commonly ascribed to two (often not very well defind: De Vignemont, 2011) cognitive 
representations: an internal body image, which is considered a rather permanent 
representation of the body’s configuration, and a body schema, a sensorimotor representation 
based on afferent and efferent information related to bodily movements. Interestingly, body 
representations are quite malleable. A striking example is the rubber hand illusion (RHI), 
showing that people perceive a rubber hand in front of them as their own if it is stroked 
synchronously with their real, unseen hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Similarly, people 
adopt ownership for a virtual hand if this hand moves in synchrony with their own physical 
hand—the virtual-hand illusion (VHI; e.g., Slater et al., 2008; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; 
Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 2012; Ma & Hommel, 2013). 
According to bottom-up approaches (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003), this is because synchronous stroking (or movement) leads to an 
intermodal match between the visual pattern created by stroking the rubber hand (or by 
moving the virtual hand) and the tactile pattern created by stroking (or the proprioceptive 
pattern created by moving) the real hand. As intermodal matching is considered the main 
criterion for telling one’s own body parts from those of others, the artificial hand is integrated 
into one’s body representation. Especially the VHI suggests that any controllable object or 
event can become part of one’s body, provided that i s movements are synchronized with self-
generated re-afferent information (Short & Ward, 2009). Interestingly, this suggests that body 
ownership (the sense that a given object or event is part of one’s body) and agency (the sense 
of control over a particular object or event) are more strongly related than commonly assumed. 
It is also of interest that a key variable for both wnership and agency, the temporal 
correlation between self-generated movement and environmental changes, has also been 
considered crucial for the acquisition of voluntary ction (see Hommel, 2009).  
However, the bottom-up approach has been challenged by authors claiming that body 
ownership emerges from the interaction between current multisensory input and internal 
models of the body (e.g., Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach & Gallagher, 2007). 
According to this idea, the eventual multisensory matching process is preceded by a 
comparison of the visual form of the viewed object with a stored, stable body representation 
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and a comparison between some postural and anatomical features of the object with the 
current state of the body. For instance, Makin, Holmes, and Ehrsson (2008) and Ehrsson, 
Spence, and Passingham (2004) proposed a model, basd on Maravita, Spence, and Driver 
(2003), that assumes that ownership emerges from multisensory signal matching (a bottom-up 
component) which however has to satisfy particular top-down constraints: the candidate 
effector should be placed in an anatomically plausible position and the multisensory bottom-
up information needs to appear near to it. Tsakiris (2010) considered even this model as too 
parsimonious. According to his approach, synchronous m ltisensory input information is 
mediated by a full-fledged body model which contains a atomical, postural, and spatial 
information about the body, so that ownership illuson  will only occur if the candidate 
effector fits with the model (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Gallagher, 2007; Haans, Ijsselsteijn & de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James & 
Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; Costantini & Haggrd, 2007; Lloyd, 2007). 
Top-down approaches have been motivated by two arguments (for an overview, see 
Tsakiris, 2010). First, various studies show that te strength of the RHI depends on 
anatomical, postural and spatial constraints, especially the similarity between the to-be-
integrated object (such as a rubber hand) and the compared/related body part (e.g., Haans, 
Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Graziano, Cooke, and Taylor, 2000; 
Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010). While 
these observations have been taken to support top-down approaches, they actually don’t: 
Dissimilarities between novel object and actual body part are likely to reduce the degree of 
intersensory matching (the key factor of bottom-up ap roaches), which renders this factor 
theoretically nondiagnostic. The second argument for top-down approaches refers to the fact 
that there is no convincing demonstration of perceived body-ownership for non-corporeal 
objects. The only exception is Armel and Ramachandran’s (2003) observation that 
synchronous stroking of a real hand and a table induce  a kind of RHI. However, not only has 
this finding never been replicated, it also can be accounted for by ad-hoc generalization: the 
table condition was always run right after a rubber-hand condition, which was likely to induce 
transfer.  
However, there are some indications that do not seem to fit with the assumption that 
ownership illusions require a tight fit between thecandidate effector and the internal body 
model. For example, Longo et al. (2009) showed that differences in skin luminance and hand 
shape did not influence experience of the RHI. Along the same lines, Farmer, Tajadura-
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Jiménez, and Tsakiris (2012, and also see Farmer, Maister, & Tsakiris, 2014) found that the 
RHI can be induced with a hand of different skin color. Pavani and Zampini (2007) showed 
ownership effects for a rubber hand that is bigger, but not a smaller, than one’s own hand. 
Schütz-Bosbach, Tausche, and Weiss (2009) reported that some (in)congruencies between the 
visual and tactile stimulation did not affect the RHI strength, similarly to the observations of 
White, Davies, Halleen, and Davies (2010). In all these studies, the visual form and 
anatomical properties of the rubber hand differed fom those of the real hand to some extent, 
but the candidate effectors were still rubber hands—which arguably keeps considerable 
similarity to a real hand. However, Ehrsson et al. (2008) showed that amputees can experience 
rubber hand illusions, and Guterstam, Gentile, and Ehrsson (2013) observed that under 
multisensory integration conditions empty spaces can be embodied by healthy individuals. As 
the amputees no longer had a hand that could be similar to a rubber hand, and as empty space 
does not share any common visual form and anatomical properties with a real hand, these 
observations are difficult to explain from a top-down approach without additional 
assumptions (e.g., the imagination of a real hand). 
Recent research has considered factors that go beyond anatomical and postural factors 
and constraints by manipulating bottom-up factors, such as the kind of match between 
multisensory information about candidate effectors. Some studies have focused on active 
effectors in the kind of action they are involved in, which brings together aspects of body 
ownership and of agency (e.g., Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, 
& Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris et al., 2005; Hommel, in 2015a; Hommel & Elsner, 2009). In 
some modified RHI paradigms, researcher manipulated finger or palm movements (of real 
and rubber hand) to investigate the effect of visuomotor correlations on illusion induction, 
which revealed the importance of visuomotor correlations (or, more precisely, of the 
combination of self- produced visual, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive action feedback). 
Tsakiris et al. (2005) argued that efferent information (sense of agency) distinctively 
contributes to self-recognition (sense of ownership). In some experiments, RHI could be 
induced by finger or palm movements alone (e.g., Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 
2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014), but this does not exclude the possibility of a mediation by a 
body model (see Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 




In contrast to the use of rubber hands, as common in RHI studies, virtual-reality 
techniques allow for relatively realistic visuomotor c rrelations, which has been shown to 
produce reliable VHIs (Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Sanchez-
Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives, & 
Slater, 2012; Ma & Hommel, 2013). In contrast to some action RHI studies (e.g., Tsakiris, 
Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2014), in which visuomotor correlations contributed equally to or less than 
visuotactile stimulation to the illusion, VHI studies (and even some RHI studies) have shown 
that visuomotor correlations alone is sufficient to induce ownership illusions (Sanchez-Vives, 
Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Ma & Hommel, 2013). Kokkinara and Slater 
(2014) tested the two information sources against each other and found that visuomotor 
synchronicity contributes significantly more to ownership illusions than visuotactile 
synchronicity does. One possible interpretation of this finding is that a freely controllable 
virtual hand provides more and more temporally extended multisensory information and thus 
a more extended database for bottom-up multisensory matching processes. This is consistent 
with Short and Ward’s (2009) observation that visuomotor synchronous correlation is 
sufficient to induce ownership for a wide variety of virtual controllable objects, including 
virtual hand and cones. However, in their work, the subjective ownership ratings for virtual 
cones was relatively low (3 on a 5-point scale), and the critical comparison was between 
controllable cones and uncontrollable hands, which is not consistent with most RHI/VHI 
studies. 
Given the apparently great importance of visuomotor information for ownership 
illusions, we hypothesize that previous studies that used static objects, like rubber hands, 
might have systematically underestimated the contribution of bottom-up factors. If so, the use 
of virtual effectors, together with visuomotor manipulations, might allow participants to 
experience ownership for objects that do not look like a hand or other real effectors, that is, 
for non-corporeal objects. Given that the previous failures to demonstrate ownership illusions 
for non-corporeal objects were mostly obtained in tradi ional RHI paradigms, it remains to be 
seen whether a more dynamic manipulation in a VHI paradigm is equally unsuccessful. 
Accordingly, the aim of the present study was to prvide, if possible, a demonstration of 
perceived body-ownership for non-corporeal objects—a finding that would not fit with the 
assumption of a crucial role of internal body models (Tsakiris, 2010). To allow for more 
reliable visuomotor correlations, more flexibility n manipulating the artificial effector, and in 
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order to avoid the rather distracting stroking procedure, we used the VHI as demonstrated by 
Slater et al. (2008) and Ma and Hommel (2013). 
In our study, we designed two virtual non-corporal objects, a three-dimensional 
balloon and a two-dimensional square, that both did not bear any obvious visual and 
anatomical similarity to a real hand or any other human body part. These objects replaced the 
virtual hand in an otherwise standard VHI setup, so that participants could move their right 
hand to control the location, orientation, and size of the balloon (Experiment 1) and the 
location, orientation, and size or color of the square (Experiment 2). While the bottom-up 
approach to body ownership would suggest that synchro icity between people’s own hand 
movements (with their unseen hand) and the growth or shrinkage of the balloon or of the 
square (or the changes of its color) creates perceived ownership of the event, the top-down 
approach would predict no perceived ownership for such non-corporeal objects, as they do not 
match any part of the participants’ body images.  
2. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 replicated the VHI-experiment of Ma and Hommel (2013), except that 
the virtual hand was replaced by a virtual balloon. Participants were exposed to a yellow 
balloon presented on a screen, the location, orientatio , and size of which they could control 
by moving their right, unseen hand by means of a dat glove. When participants moved and 
rotated their hand, the balloon would show the same movements and when participants 
opened and closed their hand, the balloon would grow bigger and smaller, respectively. These 
changes of the size of the balloon occurred either synchronously or asynchronously with 
movements of the real hand, with the assumption that synchronicity would induce more 
perceived ownership (and agency) than the asynchronous condition (Ma & Hommel, 2013). 
To further increase the convincingness of the experience (see Ma & Hommel, 2013), 
participants were also shown a virtual needle that either touched the virtual balloon (with its 
blunt or sharp end) or made it explode or not. As impact and threat of virtual effector have 
been found to induce affective reactivity in participants (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ma 
& Hommel, 2013), we assessed skin conductance responses (SCR) in addition to the VHI 
questionnaire (an adapted version of the standard RHI questionnaire used by Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998, and many others). 
As the virtual balloon does not look like, and does not have the anatomical properties 
of, a real human hand or any other human effector, we considered it a non-corporeal object. 
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Moreover, in contrast to most RHI/VHI studies (but similar to Short & Ward, 2009), the 
balloon was placed on the screen in a way that it looked ‘disconnected’ from the participant’s 
body, which among other things increased the distance between viewed object and felt 
position (of the real hand). According to top-down approaches, and the model of Tsakiris 
(2010) in particular, these conditions should prevent participants from experiencing any 
ownership illusion for the virtual balloon. In contrast, bottom-up approaches would hold that 
the availability of synchronized/matched multisensory information should be sufficient to 
generate an ownership illusion. 
2.1. Participants 
30 participants (7 male; mean age = 25 years, SD = 3.93 years, range 20-35) were 
recruited from Leiden University in exchange for course credit or pay. We used the 
department’s standard advertisement system and accepted all volunteers registering in the first 
(and only) wave. Informed consent was obtained from all participants before the experiment. 
Participants were naive with respect to the RHI/VHI. The study was approved by the Leiden 
University Human research ethics committee. 
2.2. Design 
Participants underwent 8 conditions, in balanced order, which emerged from crossing 
three factors: (1) the size of the virtual balloon grew and shrunk either synchronously or 
asynchronously with the opening and closing of the participant’s actual hand; (2) the virtual 
balloon was touched by a virtual needle’s sharp or blunt end (as seen on the screen and felt [as 
vibration] in the palm of the hand); and (3) the contact of the needle made the balloon explode 
or not.  
2.3. Experimental setup 
The study was performed in a virtual reality environment (see Ma & Hommel, 2013). 
The setup consisted of a 3-DOF orientation tracker (InterSense), a data glove (Cyberglove), a 
cloth which is placed over the participant’s right s oulder to cover the space between the 
virtual object and the participant, and a black boxwhich participant put his right hand in to 
shield participants’ hands from view, Biopac MP100 acquisition unit, AcqKnowledge 
software and remote transmitter for SCR recording, a d virtual reality software (Vizard). The 
Cyberglove has six vibration stimulators attached, one on each finger and one on the palm; 
they are programmable to set the vibration time and strength. We designed a virtual balloon 
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and imported the balloon, the tracker, and data glove modules into Vizard to establish data 
transfer between them. This allowed us to have the balloon being controlled by the 
participant’s hand movement. Participants wore the data glove and tracker on their right and 
the SCR remote transmitter on their left hand, as in Ma & Hommel (2013). The instruments 
were shown in Figure 1 (A) and experimental setup is shown in Figure 1 (B). 
 
Figure 1: (A) Participants wore an orientation tracker and a data glove on their right hand, and 
SCR remote transmitter on their left hand; (B) Setup of Experiment 1. 
2.4. Procedure.  
Participants were seated in front of the black box with a computer monitor placed 
behind the other end of the black box, as shown in Figure 1 (B). They were asked to wear the 
glove, orientation tracker and SCR remote transmitter as shown in Figure 1 (A), then put their 
hands inside the box, and look at the monitor. At the beginning of each of the eight trials, they 
were to move their fingers for 10 seconds, which was necessary to initialize the system 
properly. Then the computer program generated a virtual balloon on the screen and the trial 
started. In each of the eight trials, participants were to open and close or rotate their right hand 
freely for 1 min—which allowed participants to explore the degree of control or agency over 
the shape of the balloon. After this phase of visuomotor correlations, visuotactile stimulation 
was applied: A virtual needle appeared on the screen and took four seconds to move to 
contact the virtual balloon, which was associated with the onset of the palm vibration 
stimulator of the glove, and then took another four seconds to return to its original position. 
This procedure was repeated until 30 seconds were over. In the synchronous/balloon 
explosion trials, the orientation and size of the virtual balloon changed in synchrony with the 




set in each time the needle contacted the balloon and the balloon exploded. In the 
asynchronous/balloon explosion trials, the size and orientation changes of the virtual balloon 
were delayed by 2 seconds with respect to the real hand movements, and vibration onset was 
delayed by 2 seconds with respect to the contact with the balloon and its explosion. After the 
illusion-induction phase of each condition participants were filled in the questionnaire. 
2.5. Measurements 
Questionnaire. To assess the extent to which participants experienced the ownership 
illusion, we used an adapted version of the standard seven-item questionnaire (Botvinick and 
Cohen, 1998; Slater et al., 2008; Ma and Hommel, 2013). Each statement was rated by means 
of a 5-point (0-4) Likert scale, ranging from 0 for‘strongly disagree’ to 4 for ‘strongly agree’. 
While Q6 is the most direct ownership question, the remaining questions refer to implications 
or signs of ownership, like location-related similarity (Q1, Q3), visual similarity (Q4, Q7), 
intersensory interactions (Q5), and agency (Q2). Q1, Q3, Q5 and Q6 are usually supposed to 
be the core illusion questions (Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; 
Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Guterstam, Gentile & Ehrsson, 2013; Kammers, De Vignemont, 
Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009). The statements were: 
Q1. Sometimes I had the sensation that vibration I felt on my hand was on the same 
location where the virtual balloon on the screen was in contact with the virtual needle on the 
screen. 
Q2. The movements of the virtual balloon on the scren were caused by me. 
Q3. It sometimes seemed my own hand was located on the screen. 
Q4. The virtual balloon on the screen began to resembl  my own hand, in terms of 
shape, skin tone, freckles, or some other visual featur . 
Q5. Sometimes it seemed as if what I was feeling was caused by the virtual needle that 
I was seeing on the screen. 
Q6. Sometimes I felt as if the virtual balloon on the screen was my own hand or part 
of my body. 
Q7. It seemed as if I might have a balloon-like hand besides my right and left hands. 
Skin conductance response (SCR) measurements. We measured SCR during the 
entire experiment. SCR has been shown to be a reliabl  measurement of at least some aspects 
of illusory body ownership (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 2008; Guterstam, 
Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013). Given that SCR reflects emotional arousal, it was expected to 
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increase in response to the threat-inducing needle event to the degree that ownership for the 
threatened virtual object would be perceived (see Ma & Hommel, 2013).  
We defined a latency onset window between 1 and 8 seconds after stimulus/event 
onset, namely when the virtual needle appeared and st rted to move towards the virtual 
balloon, with the skin conductivity before stimulus/event onset serving as baseline (see 
Boucsein, 1992; Figner & Murphy, 2010; Armel & Ramach ndran, 2003; Ehrsson et al., 
2008). We then calculated the magnitude of the event-induced SCR by subtracting baseline 
skin conductivity from the peak amplitude of the SCR during the analyzed time window, and 
took the log(magnitude+1) per participant and condition. 
2.6. Results 
Responses to the seven items of the questionnaire and the SCR measures were 
analyzed by means of 2(synchronicity) X 2(needle’s end) X 2(explosion) ANOVAs with all 
independent factors varying within participants. Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant 
design features, the presence or absence of the ownrship illusion expressed as synchronicity 
effect for Q6, as well as the means for the aggregated illusion ratings (Q1, Q3, Q5 and Q6) 
and the most direct illusion rating (Q6) (see second column).  
Table 1. Overview of experimental factors (Hand Resemblance: whether the viewed object is 
similar to real hand; Connectedness: whether the viewed object is ‘connected’ to participants’ 
body), illusion presence and ratings (aggregated illusion ratings for Q1, Q3, Q5 and Q6/most 
direct illusion item [Q6]) of the four studies: Experiment 1, Ma & Hommel (2013), 
Experiment 2 and the Control study. 
 
Virtual balloon 
 (Experiment 1) 
Virtual hand (extended)  
(taken from Ma & Hommel, 
2013) 
Virtual square  
(Experiment 2) 




No Yes No Yes 
Connectedness No Yes Yes Yes 
Illusion Yes Yes Yes Yes 




The seven ANOVAs of the questionnaire items revealed highly significant main 
effects of synchronicity for all items, Fs(1,29) = 19.60-85.29; ps<0.001; ηp2s = 0.40-0.75 (see 
Figure 2 (A) and Table 2). The only two remaining effects were an interaction of explosion 
and synchronicity for Q6, F(1,29) = 7.07, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 0.20, indicating that participants 
felt more strongly that the screen object was part of their body if the balloon did not explode, 
and a main effect of explosion for Q7, F(1,29) = 4.62, p = 0.040, ηp2 = 0.14, indicating that 
participants felt more strongly to own an extra balloon-like hand if the balloon did explode. 
An ANOVA of the event-induced SCRs revealed only a significant main effect of 
synchronicity, F(1,29) = 4.26, p = 0.048, ηp2 = 0.13, showing more pronounced SCR with 
synchronicity (see Figure 2 (B)). To assess power,  calculated post-hoc power values by 
means of G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), based on the sample size of 
Experiment 1. For questionnaires results, the power to detect a large-sized effect (ηp2 ≥.14; 
Cohen, 1988) for the main effect of synchronicity, other main effects, and interactions was 
higher than .99. For SCR results, the power to detect a medium-sized effect (ηp2 ≥.13; Cohen, 
1988) for the main effect of synchronicity was higher than .99. Accordingly, we consider the 
size of our sample sufficient to detect the sought-for differences. 
  
Figure 2: Boxplots for (A) questionnaire ratings and (B) SCR results of Experiment 1. B0, B1, 

































































Table 2. Experiment 1: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the questionnaire 
ratings. B0: Balloon not exploding; B1: Balloon exploding; N0: Needle’s blunt end contacted 
the balloon; N1: Needle’s sharp end contacted the balloon; S: Synchronous balloon 
movements; AS: Asynchronous balloon movements. 



























































































































The synchronicity effects in Experiment 1 provide evid nce for perceived body-
ownership for an actively controlled virtual balloon. As such an object does not bear any 
obvious similarity to a human hand or other human effectors, it was unlikely to be represented 
in the participants’ body model. This demonstrates that synchronization-induced increases in 
perceived ownership do not require, and can thus not depend on processes that match external 
effector candidates against internal body representatio s, as top-down approaches suggest. A 
number of further observations are of interest: 
Firstly, we obtained significant synchronicity effects for all the questionnaire items 
and not just the most direct illusion question Q6 or the core illusion questions. This is not 
consistent with some prior RHI/VHI studies, which often found reliable effects only for core 
questions. However, we note that the questionnaire that the present and these previous studies 
used was developed for static rubber hands, while we mployed dynamic non-corporeal 
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objects/events. It is thus possible that the items of this questionnaire are not sufficiently 
specific to pick up ownership with more dynamic setups (and they indeed remain to be 
externally validated and psychometrically scrutinized), but it may also be that such dynamic 
setups produce more integrated percepts of ownership. 
Secondly, we note that the explosion manipulation affected two items, one as a main 
effect and one in interaction with synchronicity. The fact that the two effects contradict each 
other to some degree (explosion increased the illusion of owning extra hands in one case and 
reduced the illusion of owning the balloon as ones’ own hand in the other) makes these 
observations difficult to interpret. We speculate that two reasons might have been responsible. 
For one, the seeming contradiction may be taken as preliminary evidence for some, not yet 
fully understood role of affective factors in the prception of body ownership (see Ma & 
Hommel, 2013). For another, prior knowledge might have worked against the bottom-up 
bases of the illusion. While the synchronicity effect indicates that bottom-up information was 
effective in creating the illusion, resulting in the participants’ perception of the virtual balloon 
as their own hand or other body part, prior knowledge might have suggested that one’s own 
hand or body part does not explode through contact with a needle. If so, the balloon might 
have felt as one’s own hand if it did not explode, but as an extra hand if the balloon did 
explode. In any case, none of these effects eliminated the general illusion, as ratings were still 
significantly increased in the synchronicity condition.  
Thirdly, the mean direct ownership rating was relatively low (1.39), as was the mean 
for all illusion questions (aggregated illusion rating: 2.05 on the 0-4 rating scale; see Table 1). 
This means that participants were not very sure about whether the virtual balloon was or was 
not their hand or part of their body, a finding that is consistent with the equally low ratings for 
artificial objects reported by Short and Ward (2009). While these significant synchronicity 
effects show that some illusion was induced, it is interesting to consider possible reasons for 
the relatively low overall ratings. Equally low overall ratings (in the presence of significant 
synchronicity effects) were reported by Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, and Aglioti (2010), who 
found an ownership illusion for other people’s faces presented in front of the participants. 
This commonality might suggest that perceived connectedness between one’s own body and 
the virtual extension plays a role. Neither was the other person’s face connected to the bodies 
of the participants in the Sforza et al. study, nor we e the virtual balloons connected to 
participants’ real hands in our Experiment 1. Similarly, in the study of Short and Ward (2009), 
the virtual cones were not connected to participants’ real hands. These observations suggest 
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that the lack of connectedness might lead to a general drop of ownership ratings. Indeed, the 
VHI has been shown to be highly dependent on the apparent connectedness between the 
virtual object and the participant’s body (Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 2012). 
Another possible reason for the rather low illusion ratings in Experiment 1 might have been 
the multisensory mismatch resulting from the considerable apparent distance between the real 
hand and the balloon. Hence, taken altogether, there are reasons to assume that the illusion 
obtained in Experiment 1 represents a rather conservative estimate. 
3. Experiment 2 
As pointed out, Experiment 1 provides evidence for ownership illusions for non-
corporeal objects/events. However, even though the synchronicity effect was significant for 
all items, the overall level of the ratings for the location questions and the ownership question 
were rather low. We have discussed two possible reasons for that, namely, the (lack of) 
connectedness between real and candidate effector and spatial multisensory mismatch. 
According to this reasoning, increasing connectedness and reducing spatial mismatch should 
result in higher overall illusion ratings and, in particular, a higher ownership rating. We tested 
this possibility in Experiment 2, where we changed the setup so to maximize connectedness 
and minimize mismatch, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Setup of Experiment 2 and Control study. 
3.1. Rationale and design 
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 3, with the screen being placed on the top 
of the box to avoid (considerable) multisensory mismatch. This setup also presented the 
virtual object in a way that it looked better connected to participants’ bodies. A two-
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dimensional virtual square was used in Experiment 2 i stead of the virtual balloon in 
Experiment 1. Similar to the controllability of the balloon, the location, orientation, and color 
or size of the square changed synchronously or asynchro ously with the participant’s hand 
movements. While we optimized the setup for connectedness and multisensory matching, we 
used this particular object to make it even less similar to real human effectors than the virtual 
balloon used in Experiment 1. For one, while the virtual balloon was as three-dimensional as 
the participant’s real hand, the virtual square wastwo-dimensional. And, for another, while 
the size changes used in Experiment 1 and in the size condition of Experiment 2 bear some 
similarity to the opening and closing movement of the real hand (which also results in size 
changes of the real hand’s shape), the color changes used in the color condition of Experiment 
2 minimize this similarity. By comparing the results for the size and the color condition of 
Experiment 2, and by comparing the overall results of Experiment 2 to Experiment 1, these 
manipulations allowed us to assess the possible role of similarity between real hands and 
virtual objects. 
3.2. Method 
Twenty-two participants (5 males; mean age = 23 years, SD = 3.79 years, range 20-34) 
fulfilling the same criteria as in Experiment 1 were recruited. The study was approved by the 
Leiden University human research ethics committee. Th  participants experienced four 
conditions in balanced order, composed by combining two factors: (1) in addition to hand-
controlled location changes, the square changed either in size or in color with the opening and 
closing of the participant’s hand; and (2) the dimension changes of the virtual square were 
either synchronized or not synchronized with the movement of the participant’s hand.  
The experimental procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1. Participants 
wore the same instruments as shown in Figure 1 (A). They were seated in front of the screen 
and put their hands inside the box, and looked at the screen, as shown in Figure 3, where a 
virtual square appeared. In each trial, the participants were to rotate, open and close their 
hands freely. In the synchronous size trials, opening the hand made the virtual square bigger 
while closing the hand made it smaller, and in synchronous color change trials, opening the 
hand made the square greener while closing it made it bluer. The orientation of the virtual 
square changed synchronously with the orientation change of the real hand. This visuomotor 
phase lasted for 1 minute. Then visuotactile stimulation was applied: a virtual ball appeared 
and took four seconds to move to contact the virtual square, which was again accompanied by 
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vibration, and then took another four seconds to return to the original position. This procedure 
was repeated until 30 seconds were over. In asynchro ous trials, the orientation and color/size 
change of the virtual square was delayed by 2 seconds with respect to the hand movements, 
and the vibration was delayed by 2 seconds with respect to the contact with the square.  
After each condition, participants responded to the same seven questions as in 
Experiment 1, except that we replaced all references to the balloon by references to the square, 
and replaced all references to the virtual needle by references to the virtual ball. After the 
questionnaire and a short break, participants ran through the same procedure again, only that a 
threat phase was presented instead of the questionnaire. In the threat phase, we used the same 
virtual ball movement as in the synchronous condition. However, when the ball touched the 
square, the square broke into several pieces and partici nts received vibration at the palm of 
their hand. We measured SCR during the entire experiment, the SCR was computed almost 
the same way as in Experiment 1, except that the stimulus/event onset was defined as the time 
when the square broke. 
3.3. Results  
Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant design features, the presence or absence 
of the ownership illusion expressed as synchronicity effect for Q6, the mean of all illusion 
questions ratings, and the direct illusion question rating for Experiment 2. The most direct 
ownership illusion rating assessed by Q6 was 2.16 and the aggregated illusion rating (direct 
illusion and location questions) was 2.80 (see fourth column). 
Responses to the seven items of the questionnaire and the SCR measures were 
analyzed by means of 2(synchronicity) X 2(changing dimension) ANOVAs with all 
independent factors varying within participants. The seven ANOVAs of the questionnaire 
items revealed highly significant main effects of synchronicity for all questionnaire items, 
Fs(1,21) = 22.47-84.23; ps < 0.001; ηp2s = 0.52-0.80 (see Figure 4A and Table 3), indicating 
that the illusion was created for all aspects we asses ed. Moreover, there was an interaction 
between synchronicity and dimension for Q6, F(1,21) = 4.59, p = 0.044, ηp2 = 0.18, showing 
that participants felt more strongly that the screen object was part of their body if the square 
changed in color than in size. The ANOVA of the event-induced SCRs produced only a 
significant main effect of synchronicity, F(1,21) = 4.506, p = 0.046, ηp2 = 0.177, showing 
more pronounced SCR with synchronicity (see Figure 4B). Power was calculated as in 
Experiment 1. For questionnaire results, the power to detect a large-sized effect (ηp2 ≥.18) for 
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the main effect of synchronicity and an interaction was higher than .99. For SCR, the power to 
detect a large-sized effect (ηp2 ≥.177) for the main effect of synchronicity was higher than .99.  
Table 3. Experiment 2: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the questionnaire 
ratings. CC: Square color changes; SC: Square size changes; S: Synchronous square changes; 
AS: Asynchronous square changes. 































































Figure 4: Boxplots for (A) Questionnaire ratings and (B) SCR results of Experiment 2. CC, 
SC, S, AS represent same conditions as in Table 3. Error bars represent ± 2 SD. 
3.4. Discussion 
Table 1 shows that ownership illusory ratings were higher for the virtual square in 
Experiment 2 than for the virtual balloon in Experiment 1; moreover, the rating for the direct 
illusion question Q6 was higher than the middle score. Together with the high ownership 
illusory ratings, the synchronicity effects in Experiment 2 clearly indicate that participants 




























































also supports our hypothesis that connectedness and minimal multisensory mismatch 
contribute to a high degree of perceived ownership. 
The illusion again affected all questions, which confirms our previous observations 
that the standard RHI/VHI questionnaire is less specific (or the underlying processes are more 
integrated) with virtual, dynamic manipulations than it is for static rubber hands. The illusion 
was not any stronger for the size condition, which arguably captured more aspects of the real-
hand movements that controlled the size of the virtual object, than for the color condition. In 
fact, the significant interaction for Q6 indicates hat the main ownership question was more 
sensitive to the color manipulation than to the siz manipulation. This shows that the 
similarity between real hand and virtual object, including their dynamics, do not seem to play 
a relevant role in inducing ownership illusions above and beyond basic spatiotemporal 
intersensory matching.  
Another interesting observation was that the SCR level was lower in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 1. Along the lines of Ma and Hommel (2013), this is likely to reflect the 
impression that a ball hitting a virtual square (as used in Experiment 2) is perceived to be less 
threatening and less related to the real hand than a needle pricking into a virtual balloon (as 
used in Experiment 1). Hence, this observation provides convergent evidence that affective 
factors play a role in the perception of body ownership. 
Taken together, the findings confirm our observation fr m Experiment 1 in showing 
that participants are likely to perceive ownership for a virtual object the shape or color of 
which they can directly control.  
4. Control study 
In the two experiments, we showed that participants can perceive non-corporeal 
objects as part of their own body, especially when the non-corporeal object was presented 
with optimized connectedness and multisensory matching. But one may argue that, despite the 
relatively high direct illusion item rating for the virtual square in Experiment 2, the absolute 
rating is still lower than in some previous studies that were using virtual hands (e.g., 
Kammers, De Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009; Slater et al., 2008). To explore this 
issue, we considered the data from a previous study from our lab and ran a control study to 
collect ratings of corporeal objects (i.e., virtual h nds) within the same virtual environment 
and experimental setup. 
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To allow for a direct comparison between the non-corporeal condition of the present 
Experiment 1 with a corporeal-effector condition, we compared our findings to data from a 
previous study. In this study, we replicated the VHI with virtual objects that looked like real 
human hands, as reported by Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehr son, and Sanchez-Vives (2008), and 
had the virtual hands threatened by a cutting knife (instead of the pricking injection needle 
that we used in the present Experiment 1). That is, part from the particular kind of threat and 
the use of virtual hands rather than other virtual objects, the experimental conditions were 
identical. This study (reported and further described in Ma & Hommel, 2013) tested 18 
participants and used a virtual display that seemed to extend the participant’s own invisible 
hand into virtual space. Synchronicity manipulation and questionnaire were as in the present 
study (see Table 1, third column). As Table 1 shows, the ratings in Ma & Hommel (2013) 
were as high as in the present Experiment 2 but higher than in the present Experiment 1. 
Given that the setup of Ma and Hommel (2013) was different from the setup used in 
the present Experiment 2—which minimized the multisensory mismatch—we ran a further 
control study to see whether a corporeal version of Experiment 2 would produce higher 
ownership ratings than our non-corporeal version. To do so, we replace the square by a virtual 
human hand that seemed connected to the participant’s shoulder, and was located above the 
real hand, with the otherwise identical setup as in Experiment 2 (shown in Figure 3). The 
experimental procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 with a virtual ball touching the 
virtual hand. All questionnaire items were the same as Experiment 2, except that we replaced 
references to the square by references to the virtual hand. We tested 24 participants (6 males; 
mean age = 23 years, SD = 3.87 years, range 20-34) who fulfilled the same criteria as in 
Experiment 1 and 2 were recruited. The study was approved by the Leiden University human 
research ethics committee.  
The seven ANOVAs of the questionnaire items ratings revealed highly significant 
main effects of synchronicity for all items except Q7, Fs(1,23) = 6.94-28.37; ps < 0.015; ηp2s 
= 0.23-0.55 (see Figure 5 and Table 4). The power to de ect a large-sized effect (ηp2 ≥.23) for 
the main effect of synchronicity was higher than .99. The direct ownership rating assessed by 
Q6 was 2.31 and the aggregated illusion rating (direct illusion and location questions) was 
2.81 (see Table 1, fifth column).  
As Table 1 shows, with the optimized multisensory matching in the Control study, the 
illusion ratings did not differ from the ratings of Ma and Hommel (2013). This result is 
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consistent with previous RHI/VHI studies (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Ehrsson et al., 
2008; Kammers, De Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009; Slater et al., 2008; Ma & 
Hommel, 2013), in which a rubber/virtual hand induced the illusion successfully in different 
positions near the real hand. The fact that it does not matter much whether the virtual hand 
seems to extend from or is located above the real hand suggests that the spatial distances 
within the range of our manipulations do not affect the degree of multisensory mismatch in 
our virtual environment. This provides indirect evidence for the possibility that connectedness 
(which was optimal in the Control study and in Ma & Hommel, 2013) plays a role. 
Table 4. Control study: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for the questionnaire 
ratings. 

































Figure 5: Boxplots for Questionnaire ratings of Contr l study. Error bars represent ± 2 SD. 
Even more importantly, the ratings were comparable for Experiment 2 and the two 
virtual hand studies, which does not provide any evidence that synchronicity-induced 
ownership illusions are any more convincing for corporeal than for non-corporeal virtual 
objects. Moreover, our findings suggest that perceived connectedness between real hand and 
virtual object is not necessary for the ownership illusion as such, even though it increases the 





























5. General Discussion 
In two experiments, we showed that people are more likely to perceive a virtual 
balloon or a square as part of their body if they have direct, immediate control over 
spatiotemporal and appearance-related features of these objects. Body ownership was 
accompanied by significantly stronger affective “care” about the respective object, as 
indicated in the increases in SCR—a pattern that has also been claimed to indicate ownership 
(Armel & Ramachandran, 2003). Taken altogether, our findings amount to an existence proof 
that non-corporeal objects can be perceived as partof one’s own body, which provides strong 
evidence against the idea that perceived body-ownership elies on pre-existing, temporally 
stable body models (Tsakiris, 2010). This challenges th  speculation that body representations 
integrate novel parts only to the degree that there is a functional reason for that part to be 
integrated (Tsakiris et al., 2007) and provides strong support for bottom-up approaches to 
self-representation (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Armel & Ramachandran, 2003).  
Our findings also show that the integration of temporally and spatially congruent 
multisensory signals is sufficient to induce the body wnership illusion, even when visual 
information directly contradicts the presence of a physical limb at the location of the 
perceived illusory hand or effector. However, we also found that the ownership illusion is 
more convincing if real and virtual effectors seem to be close and connected. This suggests 
that self-perception is modulated by Gestalt laws, as known from object perception, where 
connectedness (as captured by the laws of proximity and the law of continuity) is a central cue 
for perceived unity (i.e., belongingness to the same object or event; e.g., Sternberg, 2003). 
Hence, the process of perceiving oneself may not be special but rely on the same principles as 
perceiving objects and non-personal events (Hommel, 2013; Hommel, Colzato, & van den 
Wildenberg, 2009)—including Gestalt laws. In the following, we discuss a number of 
theoretical and practical implications of our findigs. 
An obvious theoretical implication of our findings is that similarity between one’s 
body parts and a novel candidate effector is unlikely to be a necessary requirement for 
ownership perception. Tsakiris (2010) has suggested that an object will be perceived as a 
body part if, and only if, it meets three criteria: (1) the visual appearance of the object matches 
internal knowledge about of the shape of human body parts; (2) the postural and anatomical 
state of the object matches that of a real effector (that is hidden from view); and (3) seen 
stimuli (about the object) and felt stimuli (about ne’s real effector) match. In the present 
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study, the third criterion was fully met, but neithr did the balloon or the square look similar 
to any of our participants’ body parts nor did the balloon’s or square’s postural and 
anatomical state match that of a real effector. This implies that the first and second criterion 
are unlikely to be absolutely critical for inducing illusory ownership. If so, our findings are 
more consistent with a (however very relaxed and stripped) version of the model proposed by 
Makin, Holmes, and Ehrsson, (2008), with the only remaining constraint that virtual object 
and body are perceived to be connected. 
Another interesting finding of our study that may be of either methodological or 
theoretical relevance is that we found comparable synchronicity effects for almost all 
questionnaire items. On the one hand, this might indicate that the questionnaire taken from 
traditional RHI studies does not work quite as well for non-corporeal virtual objects. On the 
other hand, however, this may be more than a methodological observation. It is possible that 
static manipulations systematically underestimate the impact of synchronicity manipulations 
on all self-perception aspects but the most direct ownership question. More dynamic 
manipulations may make more perceptual dimensions perceivable or salient, which then leads 
to measurable synchronicity effects on all items relating to any aspect of self-perception. In 
other words, the broader, less selective effects we consistently observed may represent the 
more realistic pattern. This possibility would fit the idea that ownership and agency may be 
more closely related than hitherto assumed (cf., Short & Ward, 2009). 
It is interesting to note that our finding of a rather close relationship between 
ownership and agency does not seem to fit with recent observations of Kalckert and Ehrsson 
(2014). They compared three versions of the classicl rubber-hand setup: a standard version in 
which the experimenter stroked both the rubber hand and the real hand; a passive movement 
condition in which the experimenter moved a finger of the rubber hand and a finger of the real 
hand; and an active movement condition in which the participant him or herself moved a 
finger of the real hand and thereby induced a movement of the corresponding rubber-hand 
finger. The findings did not provide evidence for the difference between these three 
conditions, and so the authors concluded that these conditions are comparable. Given that the 
active-movement condition can be considered to induce more agency (which is indeed what 
the authors observed), the failure to find more pronounced ownership does not seem to fit 
with our results. The fact that Kalckert and Ehrsson (2014) manipulated agency within a 
rubber-hand setup while we manipulated agency within a virtual-hand setup makes direct 
comparisons difficult, and null effects are difficult to interpret as well. However, we note that 
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the agency-inducing condition in the Kalckert and Ehrsson study was unlikely to increase the 
amount of cross-modal stimulation—it just brought the ime point of stimulation under the 
control of the participant. In contrast, our setup strongly boosted the number of data points 
available for cross-modal comparison in the agency condition. This can be taken to support 
the speculation that it is not the experience of agency that matters for ownership but the 
amount of bottom-up information that is available for cross-modal matching operations. In 
other words, it seems that it is not the experience of agency but objective agency and its 
information-generating potential that play the decisive role. 
While our findings do not support claims of a necessary role of top-down factors in the 
experience of body ownership, they do leave space for a possible compensatory or additive 
role in ownership perception. The very fact that peopl  accept immobile rubber hands as body 
parts may suggest that body-part resemblance can compensate for controllability. This would 
fit the considerations of Short and Ward (2009), who assume that a wide variety of virtual 
objects can be incorporated if their actions are predictable and in accordance with the 
intentions of the agent. In the absence of control, other factors, such as visual appearance, 
other anatomical and postural properties, may becom more important.  
More generally speaking, perceived ownership might arise from a rather broad 
integration of both top-down and bottom-up factors, much like it has been considered for 
judgments of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008). Indeed, in real life neither 
ownership nor agency issues are particularly common, s  that evolutionary pressure to create 
dedicated mechanisms to explicitly judge ownership or agency must have been low. If so, 
people that are forced to make such judgments are likely to “grab” any information they can 
get hold on, so that the use of multiple sources of inf rmation and stimulation seems to make 
a lot of sense. 
Taken altogether, our findings challenge strict top-d wn models that require a match 
between external objects and some internal body repres ntation for illusory ownership to 
occur. Rather, people seem to be relatively liberal in ccepting all sorts of objects to become 
part of their body, if they can control relevant features and the behavior of these objects, and 
in particular if the objects seem physically connected to their body. In other words, people 
perceive as their body everything that expresses their intentions, including things within reach 
that move “as they wish”. Given the emphasis of the ideomotor approach to action control on 
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self-generated action effects (Hommel, 2009), this suggests that ideomotor mechanisms play 
an important role in the generation of self-representations (Hommel, 2013).  
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The rubber hand illusion shows that people can perceive artificial effectors as part of 
their own body under suitable conditions, and the virtual hand illusion shows the same for 
virtual effectors. In this study, we compared a virtual version of the rubber-hand setup with a 
virtual-hand setup, and manipulated the synchrony between stimulation or movement of a 
virtual “effector” and stimulation or movement of people’s own hand, the similarity between 
the virtual effector and people’s own hand, and the degree of agency, that is, the degree to 
which the virtual effector could be controlled by peo le’s own movements. Findings show 
that synchrony-induced ownership illusion is strongly affected by agency but not by 
similarity, which indicates the role of agency in virtual hand illusion, and is inconsistent with 
top-down modulation approaches but consistent with bottom-up approaches to ownership. 
However, both agency and similarity induce a general bias towards perceiving an object as 
part of one’s body, suggesting that ownership judgments integrate various sources of 
information. 
 
Keywords: Rubber hand illusion, Virtual hand illusion, Body ownership, Body 









How do we come to experience ourselves as independent individuals? According to 
Jeannerod (2003), self-perception relies on two ingredients: experiencing oneself as the owner 
of one’s body (ownership) and experiencing oneself as the agent of one’s actions (authorship 
or agency). Recent research on body ownership has made use of the rubber hand illusion 
(RHI). In the classical RHI study design, a person’ real hand is hidden from his or her view 
and a static rubber hand is being placed in front of his or her—often in close distance to the 
real hand. Then the real and the rubber hand are synchronously or asynchronously stroked or 
otherwise stimulated (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010). After receiving synchronous (but not 
asynchronous) stimulation for several minutes or even shorter time periods (Tsakiris, Prabhu, 
& Haggard, 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014), participants start to feel the stimulation at the 
location of the rubber hand, rather than on their real hand, and report perceiving the rubber 
hand as their own hand (sense of ownership) and as more controllable (sense of agency) 
(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014). More recently, various re earchers were able to replicate the RHI 
in virtual environments by replacing the rubber hand by a virtual hand—which often can be 
controlled by the participants by means of a data glove (the virtual hand illusion or VHI; see 
Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Ma & 
Hommel, 2013, 2015). The main question the present study aimed to address was whether the 
RHI and the VHI are the same. While this might be considered a rather methodological 
question, we think it relates to two major theoretical issues that are dominating research on 
body ownership: the relevance of bottom-up and top-d wn factors in creating ownership 
illusions, like the RHI and the VHI, and the relationship between ownership and agency. 
1.1. Bottom-up and top-down factors 
With regard to the first question, one can distingush two general approaches, one 
assuming that bottom-up information (such as created by synchronous stroking) is sufficient 
to create the illusion of body ownership and another at assumes an interaction between 
bottom-up information and top-down-operating schemata representing body characteristics. 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998) and Armel and Ramachandran (2003) proposed versions of a 
bottom-up account, that assumes that the processing of spatially and temporally matching 
multisensory information, such as coming from the se n stroking of a rubber hand and the felt 
stroking of one’s own hand, is sufficient to perceive an object as part of one’s body. In 
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support of that assumption, Armel and Ramachandran (2003) provided some preliminary 
evidence that participants can perceive ownership for a wooden table and feel nervous when 
they see the table being “hurt”—even though the experimental design of this study was likely 
to invite transfer effects. Later research revealed  number of further constraints that seem to 
limit the impact of bottom-up information, such as the anatomical and postural properties of 
the artificial hand in relation to one’s own hand (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; 
Pavani & Zampini, 2007; Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, 
Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009; Lloyd, 2007; Haans, IJssel teijn, & de Kort, 2008; De Vignemont, 
2011).  
These and other observations have been taken to imply contributions of a relatively 
permanent body representation that gates the processing of bottom-up information. For 
instance, Makin, Holmes, and Ehrsson (2008; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; 
Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 2003; Cardinali, Brozzoli, & Farnè, 2009; Làdavas, 2002; 
Brozzoli, Gentile, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Brozzoli, Gentile, Bergouignan, & Ehrsson, 
2013) have suggested that ownership illusions can only be created if the rubber hand is placed 
in an anatomically and postural plausible (i.e., expected, given the current position of one’s 
real hand) position, and if the synchronous stimulation is presented near to the artificial hand. 
Another, even more top-down-heavy model was proposed by Tsakiris (2010). He assumes 
that people possess a relatively permanent model of their own body, which contains 
information about both the structural aspects of the body in general and about the current 
states and effector positions. Bottom-up information will consistently be checked for a match 
with information from the body model and censored in the case of a mismatch (Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; 
Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Lloyd, 2007). According to this approach, the resemblance 
between the visible artificial effector and the real h nd/body part is a predominant factor for 
RHI illusions (Tsakiris et al., 2010): Artificial eff ctors are perceived as body parts only if 
they are sufficiently similar to the content of the internal body model, which in turn represents 
the person’s actual body. However, in contrast to this prediction, the similarity between real 
and artificial effectors failed to play a decisive role in several studies. For example, using a 
rubber hand with a skin color or roughness different from the participant’s real hand did not 
reduce the strength of the ownership illusion (Schütz-Bosbach, Tausche, & Weiss, 2009; 
White, Davies, Halleen, & Davies, 2010; Longo et al., 2009; Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, & 
Chapter 4 
65 
Tsakiris, 2012) and even balloons and geometric objects (Ma & Hommel, 2015) or empty 
spaces (i.e., objects bearing no similarity to peopl ’s real effectors) can be incorporated by 
healthy participants (Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013). These findings do not support the 
idea that artificial effectors are accepted as body parts only if they are sufficiently similar to 
components of internally stored body representations. 
1.2. Ownership and agency 
While earlier studies tended to consider body ownership and agency as separate 
components of the self (see Jeannerod, 2003; Gallagher, 2000; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Gallagher, 2007), there is increasing evidence that these two factors interact in producing 
ownership illusions (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Tsakiris, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Burin et al., 2015; 
Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Ma & Hommel, 2013, 2015). However, the relationship between 
sense of ownership and sense of agency is still not clear: Some studies showed greater sense 
of illusory ownership with greater sense of agency, some studies showed the opposite 
relationship between the two senses, and some studie  showed no correlation at all.  
For example, Burin et al. (2015) found that patients with left upper limb hemiplegia 
display stronger illusory effects than healthy participants when the affected hand is stimulated 
but no effects when the unaffected hand is stimulated, and concluded that active movement 
plays a role for body ownership maintenance. Along the same lines, Kokkinara and Slater 
(2014) observed higher ownership for a virtual leg in active-movement than visuotactile-
stimulation conditions. Caspar et al. (2014) also repo t a positive correlation between agency 
and ownership ratings. However, Walsh and colleagues (2011) showed that ratings for 
passive-stimulation conditions were higher than for active-movement conditions and Dummer 
and colleagues (2009) found more pronounced ownership illusions for visuotactile stimulation 
than for active and passive movement conditions. Latly, Riemer and colleagues (2013) report 
equally strong subjective ratings for active-movements and visuotactile-stimulated conditions 
and both Tsakiris et al. (2006) and Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012, 2014) found no difference in 
ownership ratings or proprioceptive drift between three conditions that differed in activity. To 
add to the confusion, Braun et al. (2014) found some associations and some double-
dissociations between sense of agency and sense of ownership (also see Caspar, Cleeremans, 
& Haggard, 2015; Imaizumi & Asai, 2015; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). 
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What might be the reason for these confusing, seemingly nconsistent findings? We 
suggest that terminological confusion may be the main culprit. As discussed elsewhere 
(Hommel, in 2015a), objective ownership and agency is often confused with the subjective 
experience of ownership and agency, commonly called th  sense of ownership and the sense 
of agency, respectively (for an example, see Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007). 
Whereas objective agency refers to the question whether a person was actually producing a 
particular action, subjective (perceived) agency is about whether this person is actually 
sensing, experiencing, or reporting to have some sort of authorship. Objective agency may or 
may not provide the critical information used for subjective agency: While most researchers 
investigating the sense of agency implicitly assume that it does (so that manipulations of 
objective agency are assumed to be reflected in subjective agency), some authors have argued 
that objective and subjective agency rely on different sources of information (e.g., Wegner, 
2003). At the same time, objective agency is likely to provide crucial information for 
subjective ownership: when in doubt whether an object b longs to one’s body the most 
obvious test would be to try moving it intentionally (e.g., when having perceptually “lost” 
one’s hands under the table during intense discussion), and Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard 
(2006) have indeed considered the possibility that con rol over an effector determines both 
sense of agency and sense of ownership. Importantly, however, the previous investigations of 
the relationship between ownership and agency have not focused on the impact of objective 
agency on subjective ownership but, rather, on the relationship between subjective agency and 
subjective ownership.  
Among other things, this overlooks the fact that objective agency (subjectively 
experienced or not) provides a means to create re-afferent multimodal stimulation, which 
according to bottom-up approaches to ownership should increase the informational basis to 
make ownership judgments. This suggests that the traditional RHI setup, in which the 
artificial effector is either completely static (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) or moves with the real 
effector in rather limited ways (Dummer, Picot-Annad, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Tsakiris, 
Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012, 2014a), is a particularly conservative, ecologically invalid measure of the perception of 
ownership—which according to our considerations may be the main reason for the conflicting 
findings of earlier studies. In contrast, VHI setups, in which the virtual hand can be almost 
freely moved in sync with the real hand (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Ma & Hommel, 2013, 
2015; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2012; Padilla et al., 2010), and which 
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sometimes even include simulated contact with other virtual objects, provide a much richer 
database. Indeed, continuously moving one’s felt hand together with the seen virtual hand and 
having simulated contact with another object creates hundreds if not thousands of data points 
that can be correlated to calculate the degree of intermodal matching. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that VHI studies provide much more evidence for correlations between measures of 
body ownership and measures of agency than RHI studie  do (e.g., Ma & Hommel, 2013, 
2015; Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Padilla et al., 2010). 
1.3. Aim of study 
To get back to our original question, we consider RHI setups and VHI setups as 
basically addressing the same issue but as different with respect to their sensitivity to the 
influence of (objective) agency. RHI setups create highly artificial situations in which the 
agent is prevented from using active exploration to find out whether the artificial effector is 
part of her own body. This drastically restricts the available database for judging ownership, 
so that this setup can be considered to underestimate the contribution of bottom-up factors in 
the role of (objective) agency. In contrast, VHI setups permit the agent to actively explore and 
generate a rich database for ownership judgments. As this is particularly true for cases of 
objective agency, it makes sense to assume that subjective ownership and subjective agency 
correlate to the degree that objective agency translates into subjective agency—which again is 
more likely with VHI setups. 
Motivated by these considerations, the present study directly compared a RHI-type 
setup (i.e., a VHI setup that sought to re-create the classical RHI setup as far as possible) with 
a VHI setup. With the RHI-type setup, participants passively received visuotactile stimulation, 
just like in the classical rubber-hand study, which is why we refer to this condition as the 
“passive condition”. In addition to visual tactile stimulation, participants were allowed to 
actively operate the virtual hand by moving their own hand with the VHI setup, which is why 
we refer to this as the “active condition”. Hence, the major difference between the two 
conditions was the presence or absence of efferent and re-afferent information about the 
participant’s self-produced movement. Our first prediction was that the latter, which allowed 
active exploration, would lead to the stronger perception of ownership of the artificial effector 
than the former, which used passive stimulation. We tested this hypothesis by comparing 
synchronous stimulation/action conditions with asynchronous stimulation/action conditions. 
As common in rubber-hand studies, we considered the synchrony effect as an indication of 
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(synchrony-induced) ownership and were interested to see whether our passive/active 
manipulation would modify this effect in the expected direction. 
Our second question was whether the resemblance betw en the artificial and the real 
effector would matter. According to top-down approaches of ownership (Makin, Holmes, & 
Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakiris, 2010), lesser resemblance should reduce, if not eliminate the illusion 
of ownership, because bottom-up information would only be accepted if it matches the 
internal body representation. In contrast to this prediction, in a recent study we obtained 
significant ownership effects for visual balloons changing in size, and squares changing in 
size or color, in sync with movements that the participants carried out with their real hand 
(Ma & Hommel, 2015). In the present study, we thus wanted to see whether these effects are 
replicable and whether they may interact with the passive/active manipulation. 
We used a similar VHI setup as Ma & Hommel (2013, 2015). In a within-participants 
design, we manipulated (a) the resemblance between th  real hand of the participants and a 
virtual object (henceforth “effector”), which was a virtual hand or a virtual rectangle; (b) the 
way the participants encountered another virtual object, which they did either passively, by 
keeping the real hand still and waiting for a virtual object to touch the virtual effector, or 
actively, by moving their real hand to move the virtual effector to touch the other virtual 
object; and (c) the synchrony between the movements of the virtual effector and either the 
stimulation (in the passive condition) or the active movement (in the active condition) of the 
real hand. We assessed the subjective experience of ownership for the virtual effector in the 
different conditions by means of an adjusted Botvinick/Cohen-style questionnaire, and for 
explorative purposes we also included measures of proprioceptive drift and skin conductance 
responses (SCR). The proprioceptive drift represents the recalibration of proprioceptive 
information of the real hand towards the visually viewed candidate effector. While various 
RHI studies have used proprioceptive drift rates as an objective equivalent to the perception 
of ownership (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2014; Kammers, De Vignemont, Verhagen, & Dijkerman, 2009; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010), the two measures often diverge, which renders their 
conceptual relationship opaque. Irrespective of this relationship, there is evidence that the 
drift rates relate to visuo-proprioceptive mismatch between the seen and felt position of the 
hand (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Rohde, Di Luca & Ernst, 2011). The SCR measure 
represents the affective arousal that is elicited by threatening virtual effectors that are 
perceived as part of one’s own body—a measure that sometimes parallels the perception of 
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ownership (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013) and 
sometimes diverges from it (Ma & Hommel, 2013). 
2. Experiment 
The experiment adopted the basic VHI setup of Ma and Hommel (2013; 2015: Exp. 2). 
Participants were facing a horizontally oriented screen on top of a black box, in which they 
put their real hands (see Figure 1). In each condition, one of two virtual “effectors” appeared 
on the screen: either a virtual hand that looked like a human hand or a virtual green rectangle. 
In the active conditions, the participant could contr l the movement and orientation of the 
virtual hand, or the movement, orientation, and size of the virtual rectangle, by moving their 
right unseen hand by means of a data glove. In the passive conditions, participants did not 
control characteristics of the virtual effector but were presented with multimodal stimulation, 
similar to the classical rubber-hand manipulation. A virtual stick (i.e., a virtual object that 
would interact with the virtual effector) was shown o  the screen. It sometimes contacted the 
virtual effector, which would trigger a vibration of the vibration stimulator on the data 
glove—so to give participants the impression of real contact. The movements of the real hand 
(in the active conditions) or the visual contact between the virtual effector and the virtual stick 
(in both active and passive conditions) were either directly translated into the orientation or 
size changes of the virtual effector (in the active conditions) or the vibrotactile stimulation (in 
the active and passive conditions), respectively (the synchronous conditions); or with a 
considerable temporal delay (the asynchronous conditi s). To induce ownership-related 
affective responses in the SCR, we designed a threat phase, in which participants were shown 
a virtual knife that would cut the virtual effector (see Ma & Hommel, 2013, 2015).  
2.1. Participants 
Forty-four participants (10 males; mean age = 24 years, SD = 2.93, range 20-34) were 
recruited from Leiden University in exchange for course credit or pay. We used the 
department’s standard advertisement system and accepted all volunteers registering in the first 
wave. Informed consent was obtained from all participants before the experiment, which was 
approved by the Leiden University Human research ethics committee. Participants were naive 





Participants underwent 8 conditions, presented in counterbalanced order, which 
emerged from crossing three factors: (1) the virtual effector (a virtual hand, which resembled 
the participants own real hand, vs. a virtual rectangle that did not); (2) the kind of 
stimulation/control (active vs. passive); and (3) the degree of synchrony between real hand 
movements and movements of the virtual effector or between or visual impact on the virtual 
effector and vibrotactile stimulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous).  
2.3. Experimental setup 
The study was performed in a virtual reality environment (see Ma & Hommel, 2013). 
The setup consisted of a 3-DOF orientation tracker (InterSense), a data glove (Cyberglove, 
measurement frequency = 100 HZ, latency = 10 ms), a black box (50 X 24 cm X 38 cm) 
which the participant put his or her right hand into along the depth axis, so to shield it from 
view, a cloth placed over the participant’s right soulder to cover the space between the 
virtual effector and the participant, and virtual reality software (Vizard). The Cyberglove has 
six vibration stimulators attached, one on each finger and one on the palm; they are 
programmable to set the vibration time and strength (Vibrational frequency = 0-125 Hz). We 
designed a virtual hand and a virtual rectangle and imported the two effectors, the tracker and 
data glove module into Vizard, so the virtual hand or rectangle received the data from the 
tracker and data glove and was controlled by the participant’s hand movement (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Experimental setup. Participants wore an orientation tracker and a data glove on 
their right hand, and SCR remote transmitter on their left hand, the cloth served to cover the 




Participants were seated in front of the black box with a computer monitor on its top. 
They wore the glove on their right hand and the orintation tracker on their right wrist, put 
their hands inside the box, and looked down on the monitor. The computer program generated 
a virtual effector on the screen and the trial started. Each participant ran through all eight 
conditions following a sequence that was balanced aross participants. The conditions were 
nested in such a way that: (a) the first four conditions used one virtual effector and the last 
four conditions the other; (b) the first two conditions within each effector block were all 
active or all passive, while the last two conditions would be passive or active, respectively; (c) 
and synchrony would alternate from each condition to the next. Each condition would consist 
of a pre-measure of proprioceptive hand location (explained below), the actual induction of 
the illusion for about 90 seconds, a post-measure of proprioceptive hand location, the 
presentation of the questionnaire and, after a short break, the threat phase. This threat phase 
repeated the previous illusion-induction procedure fo  another 90 seconds, after which a 
virtual knife would cut the virtual effector. SCR was measured during the entire threat phase. 
During the illusion-induction phase of the synchronous/passive conditions, 
participants were unable to move the virtual effector and were asked to keep their real hand 
still while watching the virtual effector. Then a virtual blue stick appeared on the screen and 
took two seconds to move to contact the viewed effector, which was associated with the onset 
of the finger vibration stimulator of the glove, and then took another two seconds to return to 
its original position. This procedure was repeated until 90 seconds were over. The respective 
asynchronous conditions were the same except that the felt vibration was delayed by two 
seconds.  
In the illusion-induction phase of synchronous/active conditions, participants were 
asked to move their fingers and rotate their real hands freely and watch the movement/size 
changes and orientation changes of the virtual effectors for 90 seconds, during which the 
orientation and posture of the virtual hand, or the ori ntation and size of the virtual rectangle, 
changed in synchrony with the participant’s own hand movements (i.e., the orientation and 
the opening and closing of the participant’s real hand. A virtual blue stick appeared on the 
screen and participants were asked to freely move their real hands to control the virtual 
effector so to touch the virtual stick repeatedly with their fingers; and each contact with the 
stick would lead to a felt vibration on the fingers. The asynchronous conditions were the same 
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except that the seen movements of the virtual effector corresponding to the real hand 
movement were delayed by five seconds, and the felt vibration did not coincide with the 
finger’s contact with the stick but with a stick position away from the hand. 
For the proprioceptive drift measurement, the position of the virtual effector, the real 
positions, and the felt proprioceptive position of the real hidden hand were measured before 
and after the first illusion-induction phase of each condition. Participants were exposed to a 
horizontal array of letters on the screen and were asked to indicate which letter would 
correspond to the felt position of the real hidden ha d middle fingertip; the experimenter also 
recorded the positions of both the virtual hand’s middle fingertip (or the virtual rectangle’s 
midline) and the real hand’s middle fingertip with reference to the same array. The sequences 
of the shown letters were randomly determined and different for each condition, so to avoid 
response strategy is based on the recall of the previous response.  
In the threat phase, participants were asked to keep their hand still, so that the virtual 
effector would not move. A virtual knife appeared on the screen, took four seconds to 
approach and cut the virtual effector, the cut position is approximately on fingers of the 
virtual hand or front part of the virtual rectangle, which was associated with the onset of the 
finger vibration stimulator of the glove, and then took another four seconds to return to its 
original position. This procedure was repeated for several times and it was the same for all 
conditions. 
2.5. Measurements 
Questionnaire. To assess the extent to which participants experienced the VHI we 
used an adapted version of the standard RHI questionna re (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; 
Slater et al., 2008; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014; Kammers, De Vignemont, Verhagen, & 
Dijkerman, 2009). For each statement, participants responded by choosing a score in a 7-point 
(1-7) Likert scale, ranging from 1 for ‘strongly disagree’ to 7 for ‘strongly agree’. The 
statements for virtual hand conditions were: 
Q1. I felt as if the hand on the screen were my right hand or part of my body. 
Q2. it seemed as if what I were feeling on my right hand was caused by the touch of 
the blue stick on the hand on the screen that I was seeing. 
Q3. I had the sensation that the vibration I felt on my right hand was on the same 
location where the hand on the screen was touched by the blue stick. 
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Q4. It seemed my right hand was in the location where the hand on the screen was. 
Q5. It seemed like I could not really tell where myright hand was. 
Q6. It no longer felt like my right hand belonged to my body. 
Q7. It seemed as if I might have a third hand besides my left and right hands. 
Q8. The vibration on my right hand and touch on the hand on the screen were at the 
same time. 
Q9. Sometimes I felt as if my right hand were turning virtual. 
Q10. The hand on the screen began to resemble my right hand, in terms of shape, skin 
tone, or some other visual feature. 
Q11. It appeared (visually) as if the hand on the scr en were drifting towards my right 
hand. 
Q12. It seemed like I could have moved the hand on the screen if I had wanted, as if it 
were obeying my will (In passive conditions). OR, The movements of the hand on the screen 
were caused by myself (In active conditions). 
Q13. I felt as if my right hand grew longer. 
According to Botvinick and Cohen (1998), Slater et al., (2009), and Kalckert and 
Ehrsson (2014), Q1 directly assesses the ownership illusion, Q1-Q4 are considered 
ownership-related questions (that are sometimes aggregated to assess ownership, as in 
Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2014), and Q12 is an agency question. The remaining questions assess 
more specific (and probably design-dependent) percetual aspects and correlates of the 
illusion. For questionnaires in the virtual rectangle conditions, we replaced the reference to 
virtual hand with the reference to virtual rectangle; Q7 was changed to ‘It seemed as if I might 
have a rectangle-like hand besides my left and right hands’. 
Proprioceptive drift measurement. We recorded the three letters in the letter array 
corresponding to virtual effector position, the real position and the felt position of the real 
hidden hand before and after the illusion induction process (Botvinick & Cohen 1998; Tsaliris, 
Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014). The computer screen was 48 cm wide. 
We measured the actual positions of each letter in the letter array shown on the screen. The 
letters sizes differed depending on their alphabetic shape, with the biggest letter measuring 
approximately 0.4cm. Because the real hand position and virtual effector positions could be 
different before and after the illusion induction in active conditions, we standardized the six 
positions in pre- and post-measurements for each conditi n, so as to relate all measures to the 
same scale. We calculated the proprioceptive drift by subtracting the participants’ felt position 
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at the post-measure from the felt position at the pre-measure, so that positive values imply a 
drift towards the virtual effector. 
Skin conductance response (SCR) measurement. SCR data were recorded with a 
Biopac MP100 acquisition unit and AcqKnowledge software. The SCR remote transmitter 
with a strap was worn on the participant's left wrist. We measured SCR during the threat 
phase and then defined a latency onset window between 1 and 6 seconds after stimulus/event 
onset, namely when the virtual knife cut the virtual effector, with the skin conductivity before 
event onset serving as baseline (see Boucsein, 1992; Figner & Murphy, 2011; Ma & Hommel, 
2013, 2015). We then calculated the magnitude of the event-induced SCR by subtracting 
baseline skin conductivity from the peak amplitude of the SCR during the analyzed time 
window, and took the log(magnitude+1) per participant nd condition.  
3. Results 
Questionnaire. The 2(effector) X 2(activity) X 2(synchrony) ANOVA analysis of the 
thirteen questionnaire items and an additional ANOVA of the four aggregated ownership 
questions (Q1-4) revealed various significant effects; for an overview of ANOVA terms see 
Table 1.  
The main effect of synchrony was significant for almost all questions (except Q5 and 
Q7). Ratings were higher in synchronous than asynchro ous conditions, which indicates that 
multimodal bottom-up information tempted participants to perceive the virtual effectors as a 
part of their own body. However, several items showed not only an activity main effect but 
also a significant interaction between synchrony and ctivity, due to that synchrony having a 
stronger effect in the active conditions. This interaction was particularly pronounced in the 
main ownership question (Q1), two of the other three ownership-related questions (Q3, Q4), 
and the agency question (Q12). Figure 2 shows the und rlying pattern. Unsurprisingly, the 
separate ANOVA on the aggregated ownership items (Q1-4) also showed all three main 
effects being significant, as well as the interaction between synchrony and activity. Two-
tailed paired t-tests confirmed that synchrony modulated illusion ratings in both passive 
conditions, t(87) = 4.576, p < 0.001, d =0.535, andctive conditions, t(87) = 9.853, p < 0.001, 
d = 1.147. Also of interest, synchrony modulated agency (Q12) in both passive conditions, 
t(87) = 2.760, p = 0.007, d = 0.251, and active conditions, t(87) = 9.703, p < 0.001, d = 1.214. 
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The main effect of effector was also significant for the majority of the items, including 
three of the four items that directly relate to the ownership illusion. This effect indicates that 
participants received more ownership for the virtual hand than for the virtual rectangle. This 
amounts to a resemblance effect, that is, more ownership was experienced for the virtual 
effector that was more similar to the participant’s real hand. Note, however, that there was no 
indication that the impact of resemblance on ownership depends on, or interacts with 
synchrony—as top-down approaches to ownership would pre ict. That is, there was no 
evidence that resemblance mediates the processing of bott m-up information.  
Given the strong connection between synchrony—an important ingredient of the 
ownership illusion—and activity—the crucial element for agency, we computed one-tailed 
Spearman correlations between the ownership illusion (as assessed by the aggregation of Q1-
4) and the agency question (Q12). These correlations were all positive and significant for all 
eight conditions, rs = .35-.65, ps ≤ .001-.01. 
Table 1. F, P and effect size values for all the qustionnaire items ratings, with df = 43. EFF: 
virtual effector (virtual hand vs. rectangle). ACT: activity (active exploration vs. passive 
stimulation). SYN: synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous). 
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F/P/ηp2 EFF ACT SYN EFF*ACT EFF*SYN ACT*SYN 
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Figure 2: Ratings for Q1, the mean of Q1-4, and for Q12, as a function of virtual effector, 
activity, and synchrony. 
Proprioceptive drift. With the left edge of the computer screen set as zero position, 
the standardized average position of the virtual effector was 21.6 cm, SD = 1.991 cm, and of 
the real right hand 32.7 cm, SD = 2.758 cm. And a 2(effector) X 2(activity) X 2(synchrony) 








F(1,43) = 10.335, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.194, and of activity, F(1,43) = 10.403, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 
0.195. These effects showed that drift rates were more pronounced and more positive in 
synchronous than in asynchronous conditions (0.783cm vs. 0.003cm) and in active as 
compared to passive conditions (0.695cm vs. 0.091cm). The interaction between effector and 
activity was also significant, F(1,43) = 4.738, p =0.035, ηp2 = 0.099, indicating that activity 
did not matter for the virtual hand (0.383cm vs. 0.286cm for active and passive conditions, 
respectively) but strongly increased the drift rate for the virtual rectangle (1.007cm vs. -
0.104cm). No other effects were significant. We directly compared the synchrony difference 
for virtual hand and rectangle conditions with one-tailed paired t-tests, which showed 
significant effects for the virtual hand, t(87) = 3.682, p < 0.001, d = 0.505; and for the virtual 
rectangle, t(87) = 1.762, p = 0.041, d = 0.249. Theproprioceptive drift results are shown in 
Figure 3. 
It is interesting to compare these findings to those btained for Q11, which directly 
asked participants to judge the illusion-induced proprioceptive drift. It is obvious that the two 
measures do not converge: while the proprioceptive drift rates show main effects of 
synchrony and activity, and an effector-by-activity interaction, the judgment main effects of 
synchrony and effector, and an interaction between effector and synchrony (indicating a 
stronger synchrony effect for the virtual hand, 3.79 vs. 2.76, than for the virtual rectangle, 
2.92 vs. 2.42). 
SCR. A 2(effector) X 2(activity) X 2(synchrony) ANOVA of the event-induced SCRs 
(see Figure 3) revealed significant main effects of effector, F(1,43) = 4.202, p = 0.046, ηp2 = 
0.089, indicating that skin conductance was stronger in the virtual hand conditions than the 
virtual rectangle conditions (0.446 vs. 0.375 log(microsiemens-1)), and of synchrony, F(1,43) 
= 6.903, p = 0.012, ηp2 = 0.138, indicating stronger skin conductance in sy chronous 
conditions (0.441 vs. 0.380 log(microsiemens-1)). No other effects were significant. We 
directly compared the synchrony difference for virtual hand and rectangle conditions with 
one-tailed paired t-tests, which showed significant effect for the virtual hand, t(87) = 1.732, p 
= 0.044, d = 0.177; but not for the virtual rectangle, t(87) = 1.442, p = 0.077, d = 0.156. This 
pattern may be similar to previous observations that illusory ownership was successfully 
induced by visuotactile stimulation when the non-corporeal effector was active controlled by 
participants (Ma & Hommel, 2015) but not when it was a static wooden block (e.g. Tsakiris et 




Figure 3: Results for proprioceptive drift (left panel) and SCR (right panel). Error bars 
represent ± 2 SD. 
4. Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to directly compare ownership illusions evoked by a 
more RHI-like paradigm and ownership illusions evoked by a more VHI-like paradigm with 
our virtual reality setup. We were mainly interested in testing whether objective agency would 
directly contribute to perceived ownership and whether he similarity between people’s real 
hand and the virtual effector would matter. With resp ct to our first question, the results 
showed that both setups induced significant synchrony effects, which confirms that they were 
successful in inducing a rubber-hand-like ownership illusion. However, having the 
opportunity to actively operate the virtual effector (and thereby obtain additional efferent and 
re-afferent information) did not only increase perceived agency, but also boosted both the 
general impression of ownership and the synchrony-induced rubber-hand like ownership 
illusion. This is rather strong evidence for a substantial contribution of objective agency to 
perceived body ownership. 
The significant effect of activity of the questionnaire results implies that passive and 
active VHI paradigms induce different kinds of illusion. This suggests that not only the 
spatiotemporal relationship of the input sensory signals matters for the ownership illusion 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; 
Tsakiris, 2010; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014), but also the amount of sensory information. 











































































synchrony, as well as for the correlation between agency and ownership perception, is the fact 
that active exploration multiplies the amount of information that reveals multimodal 
correlations. Moving one’s real hand systematically leads to hundreds if not thousands of 
proprioceptive and tactile impressions that can be correlated with the just as many visual 
impressions created by the synchronously moving virtual effector. As compared to the 
classical rubber-hand setup, these three more or less continuous informational streams provide 
a much richer database for the computation of cross-modal contingencies. Given that these 
computations are considered to represent the main factor that underlies both subjective agency 
(Burin et al., 2015) and subjective body ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003), one would indeed expect that objective agency increases both 
subjective agency and synchrony effects. However, while objective agency clearly plays a 
role for subjective ownership, it is less clear whether subjective agency is relevant for 
subjective ownership as well. True, objective agency led to stronger subjective agency, as the 
results for our agency question indicate, and subjectiv  agency correlated with perceived 
ownership. However, this remains a correlational finding which may merely reflect that 
subjective ownership and subjective agency rely on the same kind of information—on 
objective agency, that is, and the richer multimodal database it helps to create.  
Our second question was whether resemblance between a novel effector and people’s 
real effectors would matter. Effects of resemblance are directly predicted by top-down models, 
especially if they assume that bottom-up synchrony information is matched against an internal 
body image (Tsakiris, 2010). That is, people should accept new, artificial effectors only to the 
degree that they are similar to effectors that are already part of the body image—even in the 
presence of synchronous multisensory stimulation. Several aspects of our findings speak 
against this possibility. First, we were able to find significant ownership illusions for virtual 
rectangles. As rectangles are unlikely to fit any representation included in a permanent 
representation of our body, this observation is inconsistent with top-down approaches. Second, 
even though participants were more tempted to accept hands than rectangles as part of their 
body overall, the kind of virtual effector had no impact on the synchrony effect for the 
questionnaire, proprioceptive drift, and SCR. This is inconsistent with the prediction from 
top-down modulation approaches that the processing of bottom-up information is modulated 
and gated by internal body representations.  
And yet, the main effect of effector does indicate that similarity between a novel 
effector and longer-term representations and expectations have some role for the experience 
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of one’s body. While the lack of an interaction betw en effector and synchrony in all three 
relevant measures speaks against the top-down modulation approach, it seems possible to 
reconcile our observations by considering the reasoning of Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen 
(2008) for the case of perceived agency. These authors have pointed out that under some 
circumstances bottom-up information may be insufficient for agency judgments, which may 
lead people to consider other information as well. As a consequence, agency judgments may 
integrate various sources of information, which may v ry in strength depending on the 
situational circumstances. Along these lines, it is po sible that facing a virtual hand creates a 
more general bias towards perceiving body ownership. While this bias need not interact or 
censor synchrony-based information, as our findings suggest, it may play a stronger role 
under conditions in which this kind of information is less reliable, as in traditional RHI design. 
These considerations would also explain why our participants experienced more agency with 
the virtual hand than the virtual rectangle. The possibility that facing a virtual hand induces a 
general bias towards perceived ownership would fit with the argument of Synofzik et al. 
(2008) that self-related judgments rely on multiple informational sources, and with the 
assumption that vision tends to dominate tactile and proprioceptive sensory input (Ernst & 
Banks, 2002; van Beers, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2002; Holmes, Crozier, & Spence, 2004; Kunz, 
Creem-Regehr, & Thompson, 2010; Petkova, Zetterberg, & Ehrsson, 2012). 
If ownership judgments are based on the integration of multiple informational sources, 
it is possible that information from one source canompensate for a lack of information from 
another. Support for this possibility comes from the observation that proprioceptive drift rates 
depended on activity with the virtual rectangle butnot with the virtual hand. The absence of 
the activity effect for the virtual hand (i.e., the equivalence of proprioceptive drift in active 
and passive conditions) is consistent with earlier studies (Riemer et al., 2013; Tsakiris et al., 
2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a). However, the presence of the activity effect for the 
virtual rectangle implies that objective agency plays  stronger role for less familiar or 
plausible body parts. If so, it is possible that general expectations or plausibility and objective 
agency can compensate for each other, so that the impact of objective agency increases the 
less top-down support a candidate effector receives. 
Taken altogether, our account emphasizes bottom-up echanisms in the generation of 
subjective ownership without excluding top-down influences. Along the lines of Synofzik et 
al. (2008), we assume that multiple informational sources contribute to perceived ownership. 
Hence, internal body representations do not seem to censor bottom-up information (e.g. 
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Tsakiris, 2010) but, rather, emerge from the integration of equally weighted bottom-up and 
top-down information. However, we have also consider th  possibility that one informational 
source might dominate if another is unreliable or lacking. For example, given that the absence 
of objective agency reduces the amount and reliability of bottom-up information, it is 
certainly possible that occasional visuotactile stimulation alone fails to induce illusory 
ownership without sufficient top-down information to compensate (e.g., Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005; Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2010). The presence of objective 
agency, in turn, would be likely to induce ownership illusions even have top-down 
information from internal body representations is lacking, as in the case of body-dissimilar 
effectors like a rectangle (cf., Ma & Hommel, 2015).  
There are two more observations that we consider int esting to discuss, in particular 
with respect to methodology. One refers to the relationship between proprioceptive drift rates 
and responses to Q11, the subjective counterpart. On he one hand, participants were more 
likely to perceive the virtual hand moving towards their real hand in synchronous conditions, 
and more so with a virtual hand than with a virtual rectangle, which is consistent with 
observations of Tsakiris et al. (2010). But, on the other hand, the different patterns in drift 
rates and subjective drift ratings suggest that the wo measures do not rely on exactly the same 
information. It may be that conscious self-perception is less reliable than drift rates and/or that 
self-perception integrates more, or other kinds of information (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 
2006; Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011; Ernst & Banks, 2002).  
The other interesting observation is that higher SCR was found for the virtual hand 
than for the virtual rectangle, but that this effect did not interact with synchrony. This suggests 
that people generally care more about objects that resemble their own body parts, but this 
effect is not dependent on the synchrony-induced ownership illusion. This replicates previous 
findings of Ma and Hommel (2013), who observed thatpar icipants were emotionally 
involved (as assessed by SCR) even if a threat was argeting a virtual hand that they did not 
perceive as their own. Both findings are consistent with the consideration that we developed 
above: facing an object that resembles a body part m y activate corresponding representations 
in a body image (Tsakiris, 2010) and thus produce a top-down bias towards perceived 
ownership. This may not censor bottom-up information, which explains why the object effect 
did not interact with synchrony, but rather increase the general tendency to perceive an object 
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The tendency to perceive an artificial effector as p rt of one’s own body is known to 
depend on temporal criteria, like the synchrony betwe n stimulus events informing about the 
effector. The role of spatial factors is less well understood. Rather than physical distance, 
which has been manipulated in previous studies, we investigated the role of relative, context-
induced distance between the participant’s real hand and an artificial hand stimulated 
synchronously or asynchronously with the real hand. We replicated previously reported 
distance effects in a virtual reality setup: the perception of ownership increased with 
decreased distance, and the impact of synchrony was stronger for short distances. More 
importantly, we found that ownership perception andimpact of synchrony were affected by 
previous distance: the same, medium distance between real and artificial hand induced more 
pronounced ownership after having experienced a far-distance condition than after a near-
distance condition. This suggests that subjective, context-induced spatial reference frames 
contribute to ownership perception, which does not seem to fit with the idea of fixed spatial 
criteria and/or permanent body representations are the sole determinants of perceived body 
ownership. 
 
Keywords: Body image, self-recognition, Sense of ownership, V rtual hand illusion, 





How do we perceive ourselves and what are the mechanisms underlying our ability to 
perceive our body as constituting our bodily self? A recent technique to investigate this issue 
is the rubber hand illusion (RHI) and its virtual-reality version, the virtual hand illusion (VHI). 
In the RHI/VHI, participants perceive an artificial physical or virtual hand as a part of their 
own body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Ehrsson, Spence, & 
Passingham, 2004; Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki, 2009; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & 
Sanchez-Vives, 2008). This illusion can be induced by synchronously stroking a 
rubber/virtual hand placed in front of a participant in such a way that it seems extend from the 
participant’s body, while the corresponding real hand is hidden from view. After a short while 
of synchronous stroking or, as in the virtual case, of perceived synchrony between own and 
artificial hand, the participant starts to get the perceptual impression that the rubber/virtual 
hand becomes his or her own hand.  
Temporal synchrony between multimodal input coming from the real and artificial 
hand is crucial for the illusion, as asynchronous conditions (in which one stimulus stream is 
delayed with respect to the other by several hundreds of milliseconds) commonly produce 
significantly lower ownership ratings. Interestingly, however, there is also evidence for spatial 
criteria for perceived ownership. While the illusion is most pronounced with minimal gaps 
between real and artificial hand (e.g., Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Gentile, Guterstam, 
Brozzoli, & Ehrsson, 2013; Lloyd, 2007), the illusion does survive some discrepancies. For 
example, Lloyd (2007) showed that the strength of the illusion declined significantly if the 
rubber hand is placed horizontally more than 27.5 cm away from the participant’s real 
corresponding hand. However, Zopf et al., (2010) did not find a reduction in RHI strength 
with distance up to 45 cm between the real and fake h nds, which might suggest that the 
illusion relies on reaching distance. Preston (2013) considered the possibility that it may not 
be the absolute distance between real and artificial hand that matters but, rather, the distance 
between real hand and trunk. She manipulated both the absolute distance between real and 
artificial hand and their relative distance from body midline. The finding is that the strength of 
the illusion is reduced only if the artificial hand is far from both the real hand and the trunk. 
Kalckert and Ehrsson (2014) varied the vertical instead of the horizontal distance. The illusion 
became weaker with increasing distance. 
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These and related findings were taken to suggest a role of spatial reference frames 
when considering whether an artificial hand is or is not part of one’s body. Maravita, Spence, 
and Driver (2003) proposed that although visuotactile interactions are usually most 
pronounced for stimuli near the real body part, the space to be considered can be plastically 
modified with active tool-use. If so, the ownership-related spatial reference frame could be 
flexible. FMRI studies already showed some evidence for this possibility. Brozzoli, Gentile, 
and Ehrsson (2012) found that the hand-centered encoding of space was remapped when a 
rubber hand was perceived as one’s own. In the present study, we were interested to see 
whether the situational context might also affect the spatial reference frame used to determine 
body ownership. The reasons for considering this possibility were some informal observations 
in other studies from our lab, where the order or presence/absence of conditions seemed to 
play a role (e.g., see Zhang & Hommel, 2015). Consider, for instance, a condition in which 
real hand (and body) and artificial hand are separated by a noticeable spatial gap. After just 
having experienced a condition with a closer connection between real and artificial hand, the 
artificial hand may now be perceived as rather distant, and the perception of ownership may 
be reduced. In contrast, after just having experienced a condition with an even greater gap 
between real and artificial hand, the artificial hand may now be perceived as rather closely 
connected to one’s real hand or body and, thus, motivate rather high ownership ratings. 
We tested this possibility by presenting participants with a condition with a noticeable 
but not extreme gap between real and artificial hand fter having them presented with an even 
larger or with a smaller gap. That is, we used far-distance and near-distance conditions as 
priming conditions and a medium-distance condition as test condition. We used a VHI setup, 
in which participants wore a data glove and were presented with a 3D virtual hand. Tactile 
stimulation was applied through vibrators attached to the data glove, which avoids the rather 
artificial stroking procedure required for the traditional RHI setup. Given previous reports 
about divergent findings for different kinds of ownership-perception indicators (Rohde, Di 
Luca, & Ernst, 2011), we used the standard ownership questionnaire (adapted for the virtual 
setup), in addition to proprioceptive drift and skin conductance response (SCR), two 
commonly used “objective” measures to assess the own rship illusion. Our prediction was 
that the same medium-distance test condition should pro uce lower ownership ratings after a 





There were 34 participants (three more were tested but id not complete the 
experiment), all of them were student volunteers (8 males; mean age = 23 years, Standard 
Deviation (SD) = 2.38, range 18-28) from Leiden University, unfamiliar with the 
rubber/virtual hand illusion, who participated in exchange for course credit or pay. Ethical 
approval for this study was obtained from Psychology Research Ethics Committee, and 
written informed consent was obtained from all participants.  
2.2. Design 
We used a 2-factorial within-participants design. The two factors were synchrony 
(synchronous vs. asynchronous) and distance-conditi sequence (near-medium vs. far-
medium). To avoid the influence of fatigue and response strategies, we divided the 
experiment into two sessions performed on different days (with 1.32 days on average in 
between). In the near-medium session, participants were exposed to a condition with a 
medium-sized gap between their real hand and a virtual hand on the screen in front of them 
after having been exposed to a condition with a small-sized gap. In the far-medium session, 
participants were exposed to the same medium-sized gap condition after having been exposed 
to a condition with a large-sized gap. All participants served in both sessions. Half of the 
participants participated in the near-medium session before the far-medium session while the 
other half participated in reversed order. In each of the two distance conditions per session, 
the participant would be exposed to a synchronous cndition and an asynchronous condition. 
The order of these two synchrony conditions was the same for the two distance conditions for 
a given participant, but the order of synchronous and synchronous conditions was balanced 
across participants. 
2.3. Experimental Setup 
The study was performed in a virtual reality environment. The setup consisted of a 
data glove (Cyberglove, measurement frequency = 100 Hz, latency = 10 ms), virtual reality 
software (Vizard), and a large projection screen of 212 cm × 133 cm, which was around 50 
cm away from the participants. The Cyberglove had a vibrator on the palm, through which we 
were able to apply the tactile stimulation (Vibrational frequency = 0-125 Hz). Participants 
wore the glove on their right hand, which during the experiment was placed in a fixed position 
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inside a black box (50×24×38 cm) with the palm facing up. A Biopac MP100 acquisition unit 
and AcqKnowledge software were used for the SCR data recording.  
We used a virtual hand from Vizard character set and imported the tracker and data 
glove module into Vizard. The virtual hand was projected on the large screen in three 
different positions (always aligned with the participant’s real hand): near (seemingly 
extending from the real hand), medium (22 cm horizontally away from the near position), and 
far (44cm horizontally away from the near position), as shown in Figure 1. In the near 
conditions, the virtual hand was projected in align with the participant’s real hand, which 
looked as if the virtual hand extended from the real hand; and in the far conditions, the virtual 
hand was 44cm horizontally away from the near position. 
 
Figure 1. The experimental setup (left panel) and the three different positions at which the 
virtual hand was shown on the screen (right panels). 
2.4. Measurements 
Subjective ownership perception was assessed by means of the standard ownership 
questionnaire developed by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), which we only adjusted to the 
virtual setup. Corresponding versions of this questionnaire have been used in various kinds of 
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rubber/virtual hand illusion experiments (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Makin, Holmes, & 
Ehrsson, 2008; Zhang & Hommel, 2015). We also considered more objective measures for 
explorative purposes, namely, proprioceptive drift (Kammers, Longo, Tsakiris, Dijkerman, & 
Haggard, 2009; Longo, Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008; Riemer, Kleinböhl, 
Hölzl, & Trojan, 2013; Ma & Hommel, 2015b), and SCR (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Ma 
& Hommel, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Yuan & Steed, 2010). Subjective and objective measures 
have shown different outcomes in various cases (e.g., Ma & Hommel, 2013, 2015a), 
suggesting that they do not reflect the exact same mechanisms, and objective measures such 
as proprioceptive drift have been criticized for several reasons (Folegatti, Farnè, Salemme, & 
De Vignemont, 2012; Rohde et al., 2011). This makes it difficult to make predictions for the 
more objective measures, but we nevertheless analyzed and report effects for all three 
measures. 
Questionnaire. We used an adapted version (Slater et al., 2008; Ma & Hommel, 2013; 
Padilla et al., 2010) of the standard nine-item questionnaire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) to 
assess the strength of ownership illusion in our design. Q1-Q5 are related to the experience of 
perceiving the hand as one’s own (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014; Ma & Hommel, 2015a, 2015b), 
and Q6-Q9 assess possible side effects of the illusion. Each statement was scored on a 7-point 
Likert scale, ranging from 1 for “strongly disagree” to 7 for “strongly agree”, and 4 for 
‘uncertain’. The questionnaire items are shown below: 
Q1: I felt as if I was looking at my own hand. 
Q2: I felt as if the virtual hand were my hand. 
Q3: It seemed as if I were feeling the touch of the ball in the location where I saw the 
virtual hand touched. 
Q4: It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the ball touching the virtual 
hand. 
Q5: I felt as if the virtual were part of my body. 
Q6: It felt as if my (real) hand were drifting towards the virtual hand on the screen. 
Q7: It seemed as if I might have more than one right hand or arm. 
Q8: I felt as if my real hand were turning virtual. 
Q9: I felt as if my right hand had disappeared. 
So far, no psychometrically analyzed version of the qu stionnaire have been 
developed and no absolute criteria for determining the absence or presence of an illusion have 
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been suggested. We therefore used the comparison between synchronous and asynchronous 
conditions as a proxy. A significantly stronger ownership score in synchronous as compared 
to asynchronous conditions was thus taken to indicate a relative increase in perceived 
ownership, and the size of the increase was taken to reflect the strength of the impact of the 
corresponding factor. 
Proprioceptive drift. The method we used for the proprioceptive drift measurement 
was the same as in our earlier study (Ma & Hommel, 2015b). We presented an array of letters 
on the screen and asked participants to verbally report the felt location of their real right 
middle finger by choosing the particularly corresponding letter. To work against response 
strategies, the letters in the strings were presentd i  random order. The letter size differed 
depending on their alphabetic shape, with the biggest letter measuring approximately 2 cm. 
We recorded the corresponding letter before and after the illusion induction process 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014). We 
calculated the distance between the letters and the scre n side, and calculated the 
proprioceptive drift by subtracting the distance in the post-measure from the distance in pre-
measure, so that positive values imply a drift towards the virtual hand. 
SCR. The method we used for the SCR measurement was also the same as our earlier 
study (Ma & Hommel, 2015b). We measured SCR during a threat phase, in which a virtual 
knife appeared above the virtual hand on the screen and moved down to cut the virtual hand. 
It took 4 seconds to cut the virtual hand and another 4 seconds to move back to the original 
position. The cutting procedure was repeated 5 times. We defined a latency onset window 
between 1 and 6 s after stimulus/event onset, namely, when the virtual knife cut the virtual 
hand, with the skin conductivity level before event o set serving as baseline (see Boucsein, 
1992; Figner & Murphy, 2011; Ma & Hommel, 2013, 2015a, 2015b). We then calculated the 
magnitude of the event-induced SCR by subtracting baseline skin conductivity from the peak 
amplitude of the SCR during the analyzed time window. 
2.5. Procedure 
When participants arrived in the lab, they were asked to put the glove on their right 
hand and a SCR remote transmitter on their left wrist w th a strap. Then they were seated in 
front of a desk and a projection screen (see Figure 1). They were instructed to put their right 
hand with palm upwards into a box in between the participant and the screen, so they could 
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not see their own right hand. Participants’ right hands were placed at the middle position of 
the box, and they were asked not to move their right hand during the experiment.  
As mentioned already, each session consisted of four bl cks (e.g., far/synchronous, 
far/asynchronous, medium/synchronous, medium/asynchro ous). The sequence of events was 
the same for each block. First, participants judged th  location of the right middle finger of 
their real hand, as described above. Second, the illusion was induced by means of visuotactile 
stimulation. The virtual hand was shown on the screen, seen as extending from the 
participant’s right hand, and a small virtual ball appeared above the virtual hand. The ball 
took 4 seconds to move down to contact the virtual hand’s palm, and then took another 4 
seconds to return to its original position; this illusion induction procedure was repeated for 90 
seconds. In the synchronous conditions, the contact between the virtual ball and hand was 
associated with the onset of the palm vibration stimulator of the glove, so as to apply 
synchronous visuotactile stimulation. In the asynchronous conditions, the vibration was 
delayed by 4 seconds, so that visual and tactile stimulation did not match. The vibration lasted 
for 1 second for every ball movement procedure in all conditions. Third, participants would 
again judge the location of their real right middle finger, and then fill in the ownership 
questionnaire on paper with his/her their unstimulated hand. Fourth, the same illusion 
induction procedure in the second step was implemented again, and then the virtual ball was 
replaced by a virtual knife, the threat phase started, SCR was measured while the virtual hand 
was threatened by the virtual knife, as described above. Finally, participants were asked to 
take a short break before they experienced the next block. 
3. Results 
3.1. Priming conditions (near and far) 
All questionnaire items scores for priming conditions were submitted to 2×2 ANOVA 
with the factors synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and distance (near vs. far). Means 
and standard errors for each question item in each condition, F, P and effect size values for 
each question item, are shown in Table 1. The synchro y pattern of results is similar to 
previous studies (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Slater et al., 2008), ownership questions (Q1-5) 
showed significant synchrony effects, while control questions (Q6-9) did not (except for Q8). 
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Table 1. Priming conditions (near and far): means (M) and standard errors (SE); F, P and 
effect size values for all the questionnaire items scores, and also for the aggregate scores of 
Q1-Q5, with df = 33. 


























































































































































































Following Kalckert and Ehrsson (2014) and Ma and Hommel (2015a, 2015b), we 
aggregated the ownership questions (Q1-5) and computed their mean to represent sense of 
ownership. This score was analyzed by means of a 2×2 ANOVA with the factors synchrony 
(synchronous vs. asynchronous) and distance (near vs. far). There were significant main 
effects of synchrony, F(1, 33) = 71.470, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.684, indicating a stronger sense of 
body ownership for synchronous visuotactile stimulation (M = 4.126, SE = 0.180) than for 
asynchronous stimulation (M = 2.535, SE = 0.159); and of distance, F(1, 33) = 9.837, p = 
0.004, ηp2 = 0.230, showing a stronger sense of body ownership for near (M = 3.571, SE = 
0.134) than for far (M = 3.091, SE = 0.184) placement of the virtual hand. Importantly, the 
interaction between the two factors was also significant, F(1, 33) = 18.812, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 
0.363, indicating that the synchrony effect was more pronounced for the near than the far 
condition, see Figure 2. Two tailed paired t-tests revealed that the synchrony effect was 
significant in both near and far positions, t(33) = 8.980, p < 0.001, d = 1.995, and t(33) = 
5.703, p < 0.001, d = 0.943, respectively; and the distance effect was significant in 
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synchronous conditions, t(33) = 4.425, p < 0.001, d = 0.764, but not in asynchronous 
conditions, t(33) = 0.227, p = 0.822, d = 0.034. 
 
Figure 2. Mean Score of Ownership Questions (Q1-Q5) for priming condition. Error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error. 
3.2. Test condition (medium) 
Questionnaire. All questionnaire items scores for the test condition were submitted to 
2×2 ANOVA with the factors synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and context (near-
medium vs. far-medium). Means and standard errors for each question item in each condition, 
F, P and effect size values for each question item, are shown in Table 2. 
The mean score for ownership (Q1-5) was analyzed by means of a 2×2 ANOVA with 
the factors synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and context (near-medium vs. far-
medium). There were significant main effects of synchrony, F(1, 33) = 67.002, p < 0.001, ηp2 
= 0.670, showing a stronger sense of ownership for synchronous (M = 4.129, SE = 0.175) 
than for asynchronous conditions (M = 2.694, SE = 0.187); and of context, F(1, 33) = 39.818, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.547, showing stronger ownership for the far-medium (M = 3.768, SE = 
0.156) than the near-medium condition (M = 3.056, SE = 0.179). The interaction between the 
two factors was also significant, F(1, 33) = 7.192, p = 0.011, ηp2 = 0.179, suggesting that the 
synchrony effect was more pronounced in the far-medium than the near-medium condition, 
see Figure 3. Two tailed Paired t-tests showed that the synchrony effect was significant in the 
near-medium (t(33) = 6.271, p < 0.001, d = 0.974) and the far-medium condition (t(33) = 





























t(33) = 5.458, p < 0.001, d = 0.882, and also in asynchronous conditions, t(33) = 3.244, p = 
0.003, d = 0.359.  
Table 2. Test conditions (near-medium and far-medium): means (M) and standard errors (SE); 
F, P and effect size values for all the questionnaire items scores, and also for the aggregate 
scores of Q1-Q5, with df = 33. 



























































































































































































Figure 3. Mean Score of Ownership Questions (Q1-Q5) for test condition. Error bars 





























Proprioceptive drift. The proprioceptive drift results were log transformed and the 
normality of distribution was determined using the Shapiro-Wilk test, p > 0.8. 
The transformed scores of proprioceptive drift for each condition were submitted to a 
2×2 ANOVA with the factors synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and context frame 
(near-medium vs. far-medium). There were significant main effects of synchrony, F(1, 33) 
=26.035, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.441, showing a stronger proprioceptive drift w th synchronous 
(M = 2.836 cm, SE = 0.107) than asynchronous stimulation (M = 2.156 cm, SE = 0.100); and 
of context, F(1, 33) = 24.804, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.429, showing a stronger proprioceptive drift 
in the far-medium (M = 2.834 cm, SE = 0.104) than the near-medium condition (M = 2.158 
cm, SE = 0.105). The interaction also reached significa ce, F(1, 33) = 4.170, p = 0.049, ηp2 = 
0.112, indicating that the synchrony effect was more pronounced in the far-medium than the 
near-medium condition. As shown in Figure 4, the outc me pattern was comparable to that 
for the ownership questionnaire items. Two tailed Paired t-tests showed that the synchrony 
effect was significant in the far-medium (t(33) = 5.180, p < 0.001, d = 1.229), but not the 
near-medium condition (t(33) = 1.412, p = 0.167, d = 0.368); and the context effect was 
significant in synchronous conditions, t(33) = 3.954, p < 0.001, d = 1.054, but not in 
asynchronous conditions, t(33) = 1.941, p = 0.061, d = 0.429. 
SCR. The SCR results were log transformed and the normality of distribution was 
determined using the Shapiro-Wilk test, p > 0.6. 
The transformed scores of SCR for each conditions were submitted to a 2×2 ANOVA 
with the factors synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous) and context (near-medium vs. far-
medium). There was no main effect but the interaction was significant, F(1, 33) = 5.667, p = 
0.023, ηp2 = 0.147, indicating that the synchrony effect was more pronounced in the far-
medium than the near-medium conditions (see Figure 4). Two-tailed paired t-tests revealed 
that the synchrony effect was significant for the far-medium condition, t(33) = 2.587, p = 
0.014, d = 0.379, but not for the near-medium condition, t(33) = 0.723, p = 0.475, d = 0.128; 
and the context effect was not significant in synchronous conditions, t(33) = 1.821, p = 0.078, 




Figure 4. Proprioceptive Drift (left panel) and SCR (right panel) results, the error bars 
represent ± 1 standard error. 
4. Discussion 
Temporal relationships between different sources of intermodal stimulation are known 
to affect the degree of perceived body ownership. Spatial factors also play a role, but they are 
less well understood. In contrast to previous studies, which looked into the distance between 
real and artificial hands, we tested the possibility that the situational context has an impact on 
whether a given distance is perceived as short or long. We thus tested the same medium-
distance condition after a near-distance and after  fa -distance condition, to see whether 
ownership ratings are more pronounced in the latter than in the former condition. Our findings 
provide clear evidence that the situational context affects perceived ownership. In particular, 
our findings have three implications. 
Firstly, the questionnaire results for the two priming conditions showed that we were 
able to replicate the distance effect reported by Llo d (2007) in a virtual setup. When the 
virtual hand was placed in a near position, questionnaire scores were significantly higher than 
those in the far position. It is interesting to seethat the absolute ownership scores were not 
very high in the present study, probably because our set p made the virtual hand look a little 
bit far away from the participants even in the near condition. This is also consistent with 
previous studies (Lloyd, 2007; Preston, 2013), which suggested important roles of both 
distance and reaching space. Hence, our findings can be taken to confirm that distance effects 
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Second, our results showed that the synchrony-induced increase in ownership 
perception was significantly stronger for a near thn far placed virtual hand. This provides 
even more direct evidence for the idea that ownership perception takes the distance between 
real and artificial hand (and/or between real body and artificial hand) into account. This is 
consistent with previous observations and corresponding theoretical claims (Lloyd, 2007; 
Preston, 2013; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2014; Tsakiris, 2010). As Tsakiris (2010) suggested, one 
criterion for the ownership perception may occur as a result of the comparison between 
current sensory input and body-related reference frames. Alternatively, a distance rule may 
apply. Such a rule may operate continuously, with the probability of ownership perception 
increasing with decreasing distance, discontinuously, with ownership perception being 
restricted to candidate effector is within reaching space, or some interaction of both. Given 
that we all observed interactions between distance d synchrony for both (near and far) 
priming conditions and (medium) test conditions, a merely discontinuous rule does not seem 
to be sufficient: given that all our conditions fell into reaching space, such a simple rule could 
not account for such interactions. This leaves a simple distance rule and an interaction 
between a distance rule and a discontinuous criterion as possibilities. 
Third, in the test condition, perceived body ownership was affected by the perceptual 
context: While absolute distance was kept constant, he relative size of the ownership illusion 
varied as a function of the context-induced relative distance between real hand (or body) and 
artificial hand. Given the impact of actual distance observed in the priming conditions, this 
should not be taken to rule out contributions from physical distance. However, relative 
distance that relates previous experiences to the curr nt distance between real and artificial 
hand seems to contribute as well. This observation is not consistent with the assumption that 
ownership perception relies on objective situational variables and internal representations 
thereof alone. It also does not fit with assumptions that only objective spatial parameters, like 
reaching space, and/or stable pre-existing body models play a role. Rather, ownership 
perception seems to rely on various informational sources that include subjective impressions 
informed by previous experiences in the same situation (Ma & Hommel, 2015b). 
One thing to note is that, in our experiment setup, the virtual hand seemed to extend 
from the participant’s real hand into the screen, so that the virtual hand always looked longer 
than the real hand. Could that have affected our results? Even though we are unable to 
exclude main effects, there are two reasons why we do not consider it plausible that this 
aspect can account for our main observations. For one, the “virtual extension” was the same in 
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all conditions, as we only manipulated the horizontal distance between the real and the 
artificial hand. This suggests that, even if there was some effect, it should have impacted all 
conditions equally. For another, previous RHI studies suggest that such kinds of “virtual 
extensions” do not seem to influence the synchrony effect significantly. For example, in 
Preston & Newport (2012), the experimenter pulled the participant’s arm while participants 
viewed the pull in a real-time video of themselves. In the video, the arm looked like being 
stretched to twice of its normal length. Participants did have the impression of their arm being 
stretched and they overestimated reaching distance, with the actual reaches were unaffected. 
In one of Armel and Ramachandran’s (2003) experiments, the arm looked like being stretched 
to 0.91m, but the basic illusion was still obtained. Finally, Kilteni, Normand, Sanchez-Vives, 
and Slater (2012) found that participants experienced ownership illusions even for a virtual 
arm that was about three times as long as a real arm. As we mentioned before, the ownership 
scores in the present study are relatively low, and observation that we attribute to the arm 
extension design we used in our study. Similar observations have been made in previous 
studies (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003; Kilteni et al., 2012), where ownership ratings were 
relatively low when the rubber/virtual hand seem to be much longer than the real arm. 
In addition to the more theoretical implications, our bservations are also of relevance 
methodologically. For one, they strongly suggest tha sequence effect can play an important 
role in moderating the size of the ownership illusion. Our findings also provide convergent 
evidence for the conclusion that ownership questionnaires, proprioceptive drift, and SCR are 
not fully equivalent methods to assess perceive body ownership. In the present study, the 
questionnaire turned out to be much more sensitive to the impact of our manipulations on self-
perception than the other two measures, which fits with previous observations (Folegatti et al., 
2012; Rohde et al., 2011; Ma & Hommel, 2013, 2015a). 
In conclusion, the present study extends our knowledge about the cognitive process 
underlying RHI/VHI by demonstrating the flexibility of spatial criteria for moderating 
perceived body ownership. This adds to previous evidence that ownership perception may not 
be a simple function of continuous or discontinuous distance rules or a cross-situationally 
stable body image. Rather, there is increasing evidence that multiple sources of information 
contribute to the illusion, so that the relative importance of a given source may very well 
depend on the situation and the existence of other informational sources. This again is 
consistent with previous claims that body representations are dynamic and continuously 
updated to reflect the present situation (e.g., Ehrsson, 2012; Graziano & Botvinick, 2002). 
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Mood migration: How enfacing a smile 
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People tend to perceive the face of another person more as their own if own and other 
face are stroked in synchrony—the enfacement illusion. We conceptually replicated the 
enfacement illusion in a virtual reality environment, i  which participants could control the 
movements of a virtual face by moving and touching their own face. We then used this virtual 
enfacement illusion to study whether enfacing a virtual face would also involve adopting the 
emotion that this face is expressing. As predicted, participants adopted the expressed emotion, 
as indicated by higher valence scores and better performance in a mood-sensitive divergent-
thinking task when facing a happy virtual face, if the virtual face moved in synchrony with 
their own head movements. This suggests that impact on or control over another person’s 
facial movements invite “mood migration” from the prson one identifies with to oneself. 
 
Keywords: Self face recognition; Self representation; Illusory perception; 




One commonly has no problem telling one’s own body from that of another person—
an ability that is commonly thought to rely on more  less continuous self-representations 
(Gallagher 2000; Jeannerod, 2003; De Vignemont, 2010). Interestingly, however, recent 
findings suggest that self-representation is quite malleable. For example, synchronously 
stroking a person’s real hand and a rubber hand lyig in front of her has been shown to be 
sufficient to induce the illusion that the rubber hand has become part of one’s own body 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004). Ownership illusions of 
that sort have numerous behavioral implications, including increased cooperation with, and 
liking of the owned body part or of others (e.g., Hove & Risen, 2009; Sebanz, Bekkering, & 
Knoblich, 2006; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009), suggesting that ownership illusions are 
associated with the blurring between representations of self and other.  
Body ownership has been investigated by means of various paradigms but the rubber 
hand illusion (RHI) paradigm is by far the most widely used. The findings obtained with this 
paradigm suggest that multisensory integration (of felt stroking of one’s real hand and seen 
stroking of the rubber hand) can induce a sense of ownership. Interestingly for our present 
purposes, ownership illusions can also be induced by means of virtual reality. If people 
operate a virtual hand shown on a screen (e.g., by means of a data glove), synchrony between 
real movements and virtual-hand movements creates or increases the illusion that the virtual 
hand is a part of the person’s body—the virtual hand illusion (VHI; Slater, Perez-Marcos, 
Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Ma & Hommel, 2013). The VHI and the RHI share many 
characteristics and demonstrate the same basic illusion, but they also differ in interesting ways. 
For instance, a direct comparison of a virtual version of the rubber-hand and the virtual-hand 
design (Ma & Hommel, 2015) revealed that ownership and agency are more related to each 
other in the dynamic virtual-hand than the static rubber-hand design. Considering that the 
virtual hand setup is much more representative of ral-world situations, this suggests that 
ownership and agency might be closer related than teoretical considerations based on static 
designs have implied (e.g. Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach, & Gallagher, 2007). 
Recent studies successfully extended the rubber-hand like ownership illusion to 
human faces. While traditional research on face-based self-recognition focuses on permanent 
visual features of the face (e.g., Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Zahavi & 
Roepstorff, 2011), self-recognition studies modeled according to the rubber-hand logic have 
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demonstrated contributions from multisensory matching (e.g., Tsakiris, 2008). In fact, 
watching the face of another person while that faceand one’s own face are stroked 
synchronously induces the illusion of “owning” the other face—the so-called enfacement 
illusion (e.g., Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & 
Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez, Lorusso, & Tsakiris, 2013; Tsakiris, 2008). Enfacement 
effects of that sort suggest that multisensory integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive 
signals is associated with, or contributes to blurring self-other boundaries. Interestingly, the 
enfacement illusion has been shown to affect performance in a self-recognition task, but not 
the recognition of the other face, confirming that the illusion is related to the representation of 
one’s own face (Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). As for the rubber-hand case, 
enfacement effects have also been shown to correlate with marked differences in (social) 
cognition, including conformity behavior, social inference, and self-other integration 
(Mazzurega, Pavani, Paladino, & Schubert, 2011; Paladino et al., 2010). 
1.2. Aims of present study 
The first aim of our study was methodological in nature and essential for our second, 
more theoretical aim. While the synchronous-stroking technique has been very successful in 
elucidating various aspects of perceived body ownership, the stroking procedure itself is not 
particularly natural or ecologically valid. This makes it rather unlikely that spontaneous 
feelings of ownership outside of the psychological laboratory are really based on processes 
that are fully captured in stroking studies (Ma & Hommel, 2015). We were therefore 
interested to see whether, and to what degree stroking-based enfacement effects can be 
(conceptually) replicated in a virtual-reality design.  
At first sight, a successful replication may seem very likely, given the results of recent 
studies that have replicated the RHI in virtual reaity setups (Slater et al., 2008).  Notably, 
virtual reality allows to integrate visual, proprioceptive, and tactile feedback, and offers the 
advantage to assess whether and to what extent visuomotor correlations may contribute to 
ownership illusions. Interestingly enough, in the above-mentioned study (Ma & Hommel, 
2015) in which we compared a virtual version of the rubber hand setup with a virtual-hand 
setup, we found that synchrony-induced ownership illusion was stronger when visuotactile 
synchronous stimulation and visuomotor synchrony were combined (as it was in the virtual-
hand setup) than when only visuotactile stimulation was manipulated (as it was in the virtual 
version of the rubber hand setup). This provides evidence suggesting that ownership illusions 
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are more pronounced when multiple informational sources can be integrated: continuously 
moving one’s hand together with the seen virtual hand nd having simulated contact with 
another object creates a multiplicity of data points that can be correlated to calculate the 
degree of intermodal matching (cf. Ma & Hommel, 2015). Accordingly, in the present study 
we decided to implement a similar experimental design as in the virtual-hand setup of Ma and 
Hommel (2015) in order to maximize the chance of eliciting a virtual enfacement illusion.  
To this end, we presented participants with virtual faces the movements of which they 
could either control directly/synchronously (i.e., with no noticeable delay between their own 
head movements and the movements of the virtual face) or with a noticeable 
delay/asynchronously. Participants were also asked to touch their own face with their own 
hand and view the (synchronous or asynchronous) touch n the virtual face by a virtual ball 
on corresponding facial locations. We hypothesized that the tendency to perceive the virtual 
face as part of one’s own body would be significantly more pronounced in the synchronous 
condition.  
The second, more theoretical aim of our study was to see whether enfacing/perceiving 
ownership for another face is accompanied by adopting the emotions that this other face is 
expressing. To test that possibility, we presented some participants with neutral virtual faces 
and other participants with smiling virtual faces. This manipulation was crossed with the 
synchrony manipulation, so that one group of participants could control the movements of a 
neutral face directly in one condition and with a noticeable delay in another, while another 
group of participants could control the movements of a happy face directly in one condition 
and with a noticeable delay in another.   
We considered two theoretical approaches that differ with respect to the specific 
conditions under which emotions are likely to be adopted. First, there is considerable evidence 
that people tend to imitate the facial expressions they are exposed to. For instance, when 
confronted with emotional facial expressions, peopl tend to spontaneously and rapidly react 
with distinct facial reactions (as for instance detected via electromyography) that mirror the 
observed one, even without conscious awareness of the emotional facial expression (e.g., 
Dimberg, & Thunberg, 1998; Dimberg et al., 2000). Imitating a facial expression in turn tends 
to induce the expressed emotion in the imitator (e.g., Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988), which 
is in line with the assumption that facial muscle activity is a prerequisite for the occurrence of 
emotional experience (e.g., Buck, 1980). According to this approach, one would expect that 
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being exposed to a happy face might induce a more psitive mood, perhaps by means of 
automatic imitation—we will refer to this prediction as the “mirroring hypothesis”. Note that 
this prediction does not consider synchrony as a relevant factor, which means that being 
confronted with a smiling face would be expected to improve mood to the same degree in 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. 
Second, we considered a hypothesis that was motivated by recent successful attempts 
to apply the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; 
Hommel, 2009), which originally was formulated to explain interactions between perception 
and action, to social phenomena. TEC assumes that perceived and produced events (i.e., 
perceptions and actions) are cognitively represented i  a common format, namely, as 
integrated networks of sensorimotor feature codes (so-called event files; see Hommel, 2004). 
Feature codes represent the distal features of both perceived events, such as the color or shape 
of a visual object, and self-generated events (i.e., actions), such as the location targeted by a 
pointing movement or the sound produced by pressing a piano key. In addition to these 
feature codes, event files have been shown to also include information about the goal an event 
was associated with (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003) and the affective state it was 
accompanied by (Lavender & Hommel, 2007). Hence, evnt files can be assumed to comprise 
codes of all features of a given event, which are int grated and bound. The codes bound into 
an event file are retrieved as a whole (in a pattern-completion fashion), at least if they are 
related to the task goal (Memelink & Hommel, 2013), when one of the features of a given 
event is encountered—be it while perceiving an event or while planning and action (Kühn et 
al., 2011).  
TEC does not distinguish between social and nonsocial events, which implies that 
people represent themselves and others–be them other individuals or objects–in basically the 
same way. As with object perception, where multiple objects can be perceived separately or 
grouped into comprehensive units, depending on the emphasis on discriminative vs. shared 
features, people may thus represent themselves as sep rate from, or as part of another person 
or group (Hommel, Colzato, & van den Wildenberg, 2009). This assumption fits with claims 
that people’s self-construal is dynamic and sensitive to situational and cultural biases (Kühnen 
& Oyserman, 2002), and findings suggesting that situational factors impact the degree of self-
other discrimination in joint task settings (Colzato, de Bruijn, & Hommel, 2012). Even more 
interesting for present purposes, the possible malleability of self-other discrimination allows 
for the prediction of “feature migration” from the r presentation of other to the representation 
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of oneself. For instance, Kim and Hommel (2015) showed that what is taken to indicate social 
conformity is actually due to feature migration of that sort. In that study, participants adjusted 
their judgments of the beauty of faces in the direction of what was presented as the opinion of 
a reference group, as typical for conformity studies. However, they did so no less when they 
were exposed to movies of meaningless “judgment” acts (manual movements directed at 
number keys) of another person, especially if these were similar to their own judgment acts. 
This suggests that participants stored the combinatio  of each face and their own first 
judgment as well as the combination of the face and the other person’s action. If they later 
encountered the same face again, they apparently retrieved both actions, irrespective of who 
was performing it, which then biased their second judgment. In other words, the action feature 
“belonging” to the other person apparently migrated to the representation of the participant’s 
own action. Note that this amounts to an “illusory feature conjunction” in the sense of 
Treisman and Gelade (1980): a feature that actually be ongs to one event (another person) is 
erroneously related to another (oneself). 
From this theoretical perspective, one would hypothesize that direct/immediate control 
over the head movements of the virtual face, a conditi  that is known to induce a stronger 
integration of the virtual face into self-representation (Tsakiris, 2008), promotes “mood 
migration”: participants should tend to adopt the mood expressed by the virtual face—a 
prediction that we will refer to as the “migration hypothesis”. If so, one would expect that the 
mood of participants would become more positive if they exert immediate control over the 
movements of a smiling face, as compared to delayed control over any face or immediate 
control over a neutral face. 
To summarize, the mirroring hypothesis would predict a main effect of facial 
expression, meaning that being exposed to a smiling face should lift one’s mood irrespective 
of synchrony, while the migration hypothesis would predict an interaction between synchrony 
and expression, in the sense that mood should be improved if synchrony is combined with a 
smiling face. Note that other outcome patterns cannot be excluded. For instance, it might be 
that having direct control as such is lifting people’s mood. Indeed, having direct control on 
action outcomes has been suggested to increase motivation (Eitam, Kennedy, & Tory Higgins, 
2013), and it may be that this comes along with better mood. If so, one would expect a main 
effect of synchrony (delay) but no interaction with facial expression. Another possibility 
concerns demand characteristics. Being exposed to a happy face may motivate participants to 
just assume they should be happier and report actually being so, without actually having a 
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mood-lifting experience. There are several ways to test for that possibility. For one, the 
simplest version of this scenario would produce a main effect of facial expression but no 
interaction (similar to the mirroring hypothesis). For another, we not only assessed ongoing 
mood before and after the exposure to the virtual face by means of an intuitive, nonverbal grid 
(which would make it difficult to explicitly remember one’s previous responses) but also by 
an explicit verbal question asking whether people considered their mood being improved (a 
question that arguably is more sensitive to demand characteristics). Finally, we added a rather 
indirect “measure” of mood. While the general connection between mood and creativity in a 
broader sense is less clear than commonly assumed (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008), there is 
strong evidence that positive-going mood is accompanied by better performance in divergent-
thinking tasks (Davis, 2009; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Akbari Chermahini & 
Hommel, 2012a)—presumably by boosting the striatal dopaminergic supply that divergent 
thinking benefits from (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010). If so, one would predict that 
directly controlling the movements of a happy face would improve performance in a 
divergent-thinking task. To test that hypothesis, we had participants perform the well-
established alternate uses task (AUT; Guilford, 1967). 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Given the unpredictable effect size, the sample was cho en to exceed our lab standard 
for novel manipulations (20/group; see Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011) by the factor 
of 1.5. Accordingly, 60 native Dutch speakers (mean age 22.3 years, SD = 3.03 years, range 
17-29 years; 11 males), all students from Leiden University, participated for course credit or 
pay. We used the department’s standard advertisement system and accepted all participants 
registering in the first (and only) wave. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants before the experiment. Participants were naive as to the purposes of the 
experiment. The study conformed to the ethical standards of the declaration of Helsinki and 




Figure 1. (A) The experimental setup. The Kinect system (see upper yellow frame) was 
located behind and above the computer screen (see lower yellow frame), and participant wore 
a cap with an orientation tracker attached on it. (B) A screen shot of the viewed face and 
virtual ball. (C) The four types of faces used in this study: neutral male face, happy male face, 
neutral female face and happy female face (from left to right). During the experiment, the 
virtual face shown on the screen wore a virtual blue hat, just like the participants. 
2.2. Experimental setup 
Figure 1 shows the basic setup. The participant’s facial movements were monitored by 
means of a Kinect system (recording frame rate = 30Hz) and an Intersense orientation tracker 
(update rate = 180 Hz). The orientation tracker wasattached on the top of a cap that 
participants were asked to wear. The virtual faces w re constructed and controlled by means 
of virtual reality environment software (Vizard and FAAST, Suma, et al., 2013). We used 
Vizard to build four three-dimensional virtual faces based on average Dutch faces (e.g. Jones 
et al., 2006), one for each combination of gender and f cial expression (neutral-male, happy-






Vizard, our setup allowed participants to freely move r rotate their own face to control the 
movement or rotation of the virtual face, with a latency of about 40 ms. Note that this latency 
value is well below the 300-ms threshold proposed by Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki (2009) as 
the critical time window allowing for the occurrence of multi-sensory integration processes 
constituting the self-body representation.  
2.3. Design 
The experiment manipulated two independent variables: facial expression and 
synchrony. While participants were all presented with v rtual faces corresponding their own 
gender, the virtual face had a neutral expression for one half of the participants and a happy 
expression for the other half. That is, facial exprssion varied between participants. 
Synchrony varied within participants, so that each participant experienced one condition in 
which the virtual face would move synchronously with his or her own movements and 
another condition in which the movements of the virtual face were delayed. The sequence of 
the two synchrony conditions was counterbalanced, so that one half of the participants 
experienced the synchronous condition before the asynchronous condition, and the other half 
the asynchronous before the synchronous condition.  
Four dependent measures were obtained (see below for a detailed description): the 
Including Other in the Self (IOS) scale to assess the degree of self-other inclusion (self-other 
similarity), an affect grid to assess participants’ subjective affective state in terms of arousal 
and valence, a questionnaire to assess participants’ perceived ownership over the virtual face, 
and a creative-thinking task. The IOS scale was preent d three times to assess the baseline 
level and the impact of the two subsequent synchrony c ditions, respectively. The affect grid 
was presented twice to assess the baseline level and the impact of the first synchrony 
condition. It was not presented again after the second synchrony condition to avoid possible 
carry-over effects on mood levels resulting from the creative thinking task that was performed 
after the first synchrony condition. Carrying out a task that requires creative thinking has 
previously been found to have distinct effects on mood levels, with divergent thinking 
improving one’s mood while convergent thinking lowering it (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 
2012b; Sellaro et al., 2014). The questionnaire was pre ented twice to assess perceived 
ownership after each synchrony condition. Finally, the creativity task was performed after the 
first synchrony condition only. It was not presented o assess the baseline level or the impact 
of the second synchrony condition because of the mentioned bidirectional influence between 
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mood and creative thinking, which would have confouded subsequent mood assessment and 
creative thinking performance, respectively. Presenting the AUT and the affect grid after the 
first but not after the second synchrony condition were thought to minimize both the impact of 
other measurements on AUT performance and the impact from AUT performance on other 
measurements. 
2.4. Questionnaire 
The 13-item questionnaire comprised 12 items that were taken from enfacement 
illusion studies (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2013; Sforza et al., 
2010) and one additional question on mood. While the diagnostic validity of these items still 
awaits psychometric scrutiny, Q1-4 address perceived ownership, Q5-6 refer to perceived 
appearance similarity, a possible correlate of ownership (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012), Q8-
10 to perceived agency,  Q7, Q11-12 to agency control, and Q13 to mood . For each item, 
participants responded by choosing a score in a 7-point (1-7) Likert scale, ranging from 1 for 
“strongly disagree” to 7 for “strongly agree.” The questions were: 
Q1: I felt like the face on the screen was my own face. 
Q2: It seemed like I was looking at my own reflection n a mirror. 
Q3: It seemed like I was sensing the movement and the touch on my face in the 
location where the face on the screen was. 
Q4: It seemed like the touch I felt on my face was c used by the ball touching the face 
on the screen. 
Q5: It seemed like the face on the screen began to resemble my own face. 
Q6: It seemed like my own face began to resemble the face on the screen. 
Q7: It seemed as though the movement I did was caused by the face on the screen. 
Q8: It seemed as though the movement I saw on the face on the screen was caused by 
my own movement. 
Q9: The face on the screen moved just like I wanted it to, as if it was obeying my will. 
Q10: Whenever I moved my face, I expected the face on the screen to move in the 
same way. 
Q11: It seemed like my own face was out of my control. 
Q12: It seemed the face on the screen had a will of its wn. 




2.5. Including Other in the Self (IOS) scale 
We included a variant of the IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Schubert & 
Otten, 2002; Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & Schubert, 2010) to assess subjective aspects of 
self-other integration. The scale is shown in Figure 2, in which self and other are represented 
by different circles that overlap to seven different degrees—with the degree of overlap 
representing the degree of subjective self-other int gration. Participants are to choose the 
overlap that they think represents best the degree to which the virtual face looks like their own, 
how familiar it feels to them.  
 
Figure 2. The Including Other in the Self (IOS) scale,  single-item scale consisting of seven 
Venn diagram-like pairs of circles that vary on thelevel of overlap between the self (left 
circle) and the other (right circle). Higher values indicate higher perceived self-other overlap. 
2.6. Affect grid (AG) 
To measure participants’ subjective affective state during the experiment, we used the 
Affect Grid (Russell, Weis, & Mendelsohn, 1989). The Affect Grid is a single-item scale that 
is particularly suitable for rapid and repeated asses ment of people’s subjective affective 
states. The scale consists of a 9×9 grid, where the horizontal axis represents affective valence, 
ranging from unpleasantness (-4) to pleasantness (+4), and the vertical axis represents 
perceived activation, ranging from high arousal (+4) to sleepiness (-4); see Figure 3. 
Importantly, the valence and arousal dimensions are treated as orthogonal to each other as 
they have previously been found to represent two conceptually separate dimensions (Russell 
& Pratt, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). Accordingly, two independent scores can be 
derived from the scale, one for affective valence and one for arousal (Russel et al., 1989). 
Participants were instructed to rate their mood in terms of valence and arousal whenever the 
grid appeared on the computer monitor during the experiment, which happened two times. To 
prevent participants from merely repeating their previous rating, we did not have them 
indicate the respective position directly, which is the response mode that is commonly used. 
Rather, participants were to report the code represnting the appropriate location (e.g., C4, see 
Figure 3) and the codes were changed from grid to grid.  
other self 1. other self 2. 3. other self 




A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8 I9 
 
 
Figure 3. The Affect grid (AG). The scale consists of a 9×9 grid, where the horizontal axis 
stands for affective valence (unpleasantness-pleasantness; values ranging from -4 to +4), and 
the vertical axis for perceived activation (high arousal-sleepiness; values ranging from +4 to -
4).  
2.7. Alternative uses task (AUT) 
As a more indirect, and more objective assessment of the affective state we used a 
creativity task. Positive affect has been shown to have an intimate relationship with divergent 
thinking (Davis, 2009; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 
2012b), which means that positive-going affect should increase performance in a divergent-
thinking task. If so, better performance in a divergent-thinking task can be taken to indicate 
more positive affect—as we predicted for the condition where participants move in synchrony 
with a happy face.  
The AUT is a classical divergent-thinking task that w s developed by Guilford (1967). 
Our version of the AUT presented participants with words describing two common household 
items, a pen and a newspaper, and participants had 4 minutes to write up as many possible 













on paper, and their order was counterbalanced across participants. Responses were scored 
with respect to the four standard criteria: fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality 
(Guilford, 1967; Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010; Akbari Chermahini, Hickendorff, & 
Hommel, 2012). Fluency represents the number of responses, flexibility the number of 
different categories being listed, elaboration the amount of detail and originality the 
uniqueness of every response compared to all the responses. Among these scores, the 
flexibility score can be considered the theoretically most transparent (as it is the only score to 
integrate the amount and the quality of performance) and the empirically most reliable score 
(e.g., Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010; Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Hommel, 2012). 
2.8. Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were seated in front of the computer monitor and asked to 
put on the cap with the orientation tracker attached (as shown in Figure 1B). As the Kinect 
system requires some distance to recognize the partici nt’s movements, the chair was placed 
in front of the computer screen, with a horizontal distance between Kinect and participants of 
about 2 meters, as shown in Figure 1A. Each participant underwent three conditions: the 
baseline condition, the first experimental condition, and the second experimental condition. 
The first and the second experimental conditions differed with respect to the synchrony 
manipulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous), and both comprised two consecutive phases of 
2 minutes each.  
In the baseline condition, participants were presented with a static virtual face on the 
screen for 30 seconds, which they simply had to watch. The face was always of the same 
gender as the participant and could show either a neutral or a happy facial expression. Next, 
participants rated how much they felt the virtual face looked like their own on the IOS scale 
and indicated their current mood state on the AG. These IOS and AG ratings served as 
baseline measures against which the later, post-conditi  ratings were compared to estimate 
condition-induced changes in self-other inclusion and mood.  
Immediately after, participants completed the first experimental condition. In this 
condition they were presented with the same virtual face of the baseline condition, which they 
now could actively operate for 4 minutes. They did so by freely displacing or rotating their 
own face for the first 2 minutes (i.e., the displacing phase), which led to corresponding 
displacement or rotation movements of the virtual face. The temporal delay between people’s 
own movements and that of the virtual face was either 0 sec (in synchronous conditions) or 3 
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sec (in asynchronous conditions). The displacing phase was followed by the displacing-
touching phase. During this phase, besides displacing or rotating their own face to control the 
movements of the virtual face,  participants were also sked to use their right hand to touch 
their own right cheek repeatedly for another 2 minutes. The participant’s hand movement was 
accompanied by a corresponding movement of a virtual sm ll ball on the screen, which 
eventually touched the left cheek of the virtual face. The temporal delay between people’s 
own movement and that of the virtual ball (excluding the latency caused by the equipment) 
was either 0 sec (in synchronous conditions) or 3 sec (in asynchronous conditions). The 
displacing and the displacing-touching phases were consistent with respect to the synchrony 
manipulation: they were both either synchronous or asynchronous. Next, participants rated 
again how much they felt the virtual face looked like their own on the IOS scale and indicated 
their current mood state on the AG, before they filled in the questionnaire. Finally, 
participants performed the AUT.  
In the concluding second experimental condition, participants underwent the same 
procedure as in the first experimental condition, with the following exceptions. First, 
participants who were presented with synchronous stimulation in the first condition were now 
presented with asynchronous stimulation, while participants who were first presented with 
asynchronous stimulation were now presented with synchronous stimulation. Second, 
participants responded to the IOS scale and to the wnership/agency questionnaire but neither 
did they fill in the AG nor did they perform the AUT.  
3. Results 
In the following, we first report the analyses of the dependent measures assessing 
ownership (questionnaire Q1-12 and IOS), then the analyses of the dependent measures 
assessing mood migration (questionnaire Q13, AG and AUT). 
3.1. Body ownership 
Questionnaire 
Responses to the 12 ownership and ownership-related items were analyzed by means 
of a mixed 2(facial expression) X 2(synchrony) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), 
with facial expression varying between-, synchrony varying within-participants, and the 12 
questionnaire items as dependent variables. Pillai’s Trace (V) was used as multivariate 
criterion. Results revealed that there was a significant multivariate effect of synchrony, 
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V=0.75, F (12,47) = 11.73, p< 0.001, ηp2s=0.75, while the multivariate effects of facial 
expression and the interaction between facial expression and synchrony were not significant, 
Vs≤0.18, Fs<1, ps≥0.60. Follow-up within-participants univariate analyses revealed that, 
except for Q7 and Q11, Fs ≤ 1.978, ps ≥ 0.165, the main effect of synchrony was significant 
for all items, Fs(1,58) ≥ 4.92, ps ≤ 0.03, ηp2s ≥ 0.078: ratings were higher in synchronous 
than asynchronous conditions. Figure 4 and Table 1 provide an overview of participants’ 
mean ratings as a function of synchrony and facial expression, separately for each 
questionnaire item (Figure 4) and collapsed across the five categories the questionnaire 
comprises (i.e., ownership, similarity, agency, agency control, and mood; Table 1).  
 
Figure 4. Mean ratings for each questionnaire item, as a function of synchrony and facial 
expression of the virtual face. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
Table 1. Mean ratings (standard errors in parenthesis) of the mean collapsed across five 
categories (ownership, similarity, agency, agency control, and mood), as a function of  

























































synchronous 2.87 (0.27) 2.80 (0.28) 5.90 (0.20) 2.09 (0.20) 2.73 (0.24) 
asynchronous 2.02 (0.16) 2.48 (0.25) 4.24 (0.25) 2.67 (0.20) 2.47 (0.25) 
Happy face 
synchronous 3.38 (0.23) 3.43 (0.25) 6.16 (0.13) 2.31 (0.21) 3.07 (0.29) 
asynchronous 2.36 (0.22) 2.57 (0.22) 4.08 (0.32) 3.03 (0.25) 2.60 (0.27) 
 
IOS 
To assess possible pre-experimental differences between the facial-expression groups, 
or differences resulting from watching the happy or neutral expression of the still face, we 
compared the baseline IOS ratings by means of a two tailed t-test for independent groups. We 
found no significant effect for different facial expressions (p = 0.341), suggesting that only 
viewing the neutral or happy face expression did not affect the degree of self-other inclusion. 
We then calculated the changes in IOS ratings in synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
by subtracting the baseline IOS from the IOS ratings collected after synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. These data were entered into a mixed 2(facial expression) X 
2(synchrony) ANOVA, with facial expression varying between-, and synchrony varying 
within-participants. Both main effects were significant, indicating that participants 
experienced greater overlap with the virtual face aft r synchronous than after asynchronous 
conditions, F(1,58) = 43.629, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.429, and with happy than with neutral 
expressions of the virtual face, F(1,58) = 4.029, p = 0.049, ηp2 = 0.065 (see Figure 5). The 




Figure 5. IOS rating changes (IOS ratings after either he synchronous or the asynchronous 
condition minus baseline IOS ratings) as a function of synchrony and facial expression of the 
virtual face. Positive values indicate increased perceived self-other similarity compared to the 
baseline measurement, whereas negative values indicate decreased perceived self-other 




Responses to the mood question (Q13) were analyzed with a 2(facial expression) X 
2(synchrony) ANOVA, with facial expression and synchrony varying as between- and within-
participants factors, respectively. Results revealed only a significant main effect of synchrony, 
F(1,58) = 4.128, p = 0.047, ηp2 = 0.066, indicating better mood for synchronous conditions 
(see Figure 4). The main effect of facial expression and the two-way interaction were not 
significant, Fs<1, ps≥ 0.483. 
Affect grid (AG) 
The AG data reflect levels of arousal and valence that, being them considered 
independent of each other, were analyzed separately (Russel et al., 1989). Two tailed 
independent t-tests comparing the two facial-expression groups on the baseline measures did 
not reveal any significant difference, ps≥.573, meaning that simply viewing the neutral or 
happy face expression is not sufficient to induce between-groups differences in terms of self-
























valence by subtracting baseline AG data from the AG data collected after the first 
manipulation (see Figure 6), and these change scores were entered into 2(facial expression) X 
2(synchrony) between-participants ANOVAs. No significant effects were found for arousal 
changes, Fs≤ 1.757, ps ≥ 0.190. For valence, all the three sources of variance were significant: 
the main effects of facial expression, F(1,58) = 6.061, p = 0.017, ηp2 = 0.098, and synchrony, 
F(1,56) = 7.989, p = 0.007, ηp2 = 0.125, and the interaction, F(1,58) = 4.398, p = 0.041, ηp2 
= 0.073. Two-tailed independent t-tests revealed that the synchrony effect was significant in 
the happy-face group, t(28) = 3.617, p = 0.001, d = 1.329, but not in the neutral-face group, 
t(28) = 0.498, p = 0.623, d = 0.183. As Figure 6 shows, there was a general trend of valence 
ratings to go down, except for the condition with synchronized happy faces, where the ratings 
went up. That is, being exposed to a self-controlled happy face is lifting one’s mood in 
relative terms.  
 
Figure 6. Arousal (left panel) and valence (right panel) ratings changes (ratings after the first 
synchrony condition minus baseline ratings) as a function of synchrony and expression of the 
virtual face. Positive values indicate an increase of ratings after the first synchrony condition, 
negative values a decrease. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
Alternative uses task (AUT) 
Separate 2(facial expression) X 2(synchrony) between-participants ANOVAs 
performed on all four AUT scores revealed significant effects for fluency and flexibility 
scores only. In particular, facial expression produced a main effect on flexibility, F(1,56) = 
5.419, p = 0.024 and ηp2 = 0.088, and the interaction was significant for b th fluency, F(1,56) 
= 7.894, p = 0.007 and ηp2 = 0.124, and flexibility, F(1,56) = 4.977, p = 0.030 and ηp2 = 















































= 1.172, p = 0.251, d = 0.432, and flexibility, t(28) = 0.411, p = 0.684, d = 0.151, with neutral 
facial expressions; while synchrony significantly increased both fluency, t(28) = 2.813, p = 
0.009, d = 1.041, and flexibility, t(28) = 2.745, p = 0.010, d = 1.012, with happy facial 
expressions (see Figure 7). No significant effects or interactions were found for the remaining 
scores (i.e., elaboration and originality), F≤2.72, p ≥ 0.105. 
  
Figure 7. Fluency (left panel) and flexibility (right panel) scores as a function of synchrony 
and expression of the virtual face. Higher scores indicate better creativity performance. Error 
bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
3.3. Correlational analyses 
While our research design was not optimized for corelational analyses (e.g., as 
theoretical reasons did not allow repeating all measures after each condition), we were 
interested to see whether direct and indirect mood measures could be statistically predicted 
from ownership, agency, and IOS judgments. For that purpose, we computed one-tailed 
Spearman correlations across the aggregate of ownership questions (Q1-4) and the agency 
questions (Q8-10), changes in IOS ratings, changes in the valence of mood (from baseline to 
the first-tested condition), and flexibility and fluency in the creativity task (all N=60). 
Perceived ownership did not correlate with any other m asure (even though it approached 
significance for agency, p=0.16), while perceived agency showed significant positive 
correlations with IOS changes, r = 0.23, p = 0.04, mood changes, r = 0.27, p = 0.02, and 






































The aim of the present study was twofold: first, to test whether the enfacement illusion 
can be replicated in a virtual reality environment a d, second, to test whether the mood 
expressed by a virtual face can be demonstrated to migrate to people enfacing it.  
With respect to our first aim, we successfully replicated the enfacement illusion in a 
virtual reality environment, as evident from significant synchrony effects for 
ownership/agency questionnaire and IOS ratings. This demonstration of a virtual enfacement 
illusion has considerable methodological implications, as it frees experimenters from the 
artificial and time-demanding stroking procedure that was hitherto required to produce the 
illusion. 
With respect to our second aim, our findings provide straightforward evidence for 
mood migration: participants showed better mood and better performance in a mood-sensitive 
creativity task when enfacing a smiling virtual face than when either being exposed to a static 
smiling face or when enfacing neutral faces. As mentioned in the Introduction, these results 
can be interpreted within the theoretical framework f the TEC (Hommel et al., 2001; 
Hommel, 2009). According to TEC, people represents themselves and other (social or non-
social) events alike, that is, as integrated networks f feature codes (i.e., event files) that 
represent physical attributes, affective responses, control states, and both covert and overt 
actions related to an event. An important implication of TEC is that the more features are 
shared by different events (i.e., the more they are similar and the more their representations 
overlap), the more they can be related to, compared with, or confused with each other—just as 
it is the case for non-social representations (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). This allows salient 
feature codes that are activated by (and thus actually represent) one event to become part of, 
and shape the representation of another event they actually do not belong to. In other words, 
being confronted with multiple perceptual events can lead to “illusionary conjunctions”, 
bindings of features actually representing different events into one event file—especially if 
the events share other features. From this theoretical perspective, our findings demonstrate 
that perceiving a virtual face as being a part of oneself (thus increasing self-other similarity) 
allows affective features (such as a smile) to “migrate” from the representation of the other to 




Importantly, the specifics of our experimental setup allow us to exclude a number of 
alternative interpretations. For one, there was no evidence for the mirroring hypothesis. This 
hypothesis would predict main effects of facial expr ssion but no interaction with synchrony. 
While we did obtain a number of expression main effects, such as for IOS, valence, and AUT 
flexibility, these effects were moderated by interactions with synchrony, and the overall 
pattern for all three measures shows that both the main effects and the interactions were 
entirely driven by the higher values for the combination of happy faces and synchrony. 
Relatedly, there was no evidence of a group differences at baseline (that was obtained while 
people were facing static virtual faces with neutral o  happy expressions), suggesting that 
merely seeing a smiling (virtual) face is insufficient to lift one’s mood. Taken together, these 
two observations show that neither static nor dynamic lly moving happy faces per se were 
responsible for our observations. This allows us to rule out automatic facial mimicry as a 
major factor in our study (Strack et al., 1988; Dimberg et al., 2000; Bastiaansen et al., 2009), 
which would have caused the happy virtual face to lead to better mood regardless of the 
synchrony condition. Note that this is not to deny that some kind of face-induced automatic 
imitation may have in fact occurred; to shed light on this issue, follow-up studies may 
consider to combine the virtual enfacement setup with facial electromyographic recording. 
Finally, demand characteristics are also unlikely to account for our findings. Not only would 
these characteristics have the strongest impact on our direct mood question (Q13), which 
interestingly was the least to be affected by the facial expression, but they would also be 
unlikely to improve divergent thinking. 
The demonstration of mood migration has several theoretical implications, in 
particular with respect to our understanding of sel-representation and emotion. Our findings 
suggest that people can “confuse” their own emotions with those expressed by another agent, 
if they are made to identify with that agent to some degree. How is that possible? In our view, 
three basic considerations are necessary and sufficient to explain this kind of mood migration. 
First, the Jamesian approach to emotional experience (James, 1884; Laird, 1974, 2007) holds 
that the experience of an emotion emerges from the in egration of multiple exogenous and 
endogenous features, including one’s own behavior and interoceptive signals. Various authors 
have argued that facial responses provide particularly informative cues about one’s emotions 
(see Buck, 1980), suggesting that facial cues weigh hi ly in determining one’s own affective 
state. Indeed, emotions can be read off facial expressions easily, if not automatically (de 
Gelder & van den Stock, 2011).  
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Second, there is ample evidence that perceiving one’s own facial expressions induces 
the emotional state being expressed. For instance, i structing participants to activate muscles 
that are involved in smiling has been shown to make the participants happier (Strack et al., 
1988) and comparable observations have been made for n gative emotions. This implies a 
direct association between the registration of a particular effective facial expression and other, 
more endogenous factors involved in creating emotional states, so that perceiving a smile 
biased other emotional cues towards happiness.  
And, third, the hypothesized relativity of self-other discrimination (Hommel, Colzato, 
& Van Den Wildenberg, 2009) allowed participants to perceive a synchronized face of an 
avatar as being a part of themselves. Synchronization was likely to be crucial by creating 
cross-modal matches of stimulation (i.e., between kinesthetic feedback from one’s own 
movements and sensory feedback from the avatar’s move ents) and active control over the 
avatar’s movements (objective agency, see Hommel, 2015a), which both have been argued to 
represent critical information for perceive body ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ma & 
Hommel, 2015). Accordingly, the avatar’s facial expression was in some sense perceived as 
the participants’ own facial expression, which according to Jamesian theorizing would lead 
them to use this expression as a cue to determine their own emotional state.  
Note that not all three considerations are equally re evant for all our observations. 
Combining Jamesian theory with the assumption of self-other integration is sufficient to 
account for the increased happiness when facing a synchronized smiling avatar. While it is 
possible that valence judgments were also considering interoceptive reactions to the 
perception of a seemingly self-produced smile (as implied by our second consideration), we 
have no direct evidence that such reactions were triggered. In principle, it is thus possible that 
the impact on valence judgments was directly driven by reading out the facial-expression 
information that participants in the synchronized/smile condition were assuming to come from 
a face they perceived as part of their own body. The same holds for the IOS findings, which 
do not require the assumption that processing facial expressions triggered (other) internal 
affective responses. However, the impact of our manipulation on creativity in the AUT does 
rely on all three considerations. While there is ample evidence that positive mood promotes 
divergent thinking as assessed by the AUT (Baas et l., 2008), there is no empirical or 
theoretical reason to assume that perceiving or producing a happy face by itself is sufficient to 
impact creativity. Available accounts explain the impact of mood on brainstorming-like 
creativity by pointing to a link between positive mood and phasic increases of (presumably 
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striatal: Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010) dopamine (Ashby et al., 1999), which in turn 
seems to reduce the mutual inhibition between alterna ive memory traces (Hommel, 2012, 
2015b). If so, changes in dopaminergic supply would need to be considered as both a 
component of mood and promoting creative thinking. This in turn suggests that perceiving a 
smile as one’s own was sufficient to induce phasic increases of dopamine. If we thus consider 
such changes and facial expressions as two Jamesian emotion components, our findings 
suggest that these components entertain bidirectional associations—so that the existence of 
one tends to trigger the other, as our second considerat on suggests. 
While we keep emphasizing that our study was not optimized for correlational 
analyses, it is interesting to consider what the outcomes of this analysis might imply. Recall 
that perceived ownership did not show any significant correlations while perceived agency 
correlated with changes in IOS, mood, and flexibility. At first sight, this may seem 
counterintuitive: should it not be ownership, rather than agency, that is related to interactions 
between self- and other-representation? We believe that serious consideration of two issues 
renders our observations less counterintuitive. First, questionnaires assess the subjective 
experience of ownership and agency. This experience must be based on information, on 
functional/neural states that correlate with objective ownership and agency. Correlation does 
not imply identity, however, especially given that subjective judgments of that sort integrate 
various sources of information (Hommel, 2015a; Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen, 2008). These 
sources include cues of objective ownership and agency, but also consider top-down 
expectations and interpretations, which can moderate judgments independently from objective 
bottom-up signals (Ma & Hommel, 2015). Second, objectiv  agency is likely to play a key 
role in providing bottom-up cues for both ownership and agency judgments (Synofzik et al., 
2008; Ma & Hommel, 2015), as it for instance determines the number of data points for 
computing the inter-modal correlations that are assumed to underlie the subjective experience 
of ownership (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Combining these two considerations suggests the 
following interpretation of our correlational findings: while both subjective ownership and 
subjective agency were likely to rely on objective agency (which we manipulated by means of 
synchrony), subjective agency might not be a 100% valid reflection of objective agency but it 
is likely to represent it more directly than subjective ownership does. Accordingly, we take 
our findings to imply that objective, but not subjective agency (or subjective ownership) was 
causally involved in changing self-other integration, mood, and flexibility—and that our 
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subjective-agency measure provided the comparatively best estimate for the representation of 
objective agency in the cognitive system. 
An important consideration pertains to the virtual reality setup employed in the present 
study, in which visuotactile synchronous stimulation and visuomotor synchrony were 
combined. As specified in the Introduction, we opted for such a design in order to maximize 
the chance of inducing a strong virtual enfacement illusion, which was also essential to test 
our migration hypothesis. Although the results of previous studies suggest that for ownership 
illusions to occur visuomotor synchrony alone may be sufficient (Tsakiris et al., 2006; 
Newport et al., 2010; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; González-Franco et al., 2010; Kalckert & 
Ehrsson, 2012, 2014; Jenkinson & Preston 2015), we rec ntly obtained evidence that, at least 
in a dynamic virtual environment, synchrony-induced ownership illusions are more 
pronounced when multiple information sources are provided and can be integrated (Ma & 
Hommel, 2015). We acknowledge that, given our experimental setup, it is not possible to 
ascertain whether the observed synchrony-induced eff cts (i.e., the enfacement illusion and 
mood migration) are to due to visuomotor synchrony l , to visuotactile synchrony only, or 
to their combination. Therefore, it would be advisable for follow-up studies to extend our 
findings in order to assess the relative importance and the specific contribution of visuotactile 
and visuomotor contingences in mediating the observed effects. Notwithstanding the fact that 
more research is still needed, our findings provide convergent evidence that the boundaries 
between perceived self and perceived other are rathr flexible (Hommel et al., 2009; Ma & 
Hommel, 2015), with self-other synchrony being one factor that determines the strictness of 
these boundaries. Loosening them seems to open the possibility for mood migration, that is, 
for spontaneously adopting the mood expressed by a person or (as in our case) agent that one 
identifies with. 
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The main issue addressed in this thesis is the degree to which the representation of our 
body is flexible, and what possible implication this as. By using the virtual hand illusion 
(VHI) paradigm, we provided evidence for a dissociation between subjective ownership 
perception and the skin conductance response (SCR), which is considered an objective 
method to measure the body ownership illusion (Chapter 2). By means of VHI, we then 
investigated perceived ownership for a virtual balloon and a virtual square, two artificial 
effectors that do not look like a real hand. Perceived ownership increased if participants were 
able to actively move their own hand to control the virtual effector, suggesting that non-
corporeal objects can be incorporated as a body part under certain conditions. That is, the 
body image is rather flexible (Chapter 3). Then we analyzed the contribution of the visual 
form of the effector and sense of agency for senses of ownership, finding that the sense of 
agency was more important than the visual form. We proposed that the sense of ownership 
arises from a rather broad integration of both top-d wn and bottom-up factors, including the 
agency sense, visual form, and other context information, without a modulation relationship 
between them, and it is possible that information fr m one source can compensate for a lack 
of information from another (Chapter 3, 4).  
We further investigated the flexibility of body repr sentation and found that it can be 
affected by context-induced spatial reference frames. In our static VHI setup, we manipulated 
the spatial distance between real and artificial hand, nd found that the context-induced spatial 
reference frame provided by the previous condition was affecting perceived ownership in the 
later condition (Chapter 5). Finally, we replicated he enfacement illusion (EI) in a virtual 
environment and also showed that participants can incorporate some facial features of the 
viewed face when multisensory stimulation was applied. In particular, participants assimilated 
the facial happy expressions of the viewed face and the corresponding mood (Chapter 6). 
Overall, the present thesis provides strong evidence that body representations are flexible in 
many ways. In the following, I discuss several more general theoretical and practical 
implications of these findings. 
7.1. The advantage of virtual reality technology 
The rubber hand illusion (RHI) which was originally reported by Botvinick and Cohen 
(1998) is a body ownership illusion, in which participants viewed a rubber hand and their own 
unseen hand receiving synchronous visuotactile stimulation. This made them misperceive the 
position of the rubber hand, they perceived their hand as being closer to the rubber hand than 
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it really was, and they even misperceived the rubber hand as their own hand. Until now, 
plenty of studies investigated illusory body ownership with the RHI paradigm (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Longo et al., 2008; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007; Tsakiris, Schütz-Bosbach et al., 
2007). Researchers also developed an active RHI paradigm, in which, the static rubber hand 
can be limited moved, for example, a specific finger (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014, 2014a; 
Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006; Walsh, Moseley, Taylor, & Gandevia, 2011), or the 
whole palm (Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009) can be moved by participants.  
The virtual hand illusion (VHI), which is similar to RHI, was demonstrated in Slater, 
Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, and Sanchez-Vives (2008), where t e authors replaced the rubber 
hand with a virtual hand, and also applied visuotactile stimulation. As a consequence, 
participants misperceived the virtual hand as their own hand. In Slater et al. (2008), the virtual 
hand could not be moved by participants, very similar to a static rubber hand. In later studies 
(Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009; Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, 
Bergamasco, & Slater, 2010; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-Vives, & Slater, 2012; Kokkinara & 
Slater, 2014; Padilla et al., 2010; Short & Ward, 2009; Yuan & Steed, 2010; IJsselsteijn, de 
Kort, & Haans, 2006), the virtual hand, body or even other objects could be freely moved by 
participants, so that the virtual hand moved in the same way as the real hand (Chapter 2,3,4). 
By comparing the RHI and VHI, we can see that, firstly, the VHI can be thought as a 
replication of RHI in virtual environment, with an entirely virtual three dimensional arm and 
hand. The results of VHI-paradigms are comparable to r sults of RHI-paradigms with respect 
to the subjective reporting of the illusion, the pro rioceptive drift, and SCR: perceived 
ownership is higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous condition. Secondly, virtual 
reality technique offers the possibility for a highly flexible approach to the problem of body 
ownership and representation: the free movement of the virtual hand was difficult to achieve 
systematically with the rubber hand, while in VHI paradigms the virtual hand could be almost 
freely moved in synchrony with the real hand (Padill  et al., 2010; Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-
Vives, & Slater, 2012; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010). Moreover, virtual reality provides the 
possibility to simulate contact with other virtual objects and generate a tactile feeling on the 
real hand (reafferent information matching the effer nt information). Continuously moving 
one’s felt hand together with the seen virtual hand  perceiving simulated contact with 
another object creates hundreds if not thousands of ata points that can be correlated to 
calculate the degree of intermodal matching, providing temporally extended multisensory 
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information and thus a more extended database for bottom-up multisensory matching 
processes (Chapter 2,3,4). Accordingly, the advantages of the VHI paradigm provide us with 
more opportunities to investigate the cognitive processes underlying the body ownership 
illusion perception, and more opportunities to register links between sense of ownership and 
agency than RHI studies do (Chapter 2,3,4). 
7.2. The cognitive processes underlying the body ownership illusion 
Bottom-up and top-down approaches have been proposed t  account for the body 
ownership illusion. Armel and Ramachandran (2003) proposed a bottom-up approach that 
considers the body ownership illusion a result of Bayesian perceptual learning based on 
synchronous multisensory information. In the strong version of this model, any object can 
become part of one’s body if there is sufficiently strong statistical correlation between 
different sensory modalities that process this object. If so, the illusion should be present even 
when participants are facing a neutral object that does not look like a real body part, and even 
when the anatomical and postural properties of a rubber hand do not match the real body part. 
While plenty of studies showed different results, there are some constraints on the 
ownership illusion induction. For example, illusions cannot be induced if the rubber object 
does not look like a real hand (Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008; Tsakiris, Costantini, & 
Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005, see also Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; see 
also Graziano, Cooke, & Taylor, 2000), and if the rubber hand has different anatomical and 
postural properties than the real corresponding body part (see Costantini & Haggard, 2007; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005, see also Graziano et al., 2000; Pavani, Spence, & Driver, 2000). 
Based on these findings, Tsakiris (2010) suggested thr e constraints: the visual form, the 
anatomical and postural properties of the rubber hand, nd the spatial and visual-touch 
reference frame. Tsakiris postulated a top-down modulation approach, in which bottom-up 
information is modulated by a body model. This model encompasses an implicit knowledge 
structure that encodes the body’s form and the constrai ts on how the body’s parts can be 
configured. Bottom-up information is compared against the body model to determine the 
possible incorporation of a viewed object.  
However, some other studies suggest that the constrai t  on ownership perception are 
not strict at all, which does not seem to be consistent with the top-down modulation approach. 
For example, rubber hand can be incorporated as a body part even if its color, size, or tactile 
feeling is different from the real hand (Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Longo, 
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Kammers, Gomi, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2009; Pavani & Zampini, 2007); if the visual form of 
the rubber hand does not match the form of the real hand (Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 
2013; Chapter 3, 4); if the anatomical properties of rubber and real hand differ (Ehrsson, 2009; 
Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 2011; Chapter 3, 4); and the spatial reference frame itself 
was shown to be malleably perceived (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 3, we re-investigated whether participants can experience ownership 
illusions for an external object with a different visual form from the real hand. Our hypothesis 
was based on the advantage of the VHI compared to the RHI, i.e. the virtual object can be 
freely moved by participants. Our results suggest that through the combination of self-
produced visual, kinesthetic, proprioceptive action feedback and tactile information, 
participants incorporated the non-corporeal objects, a virtual balloon changing in size, and a 
virtual square changing in size or color, into their own body representation, as the 
questionnaire and SCR results showed. This finding showed that the voluntary controllability 
of the virtual object is more important than the appearance resemblance for the ownership 
illusion induction, and suggests that all objects can be experienced as part of one’s body in 
certain conditions, as the bottom-up approach would pre ict. Previous studies have apparently 
underestimated the plasticity of body representations and put too much emphasis on the 
resemblance between viewed object and real hand. 
One interesting finding is that the ownership illusion is more convincing if the virtual 
object seems to be connected to participants’ body. When the virtual balloon did not seem to 
be connected to the body, the subjective ratings were rather low; while when the virtual 
balloon seemed connected to the body, the subjective ratings were similar as for the virtual 
hand in VHI. This suggests that self-perception is modulated by Gestalt laws, as known from 
object perception, where connectedness (as captured by the laws of proximity and the law of 
continuity) is a central cue for perceived unity (i.e., belongingness to the same object or event; 
e.g., Sternberg, 2003). This is also consistent with prior findings (Perez-Marcos, Sanchez-
Vives, & Slater, 2012), and studies investigating the first person perspective (Petkova & 
Ehrsson, 2008; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Vogeley & Fink, 2003; Slater, Spanlang, Sanchez-
Vives, & Blanke, 2010; Spanlang, Normand, Giannopoulos, & Slater, 2010), in which the 
first person perspective was proposed as necessary for human self-consciousness. 
In Chapter 4, we systematically analyzed the relationship between active control (RHI 
or VHI), visual form of the virtual object (virtual hand or virtual rectangle), and synchrony 
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(synchronous or asynchronous). The results show significant effects for visual from, with 
higher ownership ratings for the virtual hand than the virtual rectangle, but no interaction 
between visual form and synchrony. This suggests that facing an object that resembles a body 
part may activate corresponding body representations (Tsakiris, 2010) and thus produce a top-
down bias towards perceived ownership, thus increase the general tendency to perceive an 
object as part of one’s own body, but without censori g bottom-up information. To account 
for this pattern, we proposed that multisensory, bottom-up and top-down information 
contribute to the illusory ownership perception, with a compensatory, but not a modulatory 
relationship between them. In other words, when the virtual object can be freely and 
voluntarily controlled by participants and visuotactile stimulation is applied, participants will 
incorporate the virtual object as their own body part, even if the visual form does not match 
with their body part. However, when the virtual object cannot be controlled, with only 
visuotactile stimulation, the visual form becomes more important, so that participants can 
accept the virtual object only as their own body-part if the visual form is similar to a body part. 
Overall, these findings emphasize bottom-up mechanisms without excluding top-down factors, 
but they are inconsistent with the strict top-down modulation approach with a pre-existing 
body model to modulate the illusory ownership (Chapter 3,4,5). Overall, we suggest that body 
representations are more flexible than previously thought. 
Similar findings were also reported in a few behavioral studies that have investigated 
the link between action-recognition and self-recognitio  (van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002, 
and for a review see Jeannerod, 2003). In Van den Bos and Jeannerod, (2002), the researchers 
showed that subjects had difficulty in differentiating their hand from another hand when 
movements were absent, but when the two hands made distinctive movements, subjects relied 
exclusively on the movement cue and the recognition was almost perfect. 
In Chapter 5, we investigated the malleability of the spatial reference frame. The 
flexibility of spatial reference frames has not yetb en fully investigated, even though few 
studies already investigated its importance as a constraint for the RHI. We used a simple 
design: two sequences of two static VHI conditions in which the virtual hand cannot be 
moved, and three different positions where the virtual hand was placed. The difference 
between these VHI conditions is only that the virtual hand was placed in different positions. 
The virtual hand in the prior VHI conditions of the s quence could be placed in a near or far 
position, while the position of the virtual hand in later VHI conditions was always medium 
position. Our results firstly showed that for the prior VHI conditions, the illusion strength was 
Chapter 7 
 136
higher in near than far position; and secondly, the illusion strength in the later VHI condition 
was influenced by different context-induced spatial reference frames in prior VHI condition. 
This suggests that after different prior VHI conditions, the spatial reference frame was 
differently induced, and thus different illusion strength was induced in the same later VHI 
conditions. This demonstrates the malleability of the spatial criteria itself as a constraint in 
RHI/VHI, and also shows the flexibility of the body representation. 
7.3. Sense of ownership and the sense of agency 
Sense of ownership and sense of agency were thought to be dissociated sensations 
(Gallagher, 2000; Jeannerod, 2003; Tsakiris et al., 2007), but with strong interaction in 
producing ownership illusions (Burin et al., 2015; Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 
2009; Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2006, 2007). Research investigating the 
relationship between them has revealed inconsistent results with RHI/VHI, some studies 
showing greater sense of illusory ownership with greater sense of agency (Burin et al., 2015; 
Kokkinara & Slater, 2014; Caspar et al., 2014), some studies showing the opposite 
relationship between the two senses (Walsh, Moseley, Ta lor, & Gandevia, 2011; Dummer et 
al., 2009), and yet other studies showing no correlation between them at all (e.g., Tsakiris et 
al., 2006; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014a). 
In Chapter 3 and 4, we investigated the relationship between the sense of ownership 
and the sense of agency with the VHI. As the VHI has an important advantage, the virtual 
hand can be fully controlled by participants, thus providing a strong sense of agency, we think 
VHI is more appropriate to use to investigate the contribution of sense of agency for sense of 
ownership than RHI. We analyzed the role of active control (RHI or VHI), visual form of the 
virtual object (visual hand or virtual rectangle), and synchrony (synchronous or 
asynchronous). In a passive condition equivalent to the RHI, participants could not move the 
virtual hand and only passively received visuotactile stimulation; in an active condition 
equivalent to the VHI, participants could move the virtual hand and actively touch another 
virtual object to receive visuotactile stimulation. Our results showed not only a significant 
effect for activity (passive or active), but also an interaction effect between activity and 
synchrony. This suggests that having the opportunity to actively operate the virtual effector 
(and thereby obtaining additional efferent and re-aff rent information) did not only increase 
perceived agency, but also boosted both the general impression of ownership and the 
ownership illusion. To explain our results and the inconsistent findings from previous studies, 
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we proposed that previous studies confounded objective and subjective agency (Hommel, 
2015a; Wegner, 2003). Subjective ownership and subjective agency may both rely on 
objective agency, which in turn relies on a richer multimodal database in VHI. 
7.4. Different measurement results are inconsistent with each other 
Questionnaires, proprioceptive drift, and SCR are the mostly used measurement for 
ownership illusion in RHI/VHI, and we also employed them in our studies (Chapter 2, 3, 4, 5). 
Of these, the questionnaire with participants’ subjective ratings is thought to be most explicit 
because it directly asks participants to rate their ownership, agency and other feelings for the 
rubber/virtual hand. But supplementary objective measurements are also necessary to avoid 
strategies and task demands. However, given that the proprioceptive drift can be expected to 
occur even when there is no ownership illusion in subjective ratings (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011), the two measures do not 
rely on exactly the same information. In chapter 4 and 5, our results also showed different 
patterns for the two measurements, consistent with the conclusions of previous studies. 
In Chapter 2, we directly investigated the hypothesis that perceived body ownership 
and affective responses (as assessed by SCR) to body-related impact or threat do not represent 
the same underlying process. RHI studies showed that SCR rises when the rubber hand is 
threatened because participants misperceive the rubbe  hand as their own hand; but 
neuroscientific findings (Singer et al., 2004; Morrison et al., 2004) suggested affective 
resonance arises irrespective of ownership. We design d and compared impact and threat 
conditions. In the impact condition, participants showing higher SCR when the ownership 
illusion was perceived, as in the synchronous condition. In the threat condition, SCR was 
independent of synchronicity, participants showed higher SCR even if a threat was targeting a 
hand that they did not perceive as their own. We argue that affective reactions to impact are 
produced in a top-down fashion if the impacted effector is assumed to be part of one’s own 
body, whereas threatening events trigger affective responses more directly in a bottom-up 
fashion-irrespective of body ownership. 
Another interesting finding is that, in Chapter 3 and 4, we found comparable 
synchrony effects for almost all questionnaire items, which is of both methodological or 
theoretical relevance. On the one hand, this might indicate that the questionnaire taken from 
traditional RHI studies does not work quite as well for non-corporeal virtual objects (Chapter 
3). On the other hand, however, this may be more than a methodological observation. It is 
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possible that static manipulations systematically underestimate the impact of synchronicity 
manipulations on all self-perception aspects but the most direct ownership questions. More 
dynamic manipulations may make more perceptual dimensions perceivable or salient, which 
then leads to measurable synchrony effects on all items relating to any aspect of self-
perception. In other words, the broader, less selective effects we consistently observed may 
represent the more realistic pattern. This possibility would fit the idea that ownership and 
agency may be more closely related than hitherto assumed (Short & Ward, 2009; and Chapter 
3,4).  
7.5. Enfacement and mood migration 
In Chapter 6, we replicated the enfacement illusion (EI) in a virtual environment 
(Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010), and demonstrated the virtual enfacement 
illusion (VEI). In the VEI, participants can freely move their own face and see a virtual face 
moving on the screen. participants can also move their hand to touch their own face and see 
the virtual face being touched by a virtual ball which tracks the hand trajectory, so that 
participants receive integrated multiple stimulation. The results showed that synchronous 
multisensory stimulation influences self-face recognition and the internal face representation, 
suggesting that our facial awareness is not a fixed representation, but instead is dynamically 
susceptible to current multisensory information.  
The explicit subjective ratings were rather low, but the questionnaire and inclusion of 
others into self scale (IOS) both showed significant sy chrony effects. This suggests that the 
facial illusion occurred mainly at implicit, unconscious levels (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012; Tajadura-Jiménez, Lorusso, & Tsakiris, 2013). It further 
suggests that while combinations of motor activity, proprioceptive sensations and visuotactile 
stimulation can easily induce the phenomenological experience that the fake hand or the 
virtual body belong to the stimulated subject, the conscious experience of incorporating 
other’s face into one’s own body representation is more difficult to obtain. This may be 
because facial identity is at the core of our sense of s lf, which may make facial 
representations less amenable to changes. 
In Chapter 6, our second aim was to investigate whether the mood expressed by the 
viewed facial expression can migrate to participants who enface it. This hypothesis was based 
on the high social relevance of the face, as several enf cement studies (Sforza et al. 2010; 
Paladino et al. 2010; Mazzurega et al., 2011) showed that synchronous multisensory 
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stimulation can blur self-other boundaries, influenc  social cognition processes of inference 
and conformity, empathic traits, physical attractiveness and the perceived physical 
resemblance between one’s own and the other’s face. 
We designed two different mood-expressing facial expr ssions, happy and neutral, and 
also applied synchronous and asynchronous multisensory stimulation and voluntary action 
with VEI. As predicted, after enfacing a happy virtual face, participants adopted the expressed 
mood, as indicated by higher valence scores and better performance in a mood-sensitive 
divergent-thinking task. This suggests that control over another person’s facial movements 
and receiving synchronous multisensory stimulation invite mood migration from the person 
one identifies with. 
Our findings are consistent with the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, 
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Hommel, 2009), which does not distinguish between social and 
nonsocial events and assumes that perceived and produced events (i.e., perceptions and 
actions) are represented in terms of networks of featur  codes (event files; see Hommel, 2004; 
Kim & Hommel, 2015). According to TEC, participants store the combination of their own 
face and expression as well as the combination of the virtual face and its expression. The 
possible blurring of self-other discrimination by enfacement may make participants retrieve 
both expressions without awareness of who owned it. As perceiving one’s own facial 
expressions can induce the emotional state being expressed (Strack et al., 1988), the 
misperceived facial expression may bias participants’ mood and change their mood-sensitive 
behavior. In other words, with the enfacement, the expression features and expressed mood 
belonging to the other person representation migrated to the participant’s representation. 
Overall, our findings provide evidence that the boundaries between perceived self and 
perceived other are rather flexible (Hommel, Colzato, & Van Den Wildenberg, 2009). With 
self-other synchrony being one factor that determines the strictness of these boundaries, 
loosening them seems to open the possibility for mood migration, that is, for spontaneously 
adopting the mood expressed by a person or agent that one identifies with. 
7.6. Outlook: the implications of flexibility of body representation 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that although our body representation is stable to 
some degree, it is very flexible too. In several studies with RHI, VHI, and VEI paradigms, 
multisensory stimulations, voluntary movements, andeven context such as prior VHI 
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conditions were used to investigate its flexibility. As proposed in Chapter 4, our body 
considers various sources of information to update the body representation continuously 
(Ehrsson, 2012; Graziano & Botvinick, 2002). Accordingly, perceived body ownership may 
depend on many aspects of information, with a compensatory but not a modulatory 
relationship between them, similar to the sense of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 
2008). 
Based on our findings, we can hypothesize that in some specific conditions with 
specific context, the body ownership illusion may be induced even when some other generally 
accepted constraints are not met. For example, when the virtual hand does not share similar 
postural properties with the real hand; or the virtual hand is not placed in the peripheral space; 
or more facial features of the viewed face could be assimilated by participants. Even more, 
besides mood migration, will the other information, for example, the age or even gender 
character be misperceived, and participants act more like a person with such specific 
characteristics? It would be interesting to know the extent of the flexibility of the body 
representation, and to understand what is the real core of the body representation that cannot 
be modified. 
Some fascinating possible applications come to mind, especially if the real core and 
the malleable parts of the body representation can be successfully separated. Based on the 
findings in this thesis, the applications may target two aspects: First, it might be interesting to 
study how and to which degree a person’s self-percetion can be manipulated, which body 
someone can be convinced to have, how it can look like, and how it can behave when being 
controlled by the person. Second, it would be interesting to study how a person’s real 
cognitive and mental state can be influenced by making him or her believed to be smiling. 
Moreover, it would be particularly interesting to study the effects of longer periods of training 
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De centrale kwestie waarop deze dissertatie ingaat is de  mate waarin representaties 
van ons lichaam flexibel zijn  en de mogelijke  implicaties. Door gebruik te maken van het 
Virtuele Hand Illusie  paradigma (VHI) hebben wij bewijs gevonden voor een dissociatie 
tussen de subjectieve sensatie van lichaamseigenheid en de Skin Conductance Response 
(SCR), de galvanische huidreactie. Deze wordt gezien als een objectieve maat om de 
lichaamseigenheid illusie te bepalen (Hoofdstuk 2). Vervolgens hebben we, gebruikmakend 
van de VHI, gekeken naar de ervaren lichaamseigenheid van een virtuele ballon en virtueel 
vierkant, twee artificiële effectoren die er niet uitzien als een echte hand. Ervaren eigenheid 
nam toe als participanten de virtuele effector konden controleren, doormiddel van hun eigen 
hand, suggererend dat niet-corporale objecten onder bepaalde condities als lichaamsdeel 
kunnen worden opgenomen. Oftewel: het lichaamsbeeld is enigszins flexibel (Hoofdstuk 3). 
Hierna hebben wij de bijdrage van de visuele vorm van de effector en de ervaren agentschap 
(agency) op de ervaren eigenheid bestudeerd, en vonden dat ervaren agentschap belangrijker 
is dan de visuele vorm. Wij stellen dat de ervaren eigenheid voortkomt uit een brede integratie 
van bottom-up en top-down factoren, zoals de ervaren gentschap, visuele vorm en andere 
contextuele informatie, zonder een bijstellende onderlinge rol. Het is mogelijk dat informatie 
in het ene domein een gebrek aan informatie in een ander domein kan compenseren 
(Hoofdstuk 3, 4). 
Verder hebben wij ontdekt dat de flexibiliteit van lichaamsrepresentatie beïnvloed 
wordt door contextuele ruimtelijke referentiekaders. Binnen onze vaste VHI opstelling 
manipuleerde wij de ruimtelijke afstand tussen de echte en artificiële hand. Wij vonden dat 
contextuele ruimtelijke referentieframes ingegeven door de vorige conditie de ervaren 
eigenheid in de latere conditie beïnvloedde (Hoofdstuk 5). Tenslotte, hebben wij de 
Enfacement Illusie (EI), de gelaat belichaming illusie, in een virtuele omgeving gerepliceerd 
en aangetoond dat participanten sommige gelaatstrekken kunnen incorporeren wanneer er 
multi-sensorische stimulatie word toegepast. Specifiek: participanten assimileerde de blije 
expressies en de bijbehorende stemming (Hoofdstuk 6). Over het geheel gezien levert deze 
dissertatie sterk bewijs dat lichaamsrepresentaties op vele manieren flexibel zijn. In het 





7.1 Voordelen van virtuele realiteit technologie 
De rubberen hand illusie (RHI) is een lichaamseigenheid illusie, waarbij participanten 
naar een rubberen hand kijken, die samen met hun eige  ongeziene hand synchroon tactiel 
wordt gestimuleerd. Dit laat de participant de positie van de eigen hand verkeerd inschatten en 
geeft zelfs het gevoel dat de rubberen hand de eigen hand is. Er zijn vele studies die 
illusionaire lichaamseigenheid onderzoeken met behulp van het RHI paradigma. 
Onderzoekers hebben ook een actieve variant ontwikkeld, waarin de statische rubberen hand 
beperkt bewogen kan worden, bijvoorbeeld alleen een vinger of de handpalm.  
In de Virtuele Hand Illusie (VHI), die vergelijkbaar is met de RHI, wordt de rubberen 
hand met een virtuele hand vervangen en vindt ook visueel-tactiele stimulatie plaats. Als 
gevolg, wordt ook hier de virtuele hand verkeerd beschouwd als de eigen hand. De virtuele 
hand kan of statisch zijn of door participanten vrij worden bewogen. 
Als eerste, kunnen wij de VHI, door de RHI en VHI te vergelijken, zien als een 
replicatie van de RHI in een virtuele omgeving, met volledig driedimensionale hand en arm. 
De resultaten van het VHI paradigma zijn vergelijkbaar met die van het RHI paradigma in de 
subjectieve rapportage van de illusie, de proprioceptieve drift en de SCR: ervaren eigenheid is 
groter in de synchrone dan in de asynchrone conditie. Ten tweede, virtuele 
realiteitstechnieken geven de mogelijkheid tot flexib le aanpak van het probleem van 
lichaamseigenheid en -representatie: vrije beweging is in de RHI lastig systematisch te 
realiseren, terwijl in de VHI de virtuele hand bijna volledig vrij, synchroon met de eigen hand, 
bewogen kan worden. Verder, virtuele realiteit geeft d  mogelijkheid om de contactstimulatie 
met verschillende objecten te laten plaatsvinden en tactiele sensaties in de echte hand te 
genereren (re-afferente informatie overeenkomend met de fferente informatie). Het continue 
bewegen van de gevoelde hand, samen met de geziene virtuele hand, levert honderden, zo niet 
duizenden, datapunten op die gecorreleerd kunnen worden om de mate van intermodale 
overeenkomst te berekenen, daarmee temporaal uitgebreid  multi-sensorische informatie en 
een uitgebreidere database voor bottom-up multi-sensorische matching processen opleverend 
(Hoofdstuk 2, 3, 4). Deze voordelen van de VHI geven ons meer mogelijkheden om de 
onderliggende cognitieve processen van de lichaamseigenheid illusie perceptie te 
onderzoeken en meer mogelijkheden om connecties tussen ervaren eigenheid en agentschap te 




7.2 Cognitieve processen in de lichaamseigenheid illusie 
Om de lichaamseigenheid illusie te verklaren zijn bottom-up en top-down 
verhandelingen voorgesteld. Een bottom-up verhandeling ziet de illusie als het resultaat van 
een Bayesiaans perceptueel leerproces gebaseerd op synchrone multi-sensorische informatie. 
In de sterke versie van dit model kan elk object een d el van het lichaam worden, als er maar 
een sterke correlatie bestaat tussen verschillende zi tuigelijke modaliteiten die het object 
verwerken. Als dit het geval is, zou de illusie ook moeten optreden als participanten 
geconfronteerd worden met een neutraal object dat niet op een lichaamsdeel lijkt en zelfs als 
de anatomische en posturele kenmerken van een rubberen hand niet overeenkomen met de 
echte hand. Hoewel er vele studies zijn met uiteenlopende resultaten zijn er een aantal 
beperkingen aan de opwekking van de illusie. Bijvoorbeeld, de illusie wordt niet opgewekt als 
de rubberen hand niet op een echte hand lijkt, als de rubberen hand andere anatomische en 
posturele kenmerken heeft dan het corresponderende lichaamsdeel. Verder is ook het spatiale 
en visueel-tactiele referentiekader beperkend. In een top-down insteek wordt de bottom-up 
informatie gemoduleerd door een lichaamsmodel. Dit model heeft een impliciete 
informatiestructuur die codeert voor de vorm van het lichaam en de beperkingen van diens 
configuraties. Bottom-up informatie wordt vergeleken met het lichaamsmodel om de 
mogelijke incorporatie van een bezichtigd object te bepalen. 
Echter, sommige studies suggereren dat de beperkingn op eigenheid perceptie geheel 
niet strikt zijn, wat niet consistent is met de top-down verhandeling. Bijvoorbeeld, een 
rubberen hand kan geïncorporeerd worden zelfs als de kleur, grootte of tactiel gevoel 
verschillend is van de echte hand; als de visuele vorm van de rubberen hand niet overeenkomt 
met de echte hand (Hoofdstuk 3, 4); als de anatomische kenmerken verschillen (Hoofdstuk 3, 
4); en het spatiale referentiekader aanpasbaar blijkt (Hoofdstuk 5).  
In hoofdstuk 3 hebben wij opnieuw onderzocht of participanten de eigenheid illusie 
kunnen ervaren met een extern object dat een ander visueel voorkomen heeft als de echte 
hand. Onze hypothese was gebaseerd op de voordelen van de VHI ten opzichte van de RHI; 
het virtuele object kan vrij bewogen worden. Onze resultaten suggereren dat door de 
combinatie van zelf-voortgebrachte visuele, kinetische en proprioceptieve feedback en tactiele 
informatie, participanten de niet-corporale objecten, een virtuele ballon die van grootte 
veranderde en een virtueel vierkant dat van grootte of in kleur veranderde, in hun eigen 
lichaamsrepresentatie kunnen integreren, zoals de vragenlijst en SCR inderdaad aangaven. 
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Deze vondst laat zien dat voor de illusie opwekking de vrijwillige controleerbaarheid van een 
virtueel object belangrijker is dan de overeenkomst in voorkomen en suggereert dat alle 
objecten, onder bepaalde condities, van het lichaam deel kunnen lijken uit te maken, zoals 
voorspeld door de bottom-up verhandeling. Vorige studies hebben blijkbaar de plasticiteit van 
de lichaamsrepresentatie onderschat en teveel nadruk gelegd op de overeenkomst tussen 
bezichtigd object en eigen hand. 
Een interessante uitkomst is dat de eigenheid illusie overtuigender is als het virtuele 
object verbonden lijkt met het lichaam van de participant. Wanneer de virtuele ballon niet met 
het lichaam verbonden leek waren de subjectieve matn l ag, terwijl wanneer de ballon wel 
verbonden leek de subjectieve maten vergelijkbaar waren met die van de virtuele hand. Dit 
suggereert dat zelf-perceptie geregeerd wordt door Gestalt-wetten, zoals bekend van object 
perceptie, waar verbondenheid (als in de wet van nabijheid en de wet van continuïteit) een 
centrale aanwijzing is voor ervaren eenheid (behorend bij hetzelfde object of dezelfde 
gebeurtenis). Dit is ook consistent met eerdere uitkomsten van studies naar het eerste 
persoonsperspectief, waarin dit perspectief als noodzakelijk voor menselijke zelfbewustzijn 
geacht word.  
In Hoofdstuk 4 analyseren wij systematisch de relatie tussen actieve controle (RHI of 
VHI), visueel voorkomen van het virtuele object (virtuele hand of vierkant) en synchroniciteit 
(synchroon of asynchroon). Resultaten laten significante effecten zien van visueel voorkomen; 
hogere eigenheid scores voor de virtuele hand dan voor het vierkant, maar geen interactie 
tussen voorkomen en synchroniciteit. Dit suggereert dat het zien van een object dat 
overeenkomt met een lichaamsdeel de bijbehorende repr s ntatie kan activeren en dus top-
down ervaren eigenheid kan beïnvloeden, hiermee wordt de bereidheid om een object te 
incorporeren verhoogd. Om dit patroon te verklaren st llen wij voor dat zowel bottom-up als 
top-down informatie bijdragen aan de illusie, in ee compenserende en niet modulerende 
relatie. In andere woorden: als het virtuele object vrij door de participant gecontroleerd kan 
worden en er ook visueel-tactiel gestimuleerd wordt, dan wordt het visuele voorkomen 
belangrijker, zodat participanten het virtuele object alleen kunnen accepteren als eigen als het 
voorkomen vergelijkbaar is met een lichaamsdeel. Samengenomen, benadrukken deze 
uitkomsten bottom-up factoren, zonder exclusie van top-down factoren, maar ze zijn wel 
inconsistent met een strikt top-down lichaamsmodel (Hoofdstuk 3, 4, 5). Wij stellen: 
lichaamsrepresentaties zijn flexibeler dan gedacht. 
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Vergelijkbare resultaten komen er uit gedragsstudies  de link tussen 
actieherkenning en zelfherkenning onderzochten. Waarin de onderzoekers aantoonden dat 
participanten moeite hadden met onderscheid maken tussen de eigen hand en een andere hand 
als er geen beweging was. Echter als de twee handen disti ctief bewegingen maakten was de 
herkenning van de eigen hand bijna perfect. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken wij de vormbaarheid van het spatiale referentiekader. De 
flexibiliteit hiervan is niet volledig onderzocht, hoewel een aantal studies dit wel hebben 
bestudeerd als beperking van de RHI. Wij hebben een simpel ontwerp gebruikt: twee 
sequenties van twee statische VHI condities, waarin de virtuele hand niet bewogen kan 
worden, en drie verschillende posities van de virtuele hand. Het enige verschil tussen deze 
condities was dat de virtuele hand in verschillende posities geplaats werd. De virtuele hand in 
de eerdere sequentie condities kon of dichtbij of veraf geplaatst worden,  in de latere condities 
alleen in een tussenpositie. Als eerste, toonde onzresultaten aan dat in de eerdere condities 
de illusie sterker was dichtbij dan veraf, en in de lat re condities dat deze sterkte afhankelijk 
was van de positie in de eerdere condities. Dit suggereert dat het eerder opgeroepen 
referentiekader een verschillende sterkte illusie in en latere conditie opwekken. Dit toont aan 
dat de vormbaarheid van spatiale criteria zelf een beperking is in de flexibiliteit van 
lichaamsrepresentaties. 
7.3 Ervaren lichaamseigenheid en ervaren agentschap 
Ervaren eigenheid en ervaren agentschap worden gezien als dissocieerbare sensaties, 
met een sterke interactie in het opwekken van eigenheid illusies. Onderzoek naar de relatie 
tussen deze twee heeft inconsistente resultaten opgeleverd. Sommige studies laten een grotere 
ervaren eigenheid met een hogere ervaren agentschap zien, terwijl andere studies de 
tegenovergestelde relatie laten zien, en weer andere studies geen enkele correlatie tussen 
beiden. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 onderzoeken we de relatie tussen de ervaren eigenheid en 
agentschap. Omdat in de VHI de virtuele hand vrij kan worden bewogen, wat een sterk gevoel 
van agentschap oplevert, menen we dat dit een geschikter paradigma is om de bijdrage van 
ervaren eigenheid en agentschap te bestuderen dan de RHI is. We hebben de rol van actieve 
controle (actief/passief), visueel voorkomen van virtueel object (hand/rechthoek) en 
synchroniciteit (synchroon/asynchroon) geanalyseerd. In e passieve conditie (vergelijkbaar 
met de RHI) waren de participanten niet in staat de virtuele hand te bewegen en kregen 
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passief visueel-tactiele stimulatie. In de actieve conditie (equivalent aan de VHI) waren de 
participanten in staat de hand vrij te bewegen en een virtueel object aan te raken, waardoor ze 
visueel-tactiele stimulatie ontvingen. De resultaten li ten niet alleen een significant effect van 
controle zien (actief versus passief) maar ook een int ractie tussen controle en synchroniciteit. 
Dit wekt de indruk dat wanneer de mogelijkheid bestaat een virtuele effector actief te 
opereren (hiermee additionele efferente en re-afferent  informatie krijgend) niet alleen 
ervaren agentschap, maar ook ervaren eigenheid toeneemt en de eigenheid illusie vergroot. 
Om onze resultaten en andere elkaar tegensprekende studi s te verklaren stellen wij dat 
eerdere studies objectieve en subjectieve agentschap met elkaar verwarren. Subjectieve 
eigenheid en subjectieve agentschap zijn mogelijk beiden afhankelijk van objectieve 
agentschap, wat op zijn beurt weer afhankelijk is van een rijkere multimodale database. 
7.4 Verschillende maten, verschillende resultaten 
Vragenlijsten, proprioceptieve drift en SCR zijn de m est gebruikte meetmethoden 
voor de lichaamseigenheid illusie binnen RHI/VHI en wij hebben deze ook ingezet in onze 
studies (Hoofdstuk 2, 3, 4, 5). Van deze wordt de vragenlijst gezien als de meest expliciete, er 
wordt direct gevraagd aan participanten ervaren eigenheid, agentschap en andere gevoelens 
aan te geven, jegens de rubberen/virtuele hand. Hiernaast zijn ook objectieve meetmethoden 
noodzakelijk om strategieën en aanpassingen aan taakeisen te ontwijken. Echter, gegeven dat 
verwacht kan worden dat proprioceptieve drift optreedt, zelfs als er geen eigenheid illusie 
wordt gerapporteerd, baseren beide maten zich niet exact op dezelfde informatie. In hoofdstuk 
4 en 5, laten onze resultaten voor beide maten ook verschillende patronen zien, consistent met 
conclusies van eerdere studies.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 testen wij de hypothese dat ervaren lichaamseigenheid en affectieve 
reacties (als bepaald door de SCR) op lichaams-gerelat erde dreiging of impact niet dezelfde 
onderliggende processen weergeven. RHI studies hebben aangetoond dat de SCR omhooggaat 
wanneer de rubberen hand bedreigd wordt, omdat partici nten deze misvatten als hun eigen 
hand; neurowetenschappelijke vondsten daarentegen suggereren dat affectieve resonantie 
optreedt los van ervaren eigenheid. Wij ontworpen en vergeleken impact en dreiging condities. 
In de impact conditie lieten participanten een hogere SCR zien wanneer de eigenheid illusie 
optrad, in de synchrone conditie. In de dreiging conditie was de SCR onafhankelijk van 
synchroniciteit. Participanten lieten een hogere SCR zien zelfs als de hand niet als hun eigen 
werd beschouwd. Wij beargumenteren dat affectieve racties op impact top-down 
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geproduceerd worden, als de aangeraakte effector ver nd rsteld wordt deelt uit te maken van 
het eigen lichaam. Terwijl bedreigende gebeurteniss affectieve reacties direct bottom-up 
opwekken, onafhankelijk van eigenheid. 
Een andere interessante uitkomst is dat, in Hoofdstuk 3 en 4, er vergelijkbare 
synchroniciteit effecten gevonden zijn voor bijna alle vragenlijstitems, dit is zowel van 
methodologisch als theoretisch belang. Aan de ene ka t, an dit aangeven dat de vragenlijst 
gebruikt bij traditionele RHI aanpak niet zo goed werkt voor non-corporale virtuele objecten 
(Hoofdstuk 3). Aan de andere kant, kan dit meer dan een methodologische observatie zijn. 
Een mogelijkheid is dat statische manipulaties systematisch de effecten van synchroniciteit 
onderschatten, op alle zelf-perceptie aspecten, afgezien van de meest directe vragen naar 
eigenheid. Meer dynamische manipulaties kunnen mogelijk meer perceptuele dimensies 
merkbaar maken of benadrukken, wat dan weer leidt tot synchroniciteit effecten op alle items 
met betrekking tot alle aspecten van zelf-perceptie. In andere woorden, de bredere, minder 
selectieve effecten die wij systematisch observeerden laten een realistischer patroon zien. 
Deze mogelijkheid sluit aan bij het idee dat eigenheid en agentschap nader met elkaar 
verweven zijn dan tot nog toe aangenomen (Hoofdstuk 3, 4)  
7.5 Gezichtsbelichaming en stemming migratie 
In Hoofdstuk 6 reproduceren wij de enfacement illusie (EI) in een virtuele omgeving 
en demonstreren de virtuele enfacement illusie (VEI). In de VEI kunnen participanten hun 
eigen en het virtuele gezicht op het scherm vrij bewegen. Participanten kunnen ook met de 
eigen hand hun gezicht aanraken en zien dan tegelijkertijd het virtuele gezicht door een 
virtuele bal aangeraakt worden, deze volgt het traject van de hand. Participanten ontvangen zo 
meerdere stimulaties. Onze resultaten wijzen uit dat synchrone multi-sensorische stimulatie 
zelf-gezicht herkenning en interne gezichtsrepresentati s beïnvloeden, suggererend dat onze 
gezichtsgewaarwording niet een vaste representatie is, maar dynamisch onderhevig is aan 
multi-sensorische informatie. Expliciete subjectieve scores waren tamelijk laag, maar de 
vragenlijst en de inclusie-van-anderen-in-de-zelf-schaal (IOS) lieten beiden significante 
synchroniciteit effecten zien. Dit wijst uit dat deg zichtsillusie grotendeels impliciet, 
onbewust plaatsvind. Verder dat, alhoewel combinaties van motoractiviteit, proprioceptieve 
sensaties en visueel-tactiele stimulatie makkelijk de fenomenologische ervaring, dat de nep of 
virtuele hand bij het eigen lichaam hoort, kunnen opwekken, de ervaring dat een ander gezicht 
bij de representatie van het eigen lichaam hoort moeilijker is te verwerkelijken. Dit kan zijn 
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doordat faciale identiteit dicht bij de kern zit van ons gevoel van zelf. Deze representaties zijn 
derhalve minder ontvankelijk voor verandering.  
In Hoofdstuk 6 is ons tweede doel te onderzoeken of emotie expressies op het 
aanschouwde gezicht kunnen worden overgenomen door diegene die een belichaming 
daarvan ervaren. Deze hypothese was gebaseerd op de hoge sociale relevantie van een gezicht, 
meerdere EI studies laten zien dat belichaming de zelf-ander grens kan vervagen; overdracht 
van conformiteit, empathische kwaliteit, fysieke aantrekkelijkheid en ervaren fysieke 
overeenkomst tussen het andere en het eigen gezicht. 
Wij hebben twee verschillende emotie uitdrukkende gezichtsexpressies ontworpen, 
blij en neutraal, en tegelijkertijd synchrone en asynchrone multi-sensorische stimulatie 
toegepast, met vrije beweging in de VEI. Als voorspelt, wanneer een blij gezicht werd 
overgenomen als eigen namen participanten ook de uitg drukte emotie over, als aangegeven 
door hogere valentie scores en betere prestaties in een stemmingsgevoelige divergente 
denktaak. Dit wijst uit dat controle over een ander g zicht, met synchrone multi-sensorische 
stimulatie, uitnodigt om de stemming over te nemen va  een persoon waar mee 
geïdentificeerd wordt. 
Onze uitkomsten komen overeen met de Theory of Event Coding (TEC), de theorie 
van gebeurtenis encodering. die geen onderscheid maakt tussen sociale en niet-sociale 
gebeurtenissen en aanneemt dat gewaarwordingen en geproduceerde gebeurtenissen (zoals 
percepties en acties) gerepresenteerd worden in netwerken van kenmerkcodes (event files). 
Volgens de TEC slaan participanten de combinatie op van hun eigen gezicht en diens 
expressie samen op met die van het andere gezicht en diens expressie. De mogelijke 
vervaging van de zelf-ander discriminatie door belichaming kan er voor zorgen dat 
participanten beide expressies op kunnen halen zonder bewust te zijn bij wie de expressie 
behoorde. Aangezien het zien van de eigen expressie de emotionele staat die daarin wordt 
uitgedrukt kan opwekken, kan een verkeerd aangenome (externe) expressie de emotionele 
staat van de participant manipuleren en hun stemmingsgevoelige gedrag aanpassen. In andere 
woorden, met gezichtsbelichaming, worden de expressie kenmerken en de stemming 
behorende bij een andere persoons representatie gemgre rd naar de eigen representatie.  
Over het geheel genomen, leveren onze resultaten bewijs dat de grenzen tussen de 
ervaren zelf en de ervaren ander flexibel zijn. Metzelf-ander synchroniciteit als één factor die 
de striktheid van deze lijn bepaald, vieren hiervan lijkt de mogelijkheid tot stemming migratie 
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te geven, het spontaan overnemen van de emotie uitgedrukt door een persoon of agent 
waarmee wordt geïdentificeerd.  
7.6 Voorschouwing: implicaties van flexibiliteit van lichaamsrepresentatie 
De hoofdconclusie van deze dissertatie is dat, hoewel onze lichaamsrepresentatie tot 
een bepaald niveau stabiel is, deze ook erg flexibel is. Verscheidene studies met RHI, VHI en 
VEI paradigma, multi-sensorische stimulatie, vrije beweging en zelfs context (eerdere 
condities) zijn gebruikt om deze flexibiliteit te onderzoeken.  Als voorgesteld in Hoofdstuk 4, 
baseert ons lichaam zich op meerdere informatiebronnen om diens representatie continue 
geüpdatet te houden. Hieruit volgend, kan ervaren lichaamseigenheid leunen op meerdere 
informatieaspecten, met een onderlinge compensatoire en niet bijstellende rol, met name op 
de relatie tussen top-down en bottom-up informatie, vergelijkbaar met de ervaren agentschap.  
Ons op onze resultaten baserend, kunnen we hypothetiseren dat in sommige specifieke 
condities in een specifieke context, de lichaamseigenheid illusie veroorzaakt  wordt zelfs als 
er niet voldaan wordt aan algemeen geaccepteerde beperkingen. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer de 
virtuele hand niet de posturele kenmerken deelt met de echte hand; of de virtuele hand niet in 
de periferie is geplaatst; of dat meer gelaatstrekken van het virtuele gezicht geassimileerd 
kunnen worden. Verder, zal naast stemming ook andere informatie, zoals de leeftijd of zelfs 
geslacht overgenomen kunnen worden? Zal de participant zich meer gedragen naar deze 
karakteristieken? Het zou interessant zijn om de mate v n flexibiliteit van 
lichaamsrepresentaties gedetailleerd in kaart te brengen en te ontdekken wat de onwrikbare 
kern hiervan is. Als we zover komen is de verwachting dat er applicaties denkbaar zijn, 
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